FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Thayananthan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 831
MIGRATION – refugees – protection visa – application – questions concerning claims for refugee status not answered on application form – statement later forwarded to Department of Immigration & Multicultural Affairs setting out claims – statement received before delegate determined application – delegate considered application and refused to grant protection visa – Tribunal affirmed decision of delegate – whether original application was valid – whether Tribunal’s decision was within Tribunal’s jurisdiction or was authorised by Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether delegate’s decision was authorised by Act.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth): ss 47, 65, 69, 411, 412, 476(1) (b) & (c)
Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 100 FCR 495 followed
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595 referred to
Li Wen Han v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 421 referred toCHELLIAH DAVID THAYANANTHAN, SATHYA JEEVAMALAR THAYANANTHAN, MARLIN MADURA THAYANANTHAN AND SABEENA DAYANI THAYANANTHAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V 1042 OF 2000
MOORE, TAMBERLIN AND GOLDBERG JJ
4 JULY 2001
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 1042 OF 2000
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
CHELLIAH DAVID THAYANANTHAN, SATHYA JEEVAMALAR THAYANANTHAN, MARLIN MADURA THAYANANTHAN AND SABEENA DAYANI THAYANANTHAN
APPELLANTSAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
MOORE, TAMBERLIN AND GOLDBERG JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
4 JULY 2001
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellants pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V1042 OF 2000
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
CHELLIAH DAVID THAYANANTHAN, SATHYA JEEVAMALAR THAYANANTHAN, MARLIN MADURA THAYANANTHAN AND SABEENA DAYANI THAYANANTHAN
APPELLANTSAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
MOORE, TAMBERLIN AND GOLDBERG JJ
DATE:
4 JULY 2001
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
Introduction
This is an appeal from a single judge of the Court who dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on 6 January 1999. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Minister”) not to grant protection visas to the appellants. Only one ground of appeal has been pressed by the appellants, which raises an issue about the status of an application for a protection visa, submitted to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Department”) in particular circumstances containing three elements. The first was that the application was initially made without the applicant setting out any specific claims in the application form which might have established that Australia owed the applicant protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status…
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- Case
- [2001] FCA 831
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the relevant provisions of the Migration Act and the regulations, which required a valid application to be lodged with the Department. The appellants argued that their initial application was invalid as it did not provide sufficient information to be considered complete. They relied on the case of Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 100 FCR 495, where a Full Court had previously considered a similar issue. In Yilmaz, the Full Court held that the application, which left critical questions unanswered, was not valid. However, the court in the present case found itself bound by the decision in Yilmaz and concluded that the appellants' application was valid.
The court further considered the Minister's undertaking that if the Court found the original decision to be invalid, the Minister would treat the original applications as nullities and not rely on section 48A to bar new applications by the appellants. This undertaking was made to facilitate the resolution of all issues the appellants wished to raise. The court ultimately dismissed the appeal, holding that the primary judge's decision was correct, and ordered the appellants to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
His Honour expressed the view that earlier decisions such as Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd have no bearing on the question of whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction in the present matter because those decisions involved review within a different statutory context, one that did not include a provision akin to s 65 which, in Marshall J’s view, made consideration of a valid application an express condition of making a decision to grant or refuse to grant a visa.Consideration of the appeal It is necessary to emphasise, at the outset, the importance of Full Courts of this Court as intermediate courts of appeal adopting a consistent approach when interpreting legislation. It was a matter recently discussed by a Full Court in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595. Branson and Finkelstein JJ said (at pars 26 to 28):“Speaking generally, appellate courts accept that they should act with caution before reviewing an earlier decision: see, for example, Clutha Developments Pty Ltd v Barry (1989) 18 NSWLR 86 at 99-101. Courts have said it may be done if the earlier decision is ‘manifestly wrong’ or ‘clearly erroneous’, or if ‘strong reasons’ are shown, or if the ‘maintenance [of the earlier authority] is contrary to the public interest’: see the examples given by Aickin J in Queensland v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 585 at 620ff; see also Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan (1999) 95 FCR 553 at 560. But, apart from suggesting caution, the cases provide little real guidance as to the circumstances in which it will be appropriate to review an earlier decision.The problem is very real when what is at issue is the construction of a statute. For one thing, statutory language is often ambiguous. Courts can struggle to determine the legislative intent. It is often impossible to discover any legislative intent. In many instances the generality of the statutory language is deliberate and allows the courts to develop a body of law to fill the gaps. This may lead to disagreement among judges about what the statute means. It would be sound policy that once that intent has been discerned by an appellate court then that should be the end of the matter. The view which we prefer is that unless an error in construction is patent, or has produced unintended and perhaps irrational consequences not foreseen by the court that created the precedent, the first decision should stand. In other areas of the law a precedent may be reconsidered if its underlying reasoning is outdated or is inconsistent with other legal developments. Perhaps, with some modification, in some instances these factors could also be applied to cases concerned with the construction of statutes. Accordingly, we venture to suggest it would be on a rare occasion that an intermediate appellate court (contrast the position of the High Court, as to which see Babaniaris v Lutony Fashions Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 1) will allow an issue concerning the construction of a statute, past and closed and especially a repealed statute, to be thrown open, producing as it clearly will, uncertainty, disruption to the conduct of affairs, a sense of grievance in those who may consequently receive treatment less favourable than that received by others under the same statute and additional cost and expense.”