Parker v Garry Crick’s (Nambour) Pty Ltd & Anor

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Parker v Garry Crick’s (Nambour) Pty Ltd & Anor [2024] QDC 20

PARTIES:

PHILIP JOSEPH PARKER

(appellant)

v

GARRY CRICK’S (NAMBOUR) PTY LTD
A.C.N. 069 267 081
(first respondent)

and

AUTOPACT PTY LTD A.C.N. 608 040 606

(second respondent)

FILE NO:

Appeal No.

 41/23

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court, Cairns

DELIVERED ON:

23 January 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Cairns

HEARING DATE:

21 November 2023

JUDGE:

Morzone KC DCJ

ORDER:

1.   Appeal dismissed.

2.   Unless either party applies for, or the parties otherwise agree to, a different costs order within 14 days of this judgment, the appellant will pay the costs of the respondents of the appeal to be assessed on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – ISSUE ESTOPPEL – stay of proceedings – claim for damages for breach of employment contract after determination of unfair dismissal application by Fair Work Commission's – whether the learned magistrate erroneously applied the doctrine of issue estoppel to proceedings of the Fair Work Commission – whether the learned magistrate erred by relying upon Leggett v Hawkesbury Race Club (No 1) as an analogue – whether appellant entitled to continue his proceeding for damages occasioned by loss of financial accreditation due to notice of termination – whether viable claim for damages for breach of his employment contract. 

LEGISLATION:

District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld)

CASES:

Addis v Gramaphone Co [1909] AC 488

Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea v Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353
Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172
Blair & Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Curran (Adams’ Will) (1939) 62 CLR 464
Brewer v Brewer (1953) 88 CLR 1
Cashman v Brown (2011) 242 CLR 647
Civil Air Operations Officers Association of Australia v Airservices Australia [2020] FCA 1665
Egri v DRG Australia Ltd (1988) 19 NSWLR 600
Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446
Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363
Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Harbord (1997) 69 SASR 75
Murphy v Abi-Saab (1995) 37 NSWLR 280
Parker v Garry Crick's (Nambour) Pty Ltd [2018] FWCFB 279
Queensland v Commonwealth (Second Territory Senators’ case) (1977) 139 CLR 585
Russell v The Trustees of Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney (2008) 72 NSWLR 559
Thompson v Cavalier King Charles Rescue (Qld) Inc [2020] QSC 34

Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531

COUNSEL:

AJ Smith for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Appellant self-represented

Aitken Legal for the respondent

Summary

  1. The appellant appeals from an order of the Magistrates Court in Cairns made on 11 July 2023 to permanently stay his proceeding seeking damages for breach of his employment contract.

  2. The appellant now appeals this decision relying on two grounds: firstly, that the learned magistrate erroneously applied the doctrine of issue estoppel to proceedings of the Fair Work Commission, and secondly, the learned magistrate erred by relying upon Leggett v Hawkesbury Race Club (No 1) as an analogue.  He asserts…

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Details
Case
[2024] QDC 20
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Parker v Garry Crick’s (Nambour) Pty Ltd & Anor, the appellant, Parker, sought to challenge the decision of the Fair Work Commission which had determined his dismissal as unfair. Parker argued that the decision of the Fair Work Commission should not preclude him from pursuing a claim for damages in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) for loss of financial accreditation due to the notice of termination. The legal issues before the court were whether the learned magistrate had erroneously applied the doctrine of issue estoppel to the proceedings of the Fair Work Commission, and whether the learned magistrate had erred by relying upon the case of Leggett v Hawkesbury Race Club (No 1) as an analogue. The court was required to determine whether Parker was entitled to continue his proceeding for damages occasioned by loss of financial accreditation due to notice of termination and whether there was a viable claim for damages for breach of his employment contract.

The court examined the decision of the Fair Work Commission and found that it met the criteria of a final judicial judgment. The determination made by the Fair Work Commission had all the indicia of being a requisite final judicial judgment, including that the matter was formally adjudicated by the commission having considered and decided the necessary issues as part of its determination of unfair dismissal. Both parties had the opportunity to present evidence and arguments on the issue, and the decision was based on the presented evidence and legal arguments. The decision included findings of fact or law relevant to and essential for the determination of the appellant’s termination constituted unfair dismissal. The decision was final and conclusive, and was not subjected to further review or appeal. The decision on the relevant issues was clear and unambiguous, and there was an accurate and full record of the proceedings. The court concluded that the decision of the Fair Work Commission was a final judicial judgment for these purposes.

