Lynch v Commissioner of Police

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Lynch v Commissioner of Police [2022] QCA 166

PARTIES:

LYNCH, Debra Leigh
(applicant)
v
COMMISIONER OF POLICE
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 251 of 2021
DC No 20 of 2020

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Beenleigh – [2021] QDC 213 (Chowdhury DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

2 September 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

11 August 2022

JUDGES:

Morrison and Bond JJA and Beech AJA

ORDER:

Application for leave to appeal is refused.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW - DEFENCES – Defence of 'sudden or extraordinary emergency' under s 25 of the Criminal Code (Qld) – Appeal against conviction for six drug-related offences – Where appellant used cannabis for over 30 years to alleviate physical and psychological pain – Where appellant relied solely on defence of 'extraordinary emergency' – Where previous Queensland Court of Appeal decision held that 'extraordinary emergency' has temporal requirement – Whether previous Queensland Court of Appeal decision was wrongly decided insofar as it imposed temporal requirement – Whether previous decision erred in failing to follow decision of Western Australian Court of Appeal concerning the meaning of 'sudden or extraordinary emergency' in s 10.3 of the Criminal Code (Cth) – Whether judge erred in holding that defence of extraordinary emergency did not apply to appellant's circumstances – Where appeal not an appeal by way of rehearing – Whether appellable error of a kind available in the present appeal demonstrated in the making of various factual findings which led to rejection of defence of extraordinary emergency

Criminal Code (Qld), s 25
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 118, s 119

Babaniaris v Lutony Fashions Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 1; [1987] HCA 19, cited
Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245; [1990] HCA 9, cited
R v Dimitropoulos (2020) 282 A Crim R 402; [2020] QCA 75, cited
R v Lacey; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2009) 197 A Crim R 399; [2009] QCA 274, cited
Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority (2008) 233 CLR 259; [2008] HCA 5, cited
Warnakulasuriya v The Queen (2012) 261 FLR 260; [2012] WASCA 10, cited

COUNSEL:

M Horvath and S F Lamb for the applicant
C W Wallis for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Brighton Langley Law for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

  1. MORRISON JA:  I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Beech AJA. I agree with those reasons and with the order proposed by his Honour.

  2. BOND JA:  I agree with the reasons for judgment of Beech AJA and with the order proposed by his Honour.

  3. BEECH AJA:  The appellant was convicted in the Magistrates Court of six drug‑related offences against the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) (DMA), including possession and production of cannabis and possession of associated drug paraphernalia. At trial, she admitted the primary facts and defended the charges on the ground…

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Details
Case
[2022] QCA 166
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Lynch v Commissioner of Police involved the appellant, Ms Lynch, who was convicted of six drug-related offences. Ms Lynch appealed against her conviction, arguing that she had a valid defence under section 25 of the Criminal Code (Qld), which pertains to the defence of 'sudden or extraordinary emergency'. Ms Lynch claimed that she had used cannabis for over 30 years to alleviate physical and psychological pain and that her actions were driven by an extraordinary emergency. The Queensland Court of Appeal had previously ruled that the defence of 'extraordinary emergency' has a temporal requirement, a decision that Ms Lynch argued was incorrect and had misapplied the law.

The legal issues before the court included whether the previous decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal was wrongly decided in imposing a temporal requirement on the defence of 'extraordinary emergency', and whether the court in Dimitropoulos had erred in failing to follow the decisions of the Western Australian Court of Appeal concerning the interpretation of 'sudden or extraordinary emergency' in section 10.3 of the Criminal Code (Cth). Additionally, the court had to determine if the trial judge erred in concluding that the defence of extraordinary emergency did not apply to Ms Lynch's circumstances. The appeal was not an appeal by way of rehearing, and the court had to ascertain whether any appellable error was demonstrated in the trial judge's factual findings that led to the rejection of the defence of extraordinary emergency.

The court reasoned that judicial decisions from other jurisdictions could guide the interpretation of similar legislation but could not control the meaning of legislation within its own jurisdiction. The court found that the previous decision in Dimitropoulos, while not binding, was a correct interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. The court also held that there was no error in the trial judge's findings, which led to the rejection of the defence of extraordinary emergency. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was refused.

