FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZTYD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 592
Appeal from: SZTYD v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1472 File number: NSD 1221 of 2017 Judge: GLEESON J Date of judgment: 4 May 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) judge erred in finding Immigration Assessment Authority (“IAA”) had jurisdiction to review delegate’s decision to refuse appellant visa – whether IAA fast track review capable of curing any denial of procedural fairness – whether FCCA judge erred in not finding IAA failed to form view due to alleged non-compliance with s 473CB(1)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 46A(2), 473CB(1)
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)
Cases cited: Applicant S1693 of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCA 512
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; (2016) 259 CLR 180
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16
SZGME v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 91; (2008) 168 FCR 487
SZNZK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 651
SZOIN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 38; (2011) 191 FCR 123
SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 125; (2015) 234 FCR 1
SZWAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1173
Twist v Randwick Municipal Council [1976] HCA 58; (1976) 136 CLR 106
Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 906; (2000) 100 FCR 495
Date of hearing: 1 November 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Searle and Mr S Lawrence Solicitor for the Appellant: Ms M Byers, Solicitor Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Francois Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 1221 of 2017 BETWEEN: SZTYD
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 MAY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GLEESON J:
This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“IAA”): SZTYD v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1472. The notice of appeal sets out six grounds. At the hearing, the appellant pressed only the following two grounds:
(1)The FCCA erred in finding that the IAA had jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) in circumstances where the decision was attended by a lack of procedural…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 592
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the FCCA judge correctly found that the IAA had jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision despite the alleged procedural unfairness, and whether the FCCA judge erred in not finding that the delegate’s failure to forward the unabridged KPMG report to the IAA resulted in the IAA’s decision being outside of jurisdiction. The appellant argued that the delegate’s failure to apply the assumption identified in SZSSJ, which required clear language indicating that the delegate was proceeding on the basis that the appellant’s personal information had been accessed by the persons or entities from whom the appellant feared persecution, constituted a breach of common law principles of procedural fairness. The Minister, on the other hand, argued that the IAA’s statutory processes were capable of curing the alleged defect, and that the IAA did, in fact, make the SZSSJ assumption.
The court found that the IAA’s jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision was not in doubt, as it only hinged on whether there was a denial of procedural fairness by the delegate. The FCCA judge did not decide whether the delegate had denied the appellant procedural fairness, considering that he did not have jurisdiction to do so. However, the court concluded that the FCCA judge should have found that the delegate did not fail to accord the appellant procedural fairness, as the appellant had an opportunity to make submissions to the delegate about the implications of the data breach for his claims for protection. Furthermore, the court found that the IAA did make the SZSSJ assumption, contrary to the appellant's contention.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister argued that:(1)The IAA’s jurisdiction operates upon the fact of a decision of the kind referred to in s 473CC having been made. The Minister noted that the alleged defect in the delegate’s decision was not as to a jurisdictional fact and argued that it “only concerned the asserted relevance of the SZSSJ assumption”.(2)The IAA statutory processes in Pt 7AA were capable of “curing” that alleged defect because the IAA could, if it considered it necessary and in the proper exercise of its powers, make the SZSSJ assumption.(3)In SZWAJ, Griffiths J considered a relevantly similar case and rejected the proposition that the procedural fairness obligations to the applicant were affected by the reasoning in SZSSJ, saying (at [26]):It is critical to note that, in the proceeding here, the Data Breach occurred prior to the appellant applying for a protection visa. The processes which then ensued before both the Minister’s delegate and the Tribunal provided the appellant with an opportunity to say whatever she wished to say concerning the implications of the Data Breach for her entitlement to protection. Subject to relevant provisions in the Migration Act the statutory processes of considering and determining her application for a protection visa, both by the delegate and on review by the Tribunal, attracted procedural fairness obligations. The appellant did not point to any aspect of those processes which involved procedural unfairness to her. Nor is her case strengthened by her reliance on SZSSJ High Court because of the findings made there concerning the different process which had commenced in respect of the aggrieved persons in those proceedings.(4)Before both the delegate and the IAA, the appellant was able to make submissions about the data breach and, if he had wished at any time prior to the delegate’s decision, seek any further information that might assist him about the data breach. Common law principles of procedural fairness did not require the delegate to make the SZSSJ assumption.(5)The IAA did make the SZSSJ assumption, as the primary judge found.Consideration The IAA’s jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision is only in doubt if there was a denial of procedural fairness by the delegate. The FCCA judge did not decide whether the delegate had denied the appellant procedural fairness, considering that he did not have jurisdiction to do so (at [35]-[42]). The parties did not argue the correctness of the FCCA judge’s conclusions on that point, but their submissions put in issue whether the delegate had denied the appellant procedural fairness. In my view, the FCCA judge was not precluded from addressing this question in order to address the argument raised by the appellant about the IAA’s power. In my view, the FCCA judge should have concluded that the delegate did not fail to accord the appellant procedural fairness in the fashion contended for by the appellant in accordance with SZWAJ. The appellant had an opportunity, which he availed himself of, to make submissions to the delegate about the implications of the data breach for his claims for protection. The delegate addressed those claims, without reference to the KPMG report. In those circumstances, the appellant was not deprived of any opportunity to address the delegate on any relevant matter.