Thayananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Thayananthan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 831

MIGRATION – refugees – protection visa – application – questions concerning claims for refugee status not answered on application form – statement later forwarded to Department of Immigration & Multicultural Affairs setting out claims – statement received before delegate determined application – delegate considered application and refused to grant protection visa – Tribunal affirmed decision of delegate – whether original application was valid – whether Tribunal’s decision was within Tribunal’s jurisdiction or was authorised by Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether delegate’s decision was authorised by Act.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth): ss 47, 65, 69, 411, 412, 476(1) (b) & (c)

Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 100 FCR 495 followed
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595 referred to
Li Wen Han v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 421 referred to

CHELLIAH DAVID THAYANANTHAN, SATHYA JEEVAMALAR THAYANANTHAN, MARLIN MADURA THAYANANTHAN AND SABEENA DAYANI THAYANANTHAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

V 1042 OF 2000

MOORE, TAMBERLIN AND GOLDBERG JJ

4 JULY 2001
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 1042 OF 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

CHELLIAH DAVID THAYANANTHAN, SATHYA JEEVAMALAR THAYANANTHAN, MARLIN MADURA THAYANANTHAN AND SABEENA DAYANI THAYANANTHAN
APPELLANTS

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

MOORE, TAMBERLIN AND GOLDBERG JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

4 JULY 2001

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V1042 OF 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

CHELLIAH DAVID THAYANANTHAN, SATHYA JEEVAMALAR THAYANANTHAN, MARLIN MADURA THAYANANTHAN AND SABEENA DAYANI THAYANANTHAN
APPELLANTS

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

MOORE, TAMBERLIN AND GOLDBERG JJ

DATE:

4 JULY 2001

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from a single judge of the Court who dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on 6 January 1999.  The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Minister”) not to grant protection visas to the appellants.  Only one ground of appeal has been pressed by the appellants, which raises an issue about the status of an application for a protection visa, submitted to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Department”) in particular circumstances containing three elements.  The first was that the application was initially made without the applicant setting out any specific claims in the application form which might have established that Australia owed the applicant protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 831
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Thayananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs was heard by the court, where the appellants, a family of ethnic Tamils from Sri Lanka, sought to challenge the validity of their protection visa applications lodged with the Department of Immigration. The appellants aimed to avoid the operation of section 48A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which prevents individuals from making new protection visa applications if they have previously done so. The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether the original applications were invalid and, if so, whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review an invalid application. The court also had to consider if the Minister's delegate could make a decision on an invalid application, and if such a decision could be reviewed by the Tribunal.

The court examined the relevant provisions of the Migration Act and the regulations, which required a valid application to be lodged with the Department. The appellants argued that their initial application was invalid as it did not provide sufficient information to be considered complete. They relied on the case of Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 100 FCR 495, where a Full Court had previously considered a similar issue. In Yilmaz, the Full Court held that the application, which left critical questions unanswered, was not valid. However, the court in the present case found itself bound by the decision in Yilmaz and concluded that the appellants' application was valid.

The court further considered the Minister's undertaking that if the Court found the original decision to be invalid, the Minister would treat the original applications as nullities and not rely on section 48A to bar new applications by the appellants. This undertaking was made to facilitate the resolution of all issues the appellants wished to raise. The court ultimately dismissed the appeal, holding that the primary judge's decision was correct, and ordered the appellants to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The apparent purpose of the appellants in maintaining this appeal is to obtain a ruling that the applications lodged by them were and remained invalid applications, with the ultimate objective of avoiding the operation of s 48A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) which, subject to s 48B, precludes a person from making an application for a protection visa if the person has previously made such an application. During the hearing of the appeal, a question arose about the power of the Court to grant the relief sought by the appellants, namely orders setting aside both the decision of the Tribunal and the delegate. In the result, senior counsel for the Minister undertook that, if the Court was to hold that the original decision was invalid, the Minister would, consistently with that statement of the law, treat the original applications as nullities and would not rely on s 48A to bar new applications by the appellants. The undertaking was proffered to facilitate the resolution of all issues the appellants wished to raise.Background The first and second appellants are husband and wife and the remaining appellants are their children. The appellants are ethnic Tamils and nationals of Sri Lanka. The first appellant applied for a protection visa by lodging an application form dated 25 November 1996. It is not in issue that the form was lodged on that day. Applications were also made by the other appellants as members of a family unit which were dependent on the application of the first appellant. It is convenient, from this point, generally to treat the first appellant’s application as if it is the only application in issue in the appeal. All the questions in the application form lodged by the first appellant which were designed to ascertain the basis of his claim to be a refugee and whether he was entitled to a protection visa, were answered with the phrase: “See statement to be forwarded”. In a statutory declaration dated 5 February 1997 the first appellant claimed that in Sri Lanka he had been detained on several occasions and beaten by reason of his political opinion, real or imputed, because he had been approached for aid by members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”). Precisely when the declaration was received by the Department is not clear, but it is not in issue that its contents were before the primary decision maker, the Minister’s delegate, and that it was received by the Department some time shortly after 6 February 1997. On 13 June 1997 the delegate refused the first appellant’s application for a protection visa. The appellants sought review of that decision by the Tribunal. On 6 January 1999 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse to grant the protection visa. The primary judge rejected the argument now advanced on appeal that the first appellant’s application for a protection visa was invalid and that, as a consequence, the decision of the Tribunal was also invalid as the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make it. The primary judge concluded that the issue had been determined by the Full Court in Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 100 FCR 495 (“Yilmaz”) and he considered himself bound to find that the first appellant’s application for a protection visa was valid. As will be apparent shortly, the notion of an application being required to be a valid application derives from the language of the Act: see, in particular, s 47(3).The Act and Regulations

