Zubair v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Zubair v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCAFC 248

MIGRATION – student visa – invalid cancellation of visa by the Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs – whether an invalid decision is ‘no decision at all’ – whether merits review can be undertaken on an invalid decision – the role of the Migration Review Tribunal in reviewing decisions

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – whether full merits review cures the defects in the original decision

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 41, 116, 119, 120, 121, 337, 338, 347, 348(1), 349
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.43

Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424 cited
Calvin v Carr [1980] AC 574 referred to
Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143 cited
Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 24 ALR 307 applied
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 cited
Jadwan Pty Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Aged Care (2003) 204 ALR 55 applied
Minister of Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 applied
NAEB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 79 cited
NAHV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 214 cited
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 cited
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 cited
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Alvaro (1994) 50 FCR 213 applied
Thayananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 297 applied
Twist v Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106 cited
Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 100 FCR 495 applied

ALI ZUBAIR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

N 1699 of 2003

FINN, MANSFIELD & GYLES JJ
3 SEPTEMBER 2004
ADELAIDE (HEARD IN SYDNEY)

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1699 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT

BETWEEN:

ALI ZUBAIR
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

FINN, MANSFIELD & GYLES JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

3 SEPTEMBER 2004

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE (HEARD IN SYDNEY)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. 

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1699 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT

BETWEEN:

ALI ZUBAIR
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

FINN, MANSFIELD & GYLES JJ

DATE:

3 SEPTEMBER 2004

PLACE:

ADELAIDE (HEARD IN SYDNEY)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant seeks to set aside a decision of a Federal Magistrate given on 13 October 2003.  The learned Magistrate declined to set aside a decision of a delegate of the respondent, or a decision…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCAFC 248
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Zubair v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, the respondent, the Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, sought to cancel the visa of the appellant, a non-citizen who was in the migration zone at the time of the cancellation. The appellant challenged the decision, arguing that the decision of the delegate was 'no decision at all' and therefore the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to review it. The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal had the power to review the decision of the delegate of the respondent to cancel the visa, and whether the Tribunal was obliged to review the decision.

