Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 55 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2000] FCA 906

MIGRATION – refugees – protection visa – appeal against decision of primary judge dismissing application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – where initial application for protection visa did not comply with statutory requirements – whether Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) have the effect that the application must be perfectly complete when lodged and that any deficiencies cannot be cured during merits review by Refugee Review Tribunal – the words “a valid application for a visa” in s 65 of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) do not form part of the conditions of exercise of power

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – administrative decision – whether application seeking and receiving full merits review cures initial defects

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 29, 31, 36, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 54, 55, 65, 69, 411, 412, 415, 417, 420, 430
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.03, 2.04, 2.07, 886.21, 886.22

Secretary, Department of Social Security v Alvaro (1994) 50 FCR 213 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v A (1999) 168 ALR 594 discussed
Phanouvong v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1489 applied
Li Wen Han v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 421 disapproved
Kundu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 560 disapproved

Nie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 347 referred to

Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 2 ALD 1 applied

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v A [2000] FCA 108 referred to
Calvin v Carr [1980] AC 574 cited

The King v Hickinan;  ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 7 CLR 598 cited
McDougall v Warringah Shire Council (1993) 30 NSWLR 258 cited

Wu v Minister for Immigration (1994) 48 FCR 294 cited
Twist v Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106 cited
R v Marks;  Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees & Builders Labourers Federation (1981) 147 CLR 471 cited
Queensland Newsagents Federation Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1993) 46 FCR 38 cited
Preston v Carmody (1993) 44 FCR 1 cited

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Thiyagarajah (2000) 169 ALR 515 cited

Meyers v Casey (1913) 17 CLR 90 cited

MUZAFFER YILMAZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V 494 of 1999

SPENDER, MARSHALL AND GYLES JJ
MELBOURNE
14 JULY 2000


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 494 of 1999

BETWEEN:

MUZAFFER YILMAZ
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SPENDER, MARSHALL & GYLES JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

14 JULY 2000

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 494 of 1999

BETWEEN:

MUZAFFER YILMAZ
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SPENDER, MARSHALL & GYLES JJ

DATE:

14 JULY…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2000] FCA 906
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved an appeal against the dismissal of an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicant, Mr Yilmaz, a Turkish citizen of Kurdish ethnicity and an Alevi Muslim, had entered Australia on a temporary business visa and applied for a protection visa. His application was incomplete at the time of submission, and the delegate of the respondent refused his application, primarily due to the lack of claims advanced. The Refugee Review Tribunal upheld the delegate's decision, and Mr Yilmaz subsequently sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. The primary Judge dismissed Mr Yilmaz's application for review, and the appeal focused on the consequences of accepting that the primary application was invalid.

The legal issues addressed in the case pertained to the interpretation of the Migration Act 1958, specifically sections 40 and 65, and the Migration Regulations 1994. The court considered whether the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs was required to consider a valid application for a visa before making a decision to grant or refuse it, and whether an incomplete application could be cured later. Furthermore, the court examined the consequences of the delegate's purported refusal of the visa on the merits, rather than declining to consider the application as it stood.