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellants invite the Court to decide two matters. If the first appellant’s application for a protection visa was an invalid application when it was first lodged with the Department whether, having regard to the regulatory regime which governed the lodgement and consideration of visa applications, it was capable of becoming a valid application by reason of the supplementary information later furnished to the Department. The second was that assuming it did not become a valid application, whether there could have been a decision by the Minister’s delegate enlivening the Tribunal’s powers of review and the related question whether any decision of the Tribunal in respect of an invalid application was a decision the Tribunal had jurisdiction to make. The decision of the Full Court in Yilmaz The combined operation of the legislative provisions referred to earlier was considered by a Full Court in Yilmaz, in a similar, although not identical, factual context. In that matter, an application for a protection visa was lodged with the Department but the following critical questions in the application form were left unanswered, except for the phrase “statement to follow”:- why did you leave that country?- what do you fear may happen to you if you go back to that country?- who do you think may harm/mistreat you if you go back?- why do you think they will harm/mistreat you if you go back?-do you think the authorities of that country can and will protect you if you go back? If not, why not? In that matter a statement, as foreshadowed in the original application, was forwarded to the Department but it was not received until five days after a decision had been made by the Minister’s delegate to refuse Mr Yilmaz’s application for a protection visa. However, Mr Yilmaz sought review of the delegate’s decision by the Tribunal, which considered the application and, in doing so, had the statement that Mr Yilmaz had provided. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant a protection visa to Mr Yilmaz. Mr Yilmaz then unsuccessfully sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in this Court. On appeal, a Full Court considered the consequences of Mr Yilmaz’s application having been made and considered by the delegate and the Tribunal in the way it was. Each member of the Full Court accepted Mr Yilmaz’s application, as initially submitted, was not a valid application. However the members of the Full Court were divided on the question of whether the invalid application was capable of later becoming a valid application. Spender J indicated that an application of the type submitted by Mr Yilmaz was “inchoate”. His Honour continued (at pars 19 to 21):“The duty of a delegate of the Minister is not to consider it: s 47(3) of the Act.If, before the making of the decision of the delegate, the promised information is supplied, in my opinion the amalgam of the original document with the claims foreshadowed in it, and the document expressing the claims that had been foreshadowed, constitutes a valid application, and the delegate is to exercise the powers referred to in s 65 of the Act in relation to it.As a matter of common sense, it seems to me that an application based on grounds which are said to be ‘to follow’ is not complete until those grounds have been supplied.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

His Honour expressed the view that earlier decisions such as Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd have no bearing on the question of whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction in the present matter because those decisions involved review within a different statutory context, one that did not include a provision akin to s 65 which, in Marshall J’s view, made consideration of a valid application an express condition of making a decision to grant or refuse to grant a visa.Consideration of the appeal It is necessary to emphasise, at the outset, the importance of Full Courts of this Court as intermediate courts of appeal adopting a consistent approach when interpreting legislation. It was a matter recently discussed by a Full Court in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595. Branson and Finkelstein JJ said (at pars 26 to 28):“Speaking generally, appellate courts accept that they should act with caution before reviewing an earlier decision: see, for example, Clutha Developments Pty Ltd v Barry (1989) 18 NSWLR 86 at 99-101. Courts have said it may be done if the earlier decision is ‘manifestly wrong’ or ‘clearly erroneous’, or if ‘strong reasons’ are shown, or if the ‘maintenance [of the earlier authority] is contrary to the public interest’: see the examples given by Aickin J in Queensland v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 585 at 620ff; see also Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan (1999) 95 FCR 553 at 560. But, apart from suggesting caution, the cases provide little real guidance as to the circumstances in which it will be appropriate to review an earlier decision.The problem is very real when what is at issue is the construction of a statute. For one thing, statutory language is often ambiguous. Courts can struggle to determine the legislative intent. It is often impossible to discover any legislative intent. In many instances the generality of the statutory language is deliberate and allows the courts to develop a body of law to fill the gaps. This may lead to disagreement among judges about what the statute means. It would be sound policy that once that intent has been discerned by an appellate court then that should be the end of the matter. The view which we prefer is that unless an error in construction is patent, or has produced unintended and perhaps irrational consequences not foreseen by the court that created the precedent, the first decision should stand. In other areas of the law a precedent may be reconsidered if its underlying reasoning is outdated or is inconsistent with other legal developments. Perhaps, with some modification, in some instances these factors could also be applied to cases concerned with the construction of statutes. Accordingly, we venture to suggest it would be on a rare occasion that an intermediate appellate court (contrast the position of the High Court, as to which see Babaniaris v Lutony Fashions Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 1) will allow an issue concerning the construction of a statute, past and closed and especially a repealed statute, to be thrown open, producing as it clearly will, uncertainty, disruption to the conduct of affairs, a sense of grievance in those who may consequently receive treatment less favourable than that received by others under the same statute and additional cost and expense.”