The court held that the decision of the delegate of the respondent to cancel the visa was a 'MRT-reviewable decision' within the meaning of s 338 of the Act, and the Tribunal was not only entitled to, but obliged to, review it. The court found that the Act provides for a full merits review by the Tribunal of decisions which may be brought to it, and that the Tribunal has the power to exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred by the Act on the person who made the decision. The court held that the review process applicable to the Tribunal is a full merits review, and that the Tribunal is given powers under s 349 to exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred by the Act on the person who made the decision. The court also held that the Tribunal is obliged to review the decision of the delegate of the respondent to cancel the visa, even if the delegate may, or arguably, have failed to comply with a procedural requirement imposed by the Act, or in some other way may, or arguably, have committed an error of law either in determining the applicable law or in applying the law.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. The court held that the Tribunal had the power and obligation to review the decision of the delegate of the respondent to cancel the visa, and that the Tribunal had fully reviewed the decision on the merits. The court found that the Tribunal had exercised its power to review the decision in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and that there was no error of law in the Tribunal’s decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The expression ‘an MRT-reviewable decision’ is defined in s 337 to have the meaning given in Div 2 of Pt 5 of the Act. Division 2 principally contains s 338. It relevantly provides:‘(1) A decision is an MRT-reviewable decision if this section so provides, unless:(a)the Minister has issued a conclusive certificate under section 339 in relation to the decision; or(b)the decision is an RRT-reviewable decision; or(c)the decision is to refuse to grant, or to cancel, a temporary safe haven visa.…(3)A decision to cancel a visa held by a non-citizen who is in the migration zone at the time of the cancellation is a MRT-reviewable decision unless the decision:(a)is covered by subsection (4); or(b)is made at a time when the non-citizen was in immigration clearance; or(c)was made under subsection 134(1), (3A) or (4) or section 501.’It is not suggested that any of the provisos in ss 338(1) or (3) are relevant to the present circumstances. In our view, the clear words of s 338 indicate that the decision of the delegate of the respondent to cancel the visa was an ‘MRT-reviewable decision’ and the Tribunal was not only entitled to, but obliged to, review it. The expression ‘decision’ is not otherwise defined in the Act. There is no textual suggestion that the expression ‘MRT-reviewable decision’ should be restricted in some way so as to refer only to decisions which have been made by a delegate of the respondent after full compliance with the mandatory procedural prescriptions of ss 119 – 121 (in the case of the cancellation of a visa) or other procedural prescriptions applicable to other forms of MRT- reviewable decisions. There is no qualification upon the use of the word ‘decision’ requiring it to be a ‘decision under the Act’: cf Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476; [2003] HCA 2. In particular, there is nothing in Pt 5 of the Act which would suggest that the Tribunal does not have the power or obligation to review a decision properly brought before it (see s 347) where the delegate of the respondent may, or may arguably, have failed to comply with a procedural requirement imposed by the Act, or in some other way may, or may arguably, have committed an error of law either in determining the applicable law or in applying the law. There is no reason why the Act, which provides for a full merits review by the Tribunal of decisions which may be brought to it, should impose upon the Tribunal the task of culling out those decisions which may involve jurisdictional error on the part of the original decision-maker. That would impose an unnecessary additional complexity upon the merits review process. Moreover, it may expose the Tribunal’s decision as to the existence of a valid delegate’s decision (a jurisdictional fact on the appellant’s argument) to review by a Court even where (as here) the Tribunal has fully reviewed the decision on the merits. Administrative convenience strongly points to an alternative conclusion to that urged by senior counsel for the appellant. The review process applicable to the Tribunal is a full merits review. As with review under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act), the Tribunal is given powers under s 349 to exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred by the Act on the person who made the decision. It may affirm the decision, vary it, or remit the matter for reconsideration with directions or recommendations, or may set aside the decision and substitute a new decision. The only limit upon its power is that it may not, by varying or setting aside a decision and substituting a new decision, make a decision that is not authorised by the Act or the regulations (s 349(4)). That is similar to the review powers of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT): see AAT Act, s 43. In that context it has been held that the review by the AAT is available even though the decision-maker at first instance may have made a decision which is legally ineffective: see e.g. Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143 at [38] – [39].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Subsequently, the Tribunal received a typed schedule from Su-Shi World showing the appellant’s earnings, his hours worked, his hourly rate, and his ‘performance incentive’. His weekly hours worked showed he worked between nine and 20 hours per week over the period in issue, generally towards the upper range. The ‘performance incentive’ was a significant component of his earnings. No reference was made to any training period, or to the need to have worked longer hours during training. The Tribunal sought details of the performance incentive scheme, including how the incentive is notified to employees and how it is calculated. Su-Shi World responded:‘Our production manager and internal financial manager caculate [sic] performance index recording to employee’s additional and better performance compare [sic] to other normal employee [sic] or our standard work performance. Performance Index was calculated depends [sic] on various things such as extra number of sushi trays achieved by employee, extra number of packed big rolls, extra number of tray with cutted [sic] big rolls etc.’It did not identify any document recording the scheme, or any records as to how the performance of individual employees were maintained or the calculation of the incentive payments, or any document provided to employees explaining the system.CONSIDERATIONDid the Tribunal have power to review the delegate’s decision? The conclusions of the learned Magistrate, referred to in [19] above are not challenged by the respondent on this appeal. It is argued (grounds of appeal 2.2 and 2.4) that as the decision of the delegate was ‘no decision at all’ the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the review application. It could only do so where there is a valid decision of the delegate of the respondent. In support of that contention, the appellant relies upon the decision of the High Court in Minister of Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597; [2002] HCA 11 (Bhardwaj). Bhardwaj concerned the validity of a further hearing of a review application by the Tribunal, after it had heard and apparently determined the application for review adversely to the appellant for the visa. The Tribunal apparently accepted that it had erred in proceeding to make its first decision, as it had overlooked or had not had brought to its attention certain information provided to it by the appellant as to his inability to attend a scheduled hearing. The Court by majority (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ, Kirby J dissenting) determined that the Tribunal had the power to make the second decision. Gleeson CJ so decided on the basis that the Act manifested an intention to permit reconsideration of the review application in the circumstances, Gaudron and Gummow JJ (with whom McHugh and Hayne JJ agreed) found that the Tribunal’s first decision was not a ‘decision on review’ under the Act because the Tribunal had not conducted the review as required by the Act. It had failed to give the then respondent a reasonable opportunity to present argument and evidence as required by the Act. Consequently, their Honours said at 614, [51]:‘There is, in our view, no reason in principle why the general law should treat administrative decisions involving jurisdictional error as binding or having legal effect unless and until set aside. A decision that involves jurisdictional error is a decision that lacks legal foundation and is properly regarded, in law, as no decision at all. Further, there is a certain illogicality in the notion that, although a decision involves jurisdictional error, the law requires that, until the decision is set aside, the rights of the individual to whom the decision relates are or, perhaps, are deemed to be other than as recognised by the law that will be applied if and when the decision is challenged. A fortiori in a case in which the decision in question exceeds constitutional power or infringes a constitution prohibition.’