FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2000] FCA 906MIGRATION – refugees – protection visa – appeal against decision of primary judge dismissing application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – where initial application for protection visa did not comply with statutory requirements – whether Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) have the effect that the application must be perfectly complete when lodged and that any deficiencies cannot be cured during merits review by Refugee Review Tribunal – the words “a valid application for a visa” in s 65 of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) do not form part of the conditions of exercise of power
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – administrative decision – whether application seeking and receiving full merits review cures initial defects
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 29, 31, 36, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 54, 55, 65, 69, 411, 412, 415, 417, 420, 430
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.03, 2.04, 2.07, 886.21, 886.22Secretary, Department of Social Security v Alvaro (1994) 50 FCR 213 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v A (1999) 168 ALR 594 discussed
Phanouvong v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1489 applied
Li Wen Han v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 421 disapproved
Kundu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 560 disapprovedNie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 347 referred to
Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 2 ALD 1 applied
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v A [2000] FCA 108 referred to
Calvin v Carr [1980] AC 574 citedThe King v Hickinan; ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 7 CLR 598 cited
McDougall v Warringah Shire Council (1993) 30 NSWLR 258 citedWu v Minister for Immigration (1994) 48 FCR 294 cited
Twist v Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106 cited
R v Marks; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees & Builders Labourers Federation (1981) 147 CLR 471 cited
Queensland Newsagents Federation Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1993) 46 FCR 38 cited
Preston v Carmody (1993) 44 FCR 1 citedMinister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Thiyagarajah (2000) 169 ALR 515 cited
Meyers v Casey (1913) 17 CLR 90 cited
MUZAFFER YILMAZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V 494 of 1999SPENDER, MARSHALL AND GYLES JJ
MELBOURNE
14 JULY 2000
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 494 of 1999
BETWEEN:
MUZAFFER YILMAZ
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
SPENDER, MARSHALL & GYLES JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
14 JULY 2000
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 494 of 1999
BETWEEN:
MUZAFFER YILMAZ
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
SPENDER, MARSHALL & GYLES JJ
DATE:
14 JULY…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 906
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues addressed in the case pertained to the interpretation of the Migration Act 1958, specifically sections 40 and 65, and the Migration Regulations 1994. The court considered whether the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs was required to consider a valid application for a visa before making a decision to grant or refuse it, and whether an incomplete application could be cured later. Furthermore, the court examined the consequences of the delegate's purported refusal of the visa on the merits, rather than declining to consider the application as it stood.
The court held that the words "after considering a valid application for a visa" in section 65 of the Act were an assumption upon which the section proceeded, and not part of the conditions of exercise of the power. The court found that the Minister was obliged not to consider an application on the merits if it was not a valid application. The court also found that, if the statutory declaration had been received prior to the delegate's decision, it would have either completed the application or cured the defect, whichever was the correct analysis. In the circumstances of the case, the court held that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: SPENDER, MARSHALL AND GYLES JJ
Indeed, where an applicant omits essential information from a prescribed form and, as occurred here, writes “statement to follow” in the relevant portions of the form, there is much to be said for the view that an application has not been made at all until the statement to follow is received (cf Heerey J in Li Wen Han v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 421 at par [49]). This way of looking at the matter was not pursued in any detail in the submissions. In any event, whether the application in its original form was made but was invalid, or was not made at all, the Minister was obliged not to consider it on the merits whilst it remained in that form. If it was not made, there was nothing to consider. If invalidly made, s 47 spells out what would otherwise have been the position in any event. It was in the following terms:“[s 47] Consideration of valid visa application47(1) The Minister is to consider a valid application for a visa.(2)The requirement to consider an application for a visa continues until:(a)the application is withdrawn; or(b)the Minister grants or refuses to grant the visa; or(c)the further consideration is prevented by section 39 (limiting number of visas) or 84 (suspension of consideration).(3)To avoid doubt, the Minister is not to consider an application that is not a valid application.(4)To avoid doubt, a decision by the Minister that an application is not valid and cannot be considered is not a decision to refuse to grant the visa.” Thus, the Minister’s delegate was plainly in error in purporting to refuse a visa on the merits, rather than in declining to consider the application as it stood. Furthermore, the refusal was conveyed in a manner which invited a review of the merits of the decision:“Review RightsIf you and members of your family unit included in your application who have been refused think this decision is wrong, you may apply for review of the decision to the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). Please note that there are time limits for making such an application. Information about applying for review is included with this letter.…Your status in AustraliaYou have been granted a Bridging Visa A which allows you to remain in Australia lawfully for 28 days from the date of this letter. If you make a valid application for review within this 28 day period, your Bridging Visa will be valid until 28 days after a final decision is made on your application.If you do not seek reviewAs your Bridging Visa expires 28 days after notification of this decision, you should make arrangements to leave Australia as soon as possible, if you:·do not apply for a review;·have no further applications with the Department; and·do not have a substantive visa.You should advise the Department’s Compliance Section if you are making arrangements to depart Australia. The telephone number is (03) 9235 3086.” In my opinion, if the statutory declaration of 13 October 1997 had been received prior to the decision of the delegate on 15 October, it would have either completed the application or cured the defect, whichever may be the correct analysis. The applicant submits that the combined effect of Reg 2.04 and 2.07 and the relevant parts of Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 to the Regulations have the effect that the application must be perfectly complete when lodged, and that any deficiencies cannot be cured later. There is some support for this argument in the language of the Regulations, but it is by no means compelling enough to warrant such an unreasonable construction. In particular, it seems to me that the words in Schedule 2 “Criteria to be satisfied at the time of application” (which are the high point of the appellant’s argument on this issue) refer generally to the time of application as contrasted with the time of decision, rather than referring to a particular date upon which the paper is first lodged. I shall return to consider some authorities later. In any event, where an application is expressed to be incomplete, in my opinion, “time of application” would certainly comprehend the completion of it.