JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: JOHNSON -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASCA 71
CORAM: OWEN JA
BUSS JA
MILLER JA
HEARD: 11 MARCH 2009
DELIVERED : 2 APRIL 2009
FILE NO/S: CACR 178 of 2008
BETWEEN: HERBERT BARRY JOHNSON
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :DEANE DCJ
File No :IND 890 of 2008
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Sudden or extraordinary emergency - Whether trial judge adequately put defence before jury - Whether defence open - Appellant charged with entering or being in the property of another without consent with intent to commit an offence therein - Appellant contending in his defence that he entered property when he heard that an associate was being attacked with an axe - Scope of defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency - Need for prosecution and trial judge to identify for jury offence the accused intends to commit
Legislation:
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 30(3), s 30(4)
Criminal Code (WA), s 24, s 25, s 31, s 70A, s 400, s 401(1)
Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act 2008 (WA), s 5
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 85, sch 1 div 2 cl 6(9)
Result:
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Conviction quashed
Retrial ordered
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr A E Eyers
Respondent: Mr B Fiannaca SC
Solicitors:
Appellant: Thames Legal
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
AK v The State of Western Australia [2008] HCA 8; (2008) 232 CLR 438
Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10
Brennan v The King (1936) 55 CLR 253
Cesan v The Queen [2008] HCA 52; (2008) 83 ALJR 43
CTM v The Queen [2008] HCA 25; (2008) 82 ALJR 978
Darkan v The Queen [2006] HCA 34; (2006) 227 CLR 373
Dudley v Ballantyne (1998) 28 MVR 209
Dunjey v Cross [2002] WASCA 14; (2002) 36 MVR 170
Gassy v The Queen [2008] HCA 18; (2008) 82 ALJR 838
Glennon v The Queen [1994] HCA 7; (1994) 179 CLR 1
Morgentaler v The Queen [1976] 1 SCR 616
Murray v The Queen [2002] HCA 26; (2002) 211 CLR 193
Nguyen v The Queen [2005] WASCA 22
Perka v The Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232
R v Borland (1907) 10 GLR 241
R v GV [2006] QCA 394
R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443
R v O'Meara [1943] NZLR 328
R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542
R v Smith [2005] QCA 1; [2005] 2 Qd R 69
R v Webb [1986] 2 Qd R 446
Stevens v The Queen [2005] HCA 65; (2005) 227 CLR 319
Sungravure Pty Ltd v Middle East Airlines Airliban SAL (1975) 134 CLR 1
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- Case
- [2009] WASCA 71
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the scope of the defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency under section 25 of the Criminal Code. The defence is not confined to the traditional common law elements of necessity but applies broadly to all offences. The court noted that the defence could be invoked in situations where the accused acted to avoid significant harm, even if the harm was not directly inflicted upon the accused. The court also considered the relevance of section 24 of the Criminal Code, which pertains to mistakes, as the appellant's actions appeared to be based on a mistaken belief that an attack was occurring. The critical issue was whether the appellant's belief, though mistaken, was honest and reasonable, and if so, whether this belief justified his actions under the circumstances.
The court concluded that the trial judge did not adequately explain the defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency to the jury, thereby failing to ensure that the defence was properly considered. The appellant's belief, albeit mistaken, was honest and reasonable, and the actions taken could be justified under the defence if properly presented. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a retrial to allow the jury to properly consider the defence in light of the correct legal principles.
The final orders of the court were that leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a retrial was ordered to ensure that the defence was correctly presented and considered by the jury.
Orders
Orders of the court
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Conviction quashed
Retrial ordered
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At least one of the modern English authorities has cast the defence of necessity in a slightly different light. In Re A (children) (conjoined twins): surgical separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961 Brooke LJ said, at 1051:[T]he existence of an emergency in the normal sense of the word is not an essential prerequisite for the application of the doctrine of necessity. The principle is one of necessity, not emergency. As authority for that proposition his Lordship cited, among others, Perka, at 273 ‑ 274 of the report cited earlier in these reasons. If that represents the common law defence of necessity as it stood when the Criminal Code was enacted, it does not fit happily with the heading to, and the plain wording of, s 25. In our opinion, s 25 of the Criminal Code, reflective though it is of the common law defence of necessity, is not constrained by or limited to the precise elements (whatever they may be) of the common law doctrine. There is nothing ambiguous about this section and it is to be construed according to its tenor. It is clear that, at common law, the defence of necessity is recognised only in specific circumstances. It has traditionally been unavailable as a defence to murder. The defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency contained within s 25 of the Criminal Code applies to all offences in the Criminal Code and in any other written law (Criminal Code s 3). The decided cases give a broad interpretation to the defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency contained within s 25 of the Criminal Code. The High Court has accepted that the defence is applicable not only where the act done was done in order to avoid 'certain consequences which have inflicted irreparable evil upon the accused' (Loughnan at 448), but also in circumstances where that evil may have been inflicted upon other persons generally and not just those whom the accused person was bound to protect (cf Stevens). The appellant said that he entered the premises at Shady Grove, Yangebup because he heard Kitson say, 'I've been hit in the head with an axe'. He said that he regarded the use of an axe as being dangerous or threatening and he entered the house 'quite fast', through a door which was open. He saw a gimpy in Rowland's hand, took it from him, and threw it to the corner of the room. The appellant thought that the gimpy was an axe. He then slapped Rowland on the head, picked up some scissors which he saw on floor and also threw those into the corner. The appellant then left by walking back out the door. On the version of the evidence most favourable to the appellant, the defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency under s 25 of the Criminal Code was open. Section 24 of the Criminal Code (mistake) was also relevant. This is because it is implicit from the appellant's evidence that, when he heard the words 'I've been hit on the head with an axe', he did something which was arguably done under an honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief in the existence of a state of things. Arguably, there was a belief that a friend had been hit on the head with an axe, which was something which was likely to have caused severe, if not life‑threatening, injury. The issue raised by the testimony of the appellant given in his defence was whether, under an arguably honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief that his friend had been hit in the head with an axe, his entry into the house was in circumstances of sudden or extraordinary emergency such that an ordinary person possessing ordinary power of self‑control could not reasonably be expected to act otherwise.