FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sirajuddin v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 116
Appeal from: Sirajuddin v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 703 File number(s): NSD 410 of 2020 Judgment of: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 22 February 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review – application for student visa – appeal against decision of Primary Judge to uphold decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where Tribunal found it lacked jurisdiction to review decision of Delegate of the Minister to refuse student visa – where application to Tribunal brought more than 21 days after notification of Delegate’s decision – whether leave granted to rely on new appeal grounds – whether Tribunal had jurisdiction to review Delegate’s decision
HELD: appeal dismissed – leave to rely on new grounds not granted – Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review Delegate’s decision
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 347(1)(b)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.10; sch 2 cl 500.214(3)
Cases cited: Al Titi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2018] FCA 239
Beni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 228
Fahme v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 41; (2019) 268 FCR 394
Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 324; (2000) 97 FCR 407
Herath v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2018] FCA 1273
Monga v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 286
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 264 CLR 217
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588
Zubair v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 248; (2004) 139 FCR
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 20 Date of hearing: 17 February 2023 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant was self-represented with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the First
Respondent:Mr N Swan Solicitor for the First respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted to any order, save as to
costsORDERS
NSD 410 of 2020 BETWEEN: MOHAMMED SIRAJUDDIN
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINSTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
22 FEBRUARY 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The first respondent’s title be updated to remove the words ‘migrant services’.
2.The appeal is dismissed.
3.The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM J
The appellant is a citizen of India born in December 1988. On 7 June 2017, he applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (subclass 500) visa. On 26 July 2017, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration refused to grant the appellant the visa…
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 116
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles for granting leave to rely on new grounds of appeal, emphasising that such leave should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so. The court noted that the practice of raising new arguments on appeal, particularly in migration matters, is not encouraged unless there is a clear justification for the delay and the proposed grounds have merit. The court found that the proposed grounds did not have sufficient merit to warrant the grant of leave, and the Minister opposed the grant of leave on the basis that there was no adequate explanation for the failure to raise the points at the AAT level.
In dismissing the appeal, the court affirmed the AAT's finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Minister's decision as the applicant had not lodged his application within the prescribed 21-day period. The court concluded that there was no error in the primary judge's decision to uphold the AAT's decision, and no error was alleged in the primary judge's reasons. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the costs of the appeal be paid by the applicant. The Minister's title was also updated to remove the words "migrant services".
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The first respondent’s title be updated to remove the words ‘migrant services’.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
3. The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For the reasons below, leave is refused and the appeal is dismissed.Consideration The relevant principles for the grant of leave to rely on new grounds of appeal are well established and are summarised in VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588 at [46]–[48], where the Full Court said:[46] In our view, the application for leave to rely upon the sole ground of appeal now raised should be refused. Leave to argue a ground of appeal not raised before the primary judge should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so: O’Brien v Komesaroff [1982] HCA 33; (1982) 150 CLR 310; H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; and Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1833; (2001) 117 FCR 424 at [20]-[24] and [38].[47] In Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1, Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ observed, in their joint judgment, at 7:It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish.[48] The practice of raising arguments for the first time before the Full Court has been particularly prevalent in appeals relating to migration matters. The Court may grant leave if some point that was not taken below, but which clearly has merit, is advanced, and there is no real prejudice to the respondent in permitting it to be agitated. Where, however, there is no adequate explanation for the failure to take the point, and it seems to be of doubtful merit, leave should generally be refused. In our view, the proposed ground of appeal has no merit. There is no justification, therefore, for permitting it to be raised for the first time before this Court. The first respondent opposed leave being granted on either ground, noting that no leave had been sought and there had been no explanation by the appellant as to why he should be permitted to run a new case on appeal. The first respondent did not suggest that it would be prejudiced by the new grounds, but submitted that in any event, the two grounds lacked sufficient merit to warrant the grant of leave. In the circumstances, whether leave is granted turns on the merit of the proposed grounds. The first respondent’s submission is accepted. Before addressing the grounds, it is appropriate to refer to the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal noted that the delegate’s decision to refuse the visa was contained within a letter that was emailed to the appellant, at his last nominated email address, on 26 July 2017. Further, the letter contained clear advice that the appellant was deemed to have received the letter on the date it was emailed and had a 21 day time limit to lodge any application for review. The Tribunal was satisfied that the appellant was lawfully notified of the decision in accordance with relevant statutory requirements. The Tribunal found that the prescribed period within which any review application could be made expired on 16 August 2017. Accordingly, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the application.