The court held that the words "after considering a valid application for a visa" in section 65 of the Act were an assumption upon which the section proceeded, and not part of the conditions of exercise of the power. The court found that the Minister was obliged not to consider an application on the merits if it was not a valid application. The court also found that, if the statutory declaration had been received prior to the delegate's decision, it would have either completed the application or cured the defect, whichever was the correct analysis. In the circumstances of the case, the court held that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from the judgment of a single Judge of the Court (“the primary Judge”) in which the application of the appellant, Mr Yilmaz, for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“RRT”), was dismissed by the primary Judge.Background Mr Yilmaz is a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. He is of Kurdish ethnicity and is an Alevi Muslim. He entered Australia on 7 July 1997 on a temporary business visa which was valid until 3 August 1997. Mr Yilmaz applied to the respondent’s department for a protection visa. His application was made under the cover of a letter from Victoria Legal Aid (“VLA”) dated 6 August 1997. In the application form completed by or on behalf of Mr Yilmaz the response “STATEMENT TO FOLLOW” was supplied in relation to the following questions concerning Mr Yilmaz and Turkey:· Why did you leave that country?· What do you fear may happen to you if you go back to that country?· Who do you think may harm/mistreat you if you go back?· Why do you think they will harm/mistreat you if you go back?· Do you think the authorities of that country can and will protect you if you go back? If not, why not? On 13 October 1997 Mr Yilmaz made a statutory declaration. The declaration provided answers to the questions raised in the application form. It was provided to the respondent’s department by VLA under the cover of a letter dated 15 October 1997 but was not received until 20 October 1997. In the meantime, also on 15 October 1997, a delegate of the respondent purported to refuse Mr Yilmaz’s application for a protection visa, chiefly having regard to the lack of claims advanced in his application. Under the cover of a letter dated 22 October 1997 from VLA, Mr Yilmaz applied for a review of the decision of the delegate by the RRT. In its decision dated 20 October 1998 the RRT decided that it was not satisfied that Mr Yilmaz was a refugee. The RRT affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant a protection visa to Mr Yilmaz. Mr Yilmaz applied to the Court to review the decision of the RRT. On 5 August 1999 the primary Judge dismissed the application. On appeal, counsel for Mr Yilmaz made submissions on an issue of importance which had not been raised before the primary Judge. That issue concerned the consequences of it being accepted that the application made to the delegate (“the primary application”) was an invalid one.The legislative context Section 40(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) provides that:“The regulations may provide that visas or visas of a specified class may only be granted in specified circumstances.”Regulation 2.04 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) provides that:“For the purposes of section 40 of the Act, and subject to these Regulations, the only circumstances in which a visa of a particular class may be granted to a person who has satisfied the criteria in a relevant Part of Schedule 2 are the circumstances set out in that Part of Schedule 2.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER, MARSHALL AND GYLES JJ
What, then, of s 65, which does not appear in subdivisions AA or AB but is the immediate source of the decision? It is in the following terms:“[s 65] Decision to grant or refuse to grant visa65 (1) After considering a valid application for a visa, the Minister:(a)if satisfied that:(i)the health criteria for it (if any) have been satisfied; and(ii)the other criteria for it prescribed by this Act or the regulations have been satisfied; and(iii)the grant of the visa is not prevented by section 40 (circumstances when granted), 500A (refusal or cancellation of temporary safe haven visas), 501 (special power to refuse or cancel) or any other provision of this Act or of any other law of the Commonwealth; and(iv)any amount of visa application charge payable in relation to the application has been paid;is to grant the visa; or(b)if not so satisfied, is to refuse to grant the visa.(2) To avoid doubt, an application put aside under section 94 is not taken for the purposes of subsection (1) to have been considered until it has been removed from the pool under subsection 95(3).” It seems to me that the words “after considering a valid application for a visa” in that section do not form part of the conditions of exercise of the power, but are, rather, the assumption upon which the section proceeds. This is not surprising, since it would be assumed that the Minister would obey s 47, which is directed to the very point. As non-compliance with s 47 is plainly covered by s 69, I do not find any inconsistency between it and s 65, which is directed to those elements (apart from the existence of the application) which must be met before a visa can be granted. The opinion of Merkel J to the contrary in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v A (supra) at pars 49 to 51 is based upon a view as to the construction of s 65 which I cannot share. In the same case, Finkelstein J dealt with the point on a different basis, at par 122. In my respectful opinion the first basis disclosed is inconsistent with the authorities I shall examine shortly on the alternate basis for jurisdiction in the RRT. The second basis disclosed does not grapple with the fact that s 47 is the only provision binding the Minister in subdivision AA. It is not clear to me what operation either of their Honours would give to s 69 in relation to a failure to comply with subdivision AA. The alternative basis to consider is that said to flow from the decision in Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (supra). In that case Bowen CJ at 4 construed “decision” in s 25 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 as “a decision in fact made, regardless of whether or not it is a legally effective decision”. The issue of controversy that he identified was whether an invalid decision was “made in the exercise of powers conferred by the enactment” and held that it included a decision made in purported exercise of powers conferred by the enactment. Smithers J also took the view that “decision” was to be construed according to its ordinary meaning, namely, “the action of deciding” notwithstanding that the decision-maker had no power to make the particular decision (at 24-25), and agreed that a decision made by an administrator in purported or assumed pursuance of the relevant statutory provision was reviewable. Deane J dissented, but on the point at issue here said (at 10):“In considering whether the application satisfied these requirement, it is necessary to distinguish between a colourable exercise of actual power conferred by an enactment and the usurpation of power. The exercise of a power conferred by an enactment will ordinarily involve, at least implicitly, assessment of the content of the power and determination of whether any conditions precedent to its existence or valid exercise have been fulfilled. Such assessment and determination, even if wrong or mistaken, are incidents of the power conferred. A decision as to the exercise of the power which is based upon and is the result of a wrong assessment of content or a mistaken determination that conditions precedent have or have not been fulfilled will, in terms of legal effect, be void or voidable. It is none the less proper, in the context of a legislative scheme for review of decisions made under the enactment, to regard the decision as a “decision under” the enactment: cf Meyers v Casey (1913) 17 CLR 90 at 114-6; Calvin v Carr (1979) 22 ALR 417 at 425-7. Where, on the other hand, an enactment confers no relevant power or function at all, the usurpation of power or function cannot properly be regarded as a “decision under” the enactment merely because the usurper points to the enactment as a source or possible source of any decision-making power or function.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER, MARSHALL AND GYLES JJ

