SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Lynch v Commissioner of Police [2022] QCA 166
PARTIES:
LYNCH, Debra Leigh
(applicant)
v
COMMISIONER OF POLICE
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
CA No 251 of 2021
DC No 20 of 2020DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Beenleigh – [2021] QDC 213 (Chowdhury DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
2 September 2022
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
11 August 2022
JUDGES:
Morrison and Bond JJA and Beech AJA
ORDER:
Application for leave to appeal is refused.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW - DEFENCES – Defence of 'sudden or extraordinary emergency' under s 25 of the Criminal Code (Qld) – Appeal against conviction for six drug-related offences – Where appellant used cannabis for over 30 years to alleviate physical and psychological pain – Where appellant relied solely on defence of 'extraordinary emergency' – Where previous Queensland Court of Appeal decision held that 'extraordinary emergency' has temporal requirement – Whether previous Queensland Court of Appeal decision was wrongly decided insofar as it imposed temporal requirement – Whether previous decision erred in failing to follow decision of Western Australian Court of Appeal concerning the meaning of 'sudden or extraordinary emergency' in s 10.3 of the Criminal Code (Cth) – Whether judge erred in holding that defence of extraordinary emergency did not apply to appellant's circumstances – Where appeal not an appeal by way of rehearing – Whether appellable error of a kind available in the present appeal demonstrated in the making of various factual findings which led to rejection of defence of extraordinary emergency
Criminal Code (Qld), s 25
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 118, s 119Babaniaris v Lutony Fashions Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 1; [1987] HCA 19, cited
Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245; [1990] HCA 9, cited
R v Dimitropoulos (2020) 282 A Crim R 402; [2020] QCA 75, cited
R v Lacey; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2009) 197 A Crim R 399; [2009] QCA 274, cited
Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority (2008) 233 CLR 259; [2008] HCA 5, cited
Warnakulasuriya v The Queen (2012) 261 FLR 260; [2012] WASCA 10, citedCOUNSEL:
M Horvath and S F Lamb for the applicant
C W Wallis for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Brighton Langley Law for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
MORRISON JA: I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Beech AJA. I agree with those reasons and with the order proposed by his Honour.
BOND JA: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Beech AJA and with the order proposed by his Honour.
BEECH AJA: The appellant was convicted in the Magistrates Court of six drug‑related offences against the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) (DMA), including possession and production of cannabis and possession of associated drug paraphernalia. At trial, she admitted the primary facts and defended the charges on the ground…
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- Case
- [2022] QCA 166
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the previous decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal was wrongly decided in imposing a temporal requirement on the defence of 'extraordinary emergency', and whether the court in Dimitropoulos had erred in failing to follow the decisions of the Western Australian Court of Appeal concerning the interpretation of 'sudden or extraordinary emergency' in section 10.3 of the Criminal Code (Cth). Additionally, the court had to determine if the trial judge erred in concluding that the defence of extraordinary emergency did not apply to Ms Lynch's circumstances. The appeal was not an appeal by way of rehearing, and the court had to ascertain whether any appellable error was demonstrated in the trial judge's factual findings that led to the rejection of the defence of extraordinary emergency.
The court reasoned that judicial decisions from other jurisdictions could guide the interpretation of similar legislation but could not control the meaning of legislation within its own jurisdiction. The court found that the previous decision in Dimitropoulos, while not binding, was a correct interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. The court also held that there was no error in the trial judge's findings, which led to the rejection of the defence of extraordinary emergency. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was refused.
No further orders were made beyond the refusal of the application for leave to appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application for leave to appeal is refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Certainly, judicial decisions on similar or identical legislation in other jurisdictions can be said to be guides to the meaning of legislation in this Court’s jurisdiction.[89] In Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority,[90] Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ referred with approval to a statement of McHugh J in Marshall v Director-General, Department of Transport[91] concerning the construction of a statutory expression - injuriously affecting - which appeared in legislation in various jurisdictions, but to which differing interpretations had been given. Their Honours in Walker observed:[92]“The caution required in construing modern Australian legislation by reference to ‘principles’ derived in this way is indicated by McHugh J in Marshall v Director‑General, Department of Transport [(2001) 205 CLR 603 at 632-633 [62]]. That case concerned the expression ‘injuriously affecting’ as it appeared in s 20 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Q); ss 49 and 63 of the 1845 Act had used the same phrase as had the subsequent legislation in various jurisdictions. Differing interpretations had been given to the expression in question. McHugh J noted the similarity in the terms of the legislation and went on [(2001) 205 CLR 603 at 632-633 [62]]:‘But that does not mean that the courts of Queensland, when construing the legislation of that State, should slavishly follow judicial decisions of the courts of another jurisdiction in respect of similar or even identical legislation. The duty of courts, when construing legislation, is to give effect to the purpose of the legislation. The primary guide to understanding that purpose is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words of the legislation. Judicial decisions on similar or identical legislation in other jurisdictions are guides to, but cannot control, the meaning of legislation in the court’s jurisdiction. Judicial decisions are not substitutes for the text of legislation although, by reason of the doctrine of precedent and the hierarchical nature of our court system, particular courts may be bound to apply the decision of a particular court as to the meaning of legislation.’”[89]Cain at [21].[90](2008) 233 CLR 259; [2008] HCA 5 at [31].[91](2001) 205 CLR 603 at [62].[92]Walker at [31]. Thus, the Western Australian decisions were by no means binding or controlling for the Court in Dimitropoulos. The appellant’s submission[93] that the decision in Dimitropoulos is per incuriam because it did not refer to the Western Australian decisions is, consequently, misplaced. So too, the appellant’s submission that Dimitropoulos is ‘in direct conflict’ with Warnakulasuriya.[94] The appellant’s submission that the Western Australian decisions are to be treated as earlier decisions which the Court in Dimitropoulos should have followed in accordance with the principles stated in Telstra Corp Ltd v Treloar as summarised in [68] above is equally misplaced.[95] A decision of a court of another State in construing different legislation does not engage the principle stated in Telstra Corp Ltd v Treloar, or like principles. But those principles apply to and govern the question of whether this Court should depart from the construction of s 25 adopted in Dimitropoulos. I turn to that question.Ground 1: disposition – should this Court depart from its decision in Dimitropoulos?[93]Applicant’s outline of submissions at [27]-[29].[94]Applicant’s outline of submissions at [23].[95]Applicant’s outline of submissions at [31]-[32].