Criminal Law—Issue estoppel—Distinguished from autrefois acquit and res judicata—Application to criminal proceedings—Trial for rape after acquittal of forcible abduction—Whether evidence tending to show guilt of abduction admissible—Direction to jury—Crimes Act 1958 (Vict.) ss. 62, 568 (1).
Decisions
Oct. 12. The following written judgments were delivered: - BARWICK C.J. The Court granted to the Crown in these proceedings special leave to appeal limited to grounds which would raise two questions: (a) whether the doctrine of issue estoppel is applicable in criminal proceedings; and (b) what are the limitations on its use in such proceedings. Consequently, the grounds of appeal assert error on the part of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Victoria in applying the doctrine of issue estoppel in the appeal of the respondents against their conviction for rape: and in holding that evidence relevant to the charge in the present proceedings was inadmissible because of the acquittal of the respondents on a former occasion of the offence of abduction of the prosecutrix. The evidence being relevant to that charge had been admitted before the jury which had acquitted the accused. (at p368)
2. The evidence so held to be inadmissible, the history of the proceedings and the relevant parts of the summing up may be found in the reasons for judgment of other Justices. I need only recite what, to my mind, are the facts essential to what I wish to say in dealing with the appeal. (at p368)
3. The elements of the offence of abduction were (a) the forcible taking away of a woman against her will and (b) a contemporaneous intent that she be carnally known. (at p369)
4. The evidence which was given in support of the indictment for abduction and which was repeated in the present proceedings for rape was in itself enough, if accepted, to establish that the prosecutrix was taken away from the waiting shed at the railway station against her will. Whether without the evidence of the subsequent rape it would have established a then present intention that the prosecutrix be carnally known by someone, not necessarily the accused, is to my mind a question. (at p369)
5. The sole defence to the charges of rape was consent on the part of the prosecutrix. Thus, the evidence of the circumstances in which the prosecutrix came into the company of the accused was clearly relevant. That the prosecutrix went with the accused unwillingly when first they met was not only relevant but of considerable moment to the Crown in seeking a conviction. I have carefully considered whether the evidence of the event in the waiting shed at Clifton Hill railway station was capable of limitation to some part account of the circumstances which did not assert that the prosecutrix went unwillingly under threat by the accused. I have come to the conclusion that the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
R v Storey [1978] HCA 39
Case
[1978] HCA 39
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *R v Storey* concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia following a conviction for conspiracy to defraud. The appellant, Storey, was charged with conspiring with others to defraud the Commonwealth by dishonestly obtaining financial assistance under the Commonwealth's export market development grants scheme. The central dispute revolved around the interpretation of the term "dishonestly" within the context of the conspiracy charge and the evidence presented to establish the appellant's intent.
The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge had adequately directed the jury on the meaning of "dishonestly" in relation to the conspiracy charge. Specifically, the court considered whether the jury should have been instructed that dishonesty, in this context, required proof of conduct that was morally reprehensible or that departed from the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people. Further, the court had to assess whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the appellant had the necessary dishonest intent to defraud the Commonwealth.
The High Court, in its joint judgment, clarified that for the purposes of a conspiracy to defraud, dishonesty does not require proof of conduct that is morally reprehensible. Instead, it requires proof that the accused acted dishonestly according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people. The court found that the trial judge's directions on dishonesty were sufficient, and that the evidence, when viewed in its totality, supported the jury's verdict. The jury was entitled to infer from the appellant's actions and the surrounding circumstances that he possessed the requisite dishonest intent.
The appeal was dismissed, with the High Court upholding the conviction.