OF A. Tort -Third party-Contribution or indemnity-Action by plaintiff against defendant
for damages for personal injury-Joinder of third party-Prior action in District Court arising out of same accident-Action by third party against defendant for damages for negligence-Contributory negligence-Judgment for third party April 24. 26,
- Res judicata-Issue estoppelPractice-La Reform Miscellaneous Pro- visions) Act 1946 (N.S.W.) (No. 33 of 1946), 8. 5 (1) (c).
W. brought an action in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against J. for damages for personal injury arising out of a collision between J.'s motor cycle, on which he was a passenger, and a car owned and driven by one G. Prior to this action G. had brought an action in the District Court against J. for damage to his car, alleging that the damage was caused by J.'s negligence, and recovered a verdict. In the Supreme Court proceedings, J. joined G. as a third party alleging that G. by negligence had materially contributed to the collision and claimed under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (N.S.W.) to be entitled to recover either contribution or a complete indemnity from him in respect of any verdict which W. might recover. In a plea, G. alleged, inter alia, that (i) the District Court found that he was not guilty of any contributory negligence and that J. was guilty of negligence which caused damage to him and (ii) that the present cause of action was the same as that which he claimed against J. in the District Court and that the negligence alleged against him by J. was the same supposed negligence which J. alleged against him in the District Court. J. demurred to the plea.
Held, by Latham C.J., McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ., that the proceedings in the District Court did not determine whether there was any
breach by G. of a duty which he owed to W., therefore the decision in that court did not estop J. from alleging that G. was guilty of a breach of duty
Per Fullagar J. (dissenting): The plea should be taken to mean (1) that the proceedings in the District Court determined an issue of fact as between G. &J., viz., the issue whether G. had at the time and place in question exercised reasonable care in driving his motor car, (2) that that issue was raised again upon the third party claim by J. against G., and (3) that there was an estoppel as to that issue. This was a good plea. The fact that the
Res judicata and issue estoppel, discussed. Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court): White V. Jackson Goldsmith (Third Party), (1949) 67 W.N. (N.S.W.) 49, reversed.
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
In an action brought by him in the Supreme Court of New South Wales Roger Bede Douglas White sued Alfred Albert Jackson for the sum of…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Jackson v Goldsmith [1950] HCA 22
Case
[1950] HCA 22
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In an action before the High Court of Australia, Roger Bede Douglas White sued Alfred Albert Jackson for damages for personal injury sustained as a passenger on Jackson's motor cycle, which collided with a car driven by Vernon Lance Goldsmith. Jackson subsequently joined Goldsmith as a third party, seeking contribution or indemnity under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (N.S.W.) on the grounds that Goldsmith's negligence materially contributed to the collision. Goldsmith pleaded, inter alia, that a prior District Court action, where Goldsmith had sued Jackson for damage to his car arising from the same collision, had determined that Goldsmith was not guilty of contributory negligence and that Jackson's negligence caused the damage. Goldsmith argued that this prior judgment estopped Jackson from alleging his liability in the current proceedings. Jackson demurred to this plea.
The legal issues before the High Court were whether the prior District Court judgment, which found Jackson negligent and Goldsmith not guilty of contributory negligence in an action concerning damage to Goldsmith's car, operated as a bar to Jackson's claim for contribution or indemnity from Goldsmith in the Supreme Court action concerning White's personal injuries. Specifically, the court had to determine if the issues decided in the District Court were identical to the issues raised in the third-party claim, and if so, whether this gave rise to an estoppel preventing Jackson from pursuing his claim.
A majority of the High Court, comprising Latham C.J., McTiernan, Williams, and Webb JJ., held that the District Court proceedings did not determine whether Goldsmith had breached a duty of care owed to White. The prior judgment only established that Goldsmith was not contributorily negligent in relation to the damage to his own vehicle, which was a different issue from whether his driving caused or contributed to White's injuries. Therefore, the decision in the District Court did not estop Jackson from alleging that Goldsmith was guilty of a breach of duty owed to White. Fullagar J., dissenting, considered that the District Court judgment did determine the issue of Goldsmith's reasonable care in driving, which was raised again in the third-party claim, and thus constituted a good plea of issue estoppel.
The High Court allowed the appeal, reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The court ordered that judgment on the demurrer be entered for the defendant Jackson, meaning Goldsmith's plea of estoppel was overruled.