Johnson v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   JOHNSON -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASCA 71

CORAM:   OWEN JA

BUSS JA
MILLER JA

HEARD:   11 MARCH 2009

DELIVERED          :   2 APRIL 2009

FILE NO/S:   CACR 178 of 2008

BETWEEN:   HERBERT BARRY JOHNSON

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :DEANE DCJ

File No  :IND 890 of 2008

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Sudden or extraordinary emergency - Whether trial judge adequately put defence before jury - Whether defence open - Appellant charged with entering or being in the property of another without consent with intent to commit an offence therein - Appellant contending in his defence that he entered property when he heard that an associate was being attacked with an axe - Scope of defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency - Need for prosecution and trial judge to identify for jury offence the accused intends to commit

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 30(3), s 30(4)
Criminal Code (WA), s 24, s 25, s 31, s 70A, s 400, s 401(1)
Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act 2008 (WA), s 5
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 85, sch 1 div 2 cl 6(9)

Result:

Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Conviction quashed
Retrial ordered

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr A E Eyers

Respondent:     Mr B Fiannaca SC

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Thames Legal

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

AK v The State of Western Australia [2008] HCA 8; (2008) 232 CLR 438

Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10

Brennan v The King (1936) 55 CLR 253

Cesan v The Queen [2008] HCA 52; (2008) 83 ALJR 43

CTM v The Queen [2008] HCA 25; (2008) 82 ALJR 978

Darkan v The Queen [2006] HCA 34; (2006) 227 CLR 373

Dudley v Ballantyne (1998) 28 MVR 209

Dunjey v Cross [2002] WASCA 14; (2002) 36 MVR 170

Gassy v The Queen [2008] HCA 18; (2008) 82 ALJR 838

Glennon v The Queen [1994] HCA 7; (1994) 179 CLR 1

Morgentaler v The Queen [1976] 1 SCR 616

Murray v The Queen [2002] HCA 26; (2002) 211 CLR 193

Nguyen v The Queen [2005] WASCA 22

Perka v The Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232

R v Borland (1907) 10 GLR 241

R v GV [2006] QCA 394

R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443

R v O'Meara [1943] NZLR 328

R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542

R v Smith [2005] QCA 1; [2005] 2 Qd R 69

R v Webb [1986] 2 Qd R 446

Stevens v The Queen [2005] HCA 65; (2005) 227 CLR 319

Sungravure Pty Ltd v Middle East Airlines Airliban SAL (1975) 134 CLR 1

Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56

Weiss v The Queen [2005] HCA 81; (2005) 224…

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Details
Case
[2009] WASCA 71
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Johnson v The State of Western Australia, the appellant was convicted of entering property without consent with the intent to commit an offence. The appellant argued that he entered the property in response to hearing that his associate was being attacked with an axe, contending that this constituted a sudden or extraordinary emergency. The central legal issues were whether the trial judge correctly presented the defence to the jury and whether the defence was available in the circumstances presented.

The court examined the scope of the defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency under section 25 of the Criminal Code. The defence is not confined to the traditional common law elements of necessity but applies broadly to all offences. The court noted that the defence could be invoked in situations where the accused acted to avoid significant harm, even if the harm was not directly inflicted upon the accused. The court also considered the relevance of section 24 of the Criminal Code, which pertains to mistakes, as the appellant's actions appeared to be based on a mistaken belief that an attack was occurring. The critical issue was whether the appellant's belief, though mistaken, was honest and reasonable, and if so, whether this belief justified his actions under the circumstances.

The court concluded that the trial judge did not adequately explain the defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency to the jury, thereby failing to ensure that the defence was properly considered. The appellant's belief, albeit mistaken, was honest and reasonable, and the actions taken could be justified under the defence if properly presented. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a retrial to allow the jury to properly consider the defence in light of the correct legal principles.

The final orders of the court were that leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a retrial was ordered to ensure that the defence was correctly presented and considered by the jury.

Orders

Orders of the court

Leave to appeal granted

Appeal allowed

Conviction quashed

Retrial ordered

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At least one of the modern English authorities has cast the defence of necessity in a slightly different light. In Re A (children) (conjoined twins): surgical separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961 Brooke LJ said, at 1051:[T]he existence of an emergency in the normal sense of the word is not an essential prerequisite for the application of the doctrine of necessity. The principle is one of necessity, not emergency. As authority for that proposition his Lordship cited, among others, Perka, at 273 ‑ 274 of the report cited earlier in these reasons. If that represents the common law defence of necessity as it stood when the Criminal Code was enacted, it does not fit happily with the heading to, and the plain wording of, s 25. In our opinion, s 25 of the Criminal Code, reflective though it is of the common law defence of necessity, is not constrained by or limited to the precise elements (whatever they may be) of the common law doctrine. There is nothing ambiguous about this section and it is to be construed according to its tenor. It is clear that, at common law, the defence of necessity is recognised only in specific circumstances. It has traditionally been unavailable as a defence to murder. The defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency contained within s 25 of the Criminal Code applies to all offences in the Criminal Code and in any other written law (Criminal Code s 3). The decided cases give a broad interpretation to the defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency contained within s 25 of the Criminal Code. The High Court has accepted that the defence is applicable not only where the act done was done in order to avoid 'certain consequences which have inflicted irreparable evil upon the accused' (Loughnan at 448), but also in circumstances where that evil may have been inflicted upon other persons generally and not just those whom the accused person was bound to protect (cf Stevens). The appellant said that he entered the premises at Shady Grove, Yangebup because he heard Kitson say, 'I've been hit in the head with an axe'. He said that he regarded the use of an axe as being dangerous or threatening and he entered the house 'quite fast', through a door which was open. He saw a gimpy in Rowland's hand, took it from him, and threw it to the corner of the room. The appellant thought that the gimpy was an axe. He then slapped Rowland on the head, picked up some scissors which he saw on floor and also threw those into the corner. The appellant then left by walking back out the door. On the version of the evidence most favourable to the appellant, the defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency under s 25 of the Criminal Code was open. Section 24 of the Criminal Code (mistake) was also relevant. This is because it is implicit from the appellant's evidence that, when he heard the words 'I've been hit on the head with an axe', he did something which was arguably done under an honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief in the existence of a state of things. Arguably, there was a belief that a friend had been hit on the head with an axe, which was something which was likely to have caused severe, if not life‑threatening, injury. The issue raised by the testimony of the appellant given in his defence was whether, under an arguably honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief that his friend had been hit in the head with an axe, his entry into the house was in circumstances of sudden or extraordinary emergency such that an ordinary person possessing ordinary power of self‑control could not reasonably be expected to act otherwise.