Indeed, where an applicant omits essential information from a prescribed form and, as occurred here, writes “statement to follow” in the relevant portions of the form, there is much to be said for the view that an application has not been made at all until the statement to follow is received (cf Heerey J in Li Wen Han v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 421 at par [49]). This way of looking at the matter was not pursued in any detail in the submissions. In any event, whether the application in its original form was made but was invalid, or was not made at all, the Minister was obliged not to consider it on the merits whilst it remained in that form. If it was not made, there was nothing to consider. If invalidly made, s 47 spells out what would otherwise have been the position in any event. It was in the following terms:“[s 47] Consideration of valid visa application47(1) The Minister is to consider a valid application for a visa.(2)The requirement to consider an application for a visa continues until:(a)the application is withdrawn; or(b)the Minister grants or refuses to grant the visa; or(c)the further consideration is prevented by section 39 (limiting number of visas) or 84 (suspension of consideration).(3)To avoid doubt, the Minister is not to consider an application that is not a valid application.(4)To avoid doubt, a decision by the Minister that an application is not valid and cannot be considered is not a decision to refuse to grant the visa.” Thus, the Minister’s delegate was plainly in error in purporting to refuse a visa on the merits, rather than in declining to consider the application as it stood. Furthermore, the refusal was conveyed in a manner which invited a review of the merits of the decision:“Review RightsIf you and members of your family unit included in your application who have been refused think this decision is wrong, you may apply for review of the decision to the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). Please note that there are time limits for making such an application. Information about applying for review is included with this letter.…Your status in AustraliaYou have been granted a Bridging Visa A which allows you to remain in Australia lawfully for 28 days from the date of this letter. If you make a valid application for review within this 28 day period, your Bridging Visa will be valid until 28 days after a final decision is made on your application.If you do not seek reviewAs your Bridging Visa expires 28 days after notification of this decision, you should make arrangements to leave Australia as soon as possible, if you:·do not apply for a review;·have no further applications with the Department; and·do not have a substantive visa.You should advise the Department’s Compliance Section if you are making arrangements to depart Australia. The telephone number is (03) 9235 3086.” In my opinion, if the statutory declaration of 13 October 1997 had been received prior to the decision of the delegate on 15 October, it would have either completed the application or cured the defect, whichever may be the correct analysis. The applicant submits that the combined effect of Reg 2.04 and 2.07 and the relevant parts of Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 to the Regulations have the effect that the application must be perfectly complete when lodged, and that any deficiencies cannot be cured later. There is some support for this argument in the language of the Regulations, but it is by no means compelling enough to warrant such an unreasonable construction. In particular, it seems to me that the words in Schedule 2 “Criteria to be satisfied at the time of application” (which are the high point of the appellant’s argument on this issue) refer generally to the time of application as contrasted with the time of decision, rather than referring to a particular date upon which the paper is first lodged. I shall return to consider some authorities later. In any event, where an application is expressed to be incomplete, in my opinion, “time of application” would certainly comprehend the completion of it.