The court then considered whether the same question or issue had been decided in the earlier proceedings before the Fair Work Commission. It held that for the doctrine of issue estoppel to apply, the issue ruled upon by the commission must have been indispensable or fundamental to the ultimate decision in that case. A practical test of whether a finding is fundamental is to ask whether it is possible to appeal against the finding. The estoppel may arise from a finding expressed in negative terms. For matters of fact, issue estoppel is confined to the ultimate facts that form the ingredients in the cause of action, but there is no estoppel as to evidentiary facts found in the course of determining the affirmative or negative of an issue. Accordingly, there is nothing to prevent a party from tendering in a later proceeding, in relation to a particular issue, facts negatived in an earlier proceeding when they were tendered in relation to a different issue. The court found that the issue of whether Parker’s dismissal was unfair had been indispensable or fundamental to the ultimate decision in the Fair Work Commission proceedings. Therefore, the doctrine of issue estoppel applied, and Parker was precluded from pursuing his claim for damages in QCAT.

ORDERS:
1. Appeal dismissed.
2. Unless either party applies for, or the parties otherwise agree to, a different costs order within 14 days of this judgment, the appellant will pay the costs of the respondents of the appeal to be assessed on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. Unless either party applies for, or the parties otherwise agree to, a different costs order within 14 days of this judgment, the appellant will pay the costs of the respondents of the appeal to be assessed on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

There is no dispute here that the parties or their privies are the same in both proceedings.Is the decision of the Fair Work Commission a final judicial judgment? Like the doctrine of res judicata, the commission’s decision must be characterised as a final judgment of a competent tribunal making a judicial, as distinct from an administrative, decision.[10] The commission must have possessed jurisdiction to decide the issue(s) conclusively between the parties and for all purposes and not merely incidentally and for a limited purpose.[11][10] Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea v Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353 at 451. [11] Cashman v Brown (2011) 242 CLR 647 at [40] per French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ agreeing); Blair & Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Curran (Adams’ Will) (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 531-532 per Dixon J. Cf Civil Air Operations Officers Association of Australia v Airservices Australia [2020] FCA 1665. I readily conclude that the decision of the Fair Work Commission is a final judicial judgment for these purposes. The determination made by the Fair Work Commission has all the indicia of being a requisite final judicial judgment, including that the matter was formally adjudicated by the commission having considered and decided the necessary issues as part of its determination of unfair dismissal; both parties had the opportunity to present evidence[12] and arguments on the issue, and the decision was based on the presented evidence and legal arguments; the decision included findings of fact or law relevant to and essential for the determination of the appellant’s termination constituted unfair dismissal; the decision was final and conclusive,[13] and was not subjected to further review or appeal;[14] the decision on the relevant issues is clear and unambiguous, and absent any uncertainty or ambiguity regarding the resolution of the matter; the decision reflects a proper application of the law to the facts of the case, consistent with established legal principles and precedent; and there is an accurate and full record of the proceedings comprising the transcripts and determination that demonstrate the court's hearing and determination of the matter.[12] Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 590.[13] Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 387(a) and 392.[14] Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 604.Was the same question or issue decided? Consideration of this question involves an examination of the record, including the reasons for the judgment, of the commission. The issue in this proceeding must be precisely the same as that decided in the earlier commission proceedings.[15] However, unlike res judicata, the plea of issue estoppel may succeed although the causes of action in the two cases (eg. statutory compensation for unfair dismissal and damages for breach of contract) are different.[16] It is not enough that the issue was raised in the former commission proceedings, or even that it made a finding upon it; rather the doctrine of issue estoppel will only apply if the issue ruled upon by the commission was indispensable or fundamental to the ultimate decision in that case.[17] A practical test of whether a finding is fundamental is to ask whether it is possible to appeal against the finding.[18] The estoppel may arise from a finding expressed in negative terms.[19] Relevantly here, for matters of fact, issue estoppel is confined to the ultimate facts that form the ingredients in the cause of action,[20] but there is no estoppel as to evidentiary facts found in the course of determining the affirmative or negative of an issue.[21] Accordingly, there is nothing to prevent a party from tendering in a later proceeding, in relation to a particular issue, facts negatived in an earlier proceeding when they were tendered in relation to a different issue.[22][15] Blair & Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Curran (Adams’ Will) (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532; Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 at 466.[16] Blair & Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Curran (Adams’ Will) (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532; Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 at 460.[17] Blair & Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Curran (Adams’ Will) (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 531-522.[18] CfMurphy v Abi-Saab (1995) 37 NSWLR 280 at 288 per Gleeson CJ.[19] CfEgri v DRG Australia Ltd (1988) 19 NSWLR 600 at 604 per McHugh JA, at 608 per Clarke JA; Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Harbord (1997) 69 SASR 75 at 95 per Doyle CJ.[20] Blair & Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Curran (Adams’ Will) (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532.[21] Blair & Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Curran (Adams’ Will) (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532-3 per Dixon J; Brewer v Brewer (1953) 88 CLR 1 at 15 per Fullagar J (Dixon J agreeing).[22] Brewer v Brewer (1953) 88 CLR 1 at 15 per Fullagar J.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established