No further orders were made beyond the refusal of the application for leave to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application for leave to appeal is refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 129(1)(d) of the DMA makes special provision as to onus of proof:“(1)In respect of a charge against a person of having committed an offence defined in part 2—…(d)the operation of the Criminal Code, section 24 is excluded unless that person shows an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of any state of things material to the charge; …”The magistrate’s decision After summarising the evidence at trial and referring to relevant legal principles, the magistrate made the following observations of the appellant:[5]“Her issues are many, varied and complex, and Ms Lynch gave evidence that without cannabis she would have killed herself as a result of the pain and psychological symptoms she suffered. Ms Lynch said she first used cannabis in a medicinal sense from October 2014, however, she said she had smoked cannabis from 1988. She used it then, she said, to calm anxiety and address social difficulties. At that point she was aged 28 years. She is now 60 years of age and she admitted to using cannabis still. It is clear from her evidence that Ms Lynch has used cannabis then for at least 32 years. Whether the use of the drug is purported to be for medicinal purposes or habitual or recreational purposes Ms Lynch produced cannabis, possessed cannabis, and possessed items associated with those offences.There is a scheme by which people in Queensland are able to be prescribed medicinal cannabis and thereby lawfully possess products which contain it. That scheme is underpinned by legislation. There is limited evidence before me of the scheme. Ms Lynch said she believed her conditions qualified for such prescription from May 2016, when the law was changed. Dr Lotz spoke of the scheme not being available at the time of the offences, which contradicts this. In any event I can only assume the scheme tightly controls the production of cannabis, the manufacturing of cannabis products, the prescription of it and its distribution. No doubt it is overseen by experts in the field of those areas, including medical specialists and psychiatrists. It does not contemplate an untrained person self-prescribing toxic substances for various medical and/or psychiatric conditions.”[5]Primary reasons at [64]. The magistrate identified the critical issue as whether the appellant had a defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency under s 25 of the Code, or an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief of an emergency under s 24. The magistrate referred to [62], [63], [66] and [67] of Dimitropoulos. The magistrate found similarities between the appellant’s situation and that of Mr Dimitropoulos, including that the appellant had other options available to her, apart from using cannabis illegally, such as moving to New South Wales. The magistrate considered that the appellant’s evidence about being denied medical cannabis prescriptions was vague and unsubstantiated, referring to the absence of supporting documents and of detail as to timing. Both the appellant and Mr Dimitropoulos used cannabis for anxiety and to manage mental health issues, as well as for pain relief. Both the appellant and Mr Dimitropoulos mixed cannabis with other medication.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Certainly, judicial decisions on similar or identical legislation in other jurisdictions can be said to be guides to the meaning of legislation in this Court’s jurisdiction.[89] In Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority,[90] Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ referred with approval to a statement of McHugh J in Marshall v Director-General, Department of Transport[91] concerning the construction of a statutory expression - injuriously affecting - which appeared in legislation in various jurisdictions, but to which differing interpretations had been given. Their Honours in Walker observed:[92]“The caution required in construing modern Australian legislation by reference to ‘principles’ derived in this way is indicated by McHugh J in Marshall v Director‑General, Department of Transport [(2001) 205 CLR 603 at 632-633 [62]]. That case concerned the expression ‘injuriously affecting’ as it appeared in s 20 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Q); ss 49 and 63 of the 1845 Act had used the same phrase as had the subsequent legislation in various jurisdictions. Differing interpretations had been given to the expression in question. McHugh J noted the similarity in the terms of the legislation and went on [(2001) 205 CLR 603 at 632-633 [62]]:‘But that does not mean that the courts of Queensland, when construing the legislation of that State, should slavishly follow judicial decisions of the courts of another jurisdiction in respect of similar or even identical legislation. The duty of courts, when construing legislation, is to give effect to the purpose of the legislation. The primary guide to understanding that purpose is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words of the legislation. Judicial decisions on similar or identical legislation in other jurisdictions are guides to, but cannot control, the meaning of legislation in the court’s jurisdiction. Judicial decisions are not substitutes for the text of legislation although, by reason of the doctrine of precedent and the hierarchical nature of our court system, particular courts may be bound to apply the decision of a particular court as to the meaning of legislation.’”[89]Cain at [21].[90](2008) 233 CLR 259; [2008] HCA 5 at [31].[91](2001) 205 CLR 603 at [62].[92]Walker at [31]. Thus, the Western Australian decisions were by no means binding or controlling for the Court in Dimitropoulos. The appellant’s submission[93] that the decision in Dimitropoulos is per incuriam because it did not refer to the Western Australian decisions is, consequently, misplaced. So too, the appellant’s submission that Dimitropoulos is ‘in direct conflict’ with Warnakulasuriya.[94] The appellant’s submission that the Western Australian decisions are to be treated as earlier decisions which the Court in Dimitropoulos should have followed in accordance with the principles stated in Telstra Corp Ltd v Treloar as summarised in [68] above is equally misplaced.[95] A decision of a court of another State in construing different legislation does not engage the principle stated in Telstra Corp Ltd v Treloar, or like principles. But those principles apply to and govern the question of whether this Court should depart from the construction of s 25 adopted in Dimitropoulos. I turn to that question.Ground 1: disposition – should this Court depart from its decision in Dimitropoulos?[93]Applicant’s outline of submissions at [27]-[29].[94]Applicant’s outline of submissions at [23].[95]Applicant’s outline of submissions at [31]-[32].