SZTYD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTYD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 592

Appeal from: SZTYD v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1472
File number: NSD 1221 of 2017
Judge: GLEESON J
Date of judgment: 4 May 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) judge erred in finding Immigration Assessment Authority (“IAA”) had jurisdiction to review delegate’s decision to refuse appellant visa – whether IAA fast track review capable of curing any denial of procedural fairness – whether FCCA judge erred in not finding IAA failed to form view due to alleged non-compliance with s 473CB(1)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 46A(2), 473CB(1)

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Applicant S1693 of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCA 512

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; (2016) 259 CLR 180

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16

SZGME v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 91; (2008) 168 FCR 487

SZNZK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 651

SZOIN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 38; (2011) 191 FCR 123

SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 125; (2015) 234 FCR 1

SZWAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1173

Twist v Randwick Municipal Council [1976] HCA 58; (1976) 136 CLR 106

Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 906; (2000) 100 FCR 495

Date of hearing: 1 November 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Searle and Mr S Lawrence
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ms M Byers, Solicitor
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 1221 of 2017
BETWEEN:

SZTYD

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GLEESON J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 MAY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GLEESON J:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“IAA”): SZTYD v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1472. The notice of appeal sets out six grounds. At the hearing, the appellant pressed only the following two grounds:

    (1)The FCCA erred in finding that the IAA had jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) in circumstances where the decision was attended by a lack of procedural…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 592
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this appeal, the appellant, a Sri Lankan national who arrived in Australia by boat in 2012 and has been in immigration detention since, challenges a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing his application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The appellant contends that the FCCA judge erred in finding that the IAA had jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision to refuse his visa, given the alleged lack of procedural fairness in the delegate’s decision, which was not cured by the IAA’s review. Additionally, he argues that the FCCA judge erred in not finding that the delegate had breached section 473CB(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by not forwarding the unabridged KPMG report to the IAA, resulting in the IAA’s decision being outside its jurisdiction.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the FCCA judge correctly found that the IAA had jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision despite the alleged procedural unfairness, and whether the FCCA judge erred in not finding that the delegate’s failure to forward the unabridged KPMG report to the IAA resulted in the IAA’s decision being outside of jurisdiction. The appellant argued that the delegate’s failure to apply the assumption identified in SZSSJ, which required clear language indicating that the delegate was proceeding on the basis that the appellant’s personal information had been accessed by the persons or entities from whom the appellant feared persecution, constituted a breach of common law principles of procedural fairness. The Minister, on the other hand, argued that the IAA’s statutory processes were capable of curing the alleged defect, and that the IAA did, in fact, make the SZSSJ assumption.

The court found that the IAA’s jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision was not in doubt, as it only hinged on whether there was a denial of procedural fairness by the delegate. The FCCA judge did not decide whether the delegate had denied the appellant procedural fairness, considering that he did not have jurisdiction to do so. However, the court concluded that the FCCA judge should have found that the delegate did not fail to accord the appellant procedural fairness, as the appellant had an opportunity to make submissions to the delegate about the implications of the data breach for his claims for protection. Furthermore, the court found that the IAA did make the SZSSJ assumption, contrary to the appellant's contention.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“IAA”): SZTYD v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1472. The notice of appeal sets out six grounds. At the hearing, the appellant pressed only the following two grounds:(1)The FCCA erred in finding that the IAA had jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) in circumstances where the decision was attended by a lack of procedural fairness that was not cured by the IAA’s review (ground 3 in the notice of appeal).(2)The FCCA erred in not finding that the delegate had breached s 473CB(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Act”) in not forwarding to the IAA the “unabridged KPMG report and in not finding that [t]his meant that the decision of the [IAA] was one made outside of jurisdiction” (ground 4 in the notice of appeal).BACKGROUND TO APPEAL The appellant is a Sri Lankan male who travelled to Australia by boat and arrived at Christmas Island in November 2012. He was taken into immigration detention, where he has remained since. Data breach The appellant is one of a group of individuals in immigration detention on 31 January 2014, whose personal information was inadvertently made available on the internet by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (“data breach”). In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; (2016) 259 CLR 180 (“SZSSJ”), the High Court of Australia summarised the circumstances of the “data breach” as follows, at [3]:The data breach occurred on 10 February 2014. The Department routinely publishes statistics on its website. This time the particular electronic form of the document in which the statistics were published included embedded information which disclosed the identities of 9,258 applicants for protection visas who were then in immigration detention. The document containing the embedded information remained on the website until 24 February 2014. As it turns out, this summary was not completely correct. In SZWAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1173 (“SZWAJ”) at [33], Griffiths J noted relevantly:Senior Counsel for the respondents acknowledged that there is evidently a factual error in SZSSJ High Court at [3] and [4] where it is suggested that the Data Breach affected only applicants for a protection visa. The Data Breach involved the disclosure of information of 9,258 persons who were in immigration detention, including but not limited to persons who are applicants for protection visas. This point is demonstrated by the Appellant’s own circumstances because the Data Breach affected her as a person who was in immigration detention even though, at that time, she was not an applicant for a protection visa. On this appeal, the Minister’s counsel, Ms Francois, emphasised that the appellant was in a similar situation to the applicant in SZWAJ in that he also was not an applicant for a protection visa at the time of the data breach, having not yet been permitted to make a protection visa application.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The FCCA judge gave answers to this argument which included the following:(1)Even if there were some defect in the delegate’s decision, this would not mean that the IAA had no decision to review. The analysis of the Full Court in SZGME v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 91; (2008) 168 FCR 487 at [25] to [34] applies equally to the circumstances under consideration (at [43]-[47]).(2)The IAA’s procedural fairness obligations were statutory and were not the same in the circumstances of the appellant as those of the respondents in SZSSJ. Particularly, it was not part of the IAA’s statutory procedural fairness obligations to make the “assumption” described in SZSSJ (at [48]-[57]). (3)In any event, on a fair reading of the IAA’s decision record, it did apply the “assumption” that the Sri Lankan authorities had accessed the data breach material (at [57]-[62]).IAA’S POWER TO REVIEW DELEGATE’S DECISIONAppellant’s submissions The appellant argued that the FCCA judge erred in concluding that the IAA could review a delegate’s decision where the delegate had not accorded the appellant procedural fairness. The failure to accord procedural fairness was described as follows:[T]he delegate failed to provide him with the KPMG report (abridged or unabridged), failed to provide him with sufficient information relating to the breach and failed to apply the presumption considered by the High Court in SZSSJ/SZTSI to have remedied the want of procedural fairness occasioned by the lack of disclosure of the report. The appellant contended that:(1)The application of the assumption identified in SZSSJ at [91]-[92] (set out at [9] above) (“SZSSJ assumption”), that the appellant’s personal information had been accessed by the persons or entities from whom the appellant feared persecution or other relevant harm, required “clear language indicating that the delegate was proceeding on the basis that the Lanza group and the Sri Lankan authorities had accessed the information”. The delegate’s failure to apply the SZSSJ assumption was a breach of common law principles of procedural fairness.(2)By failing to consider whether the delegate denied the appellant procedural fairness, the FCCA judge impermissibly conflated the following two questions:Ÿwhether a decision [the delegate’s decision] was attended by error as an objective fact relevant to some other legal question to be determined [whether the IAA had jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision]; andŸwhether the FCCA had power to grant relief.(3)The delegate’s denial of procedural fairness means that the delegate’s decision was in fact no decision and the IAA therefore had no jurisdiction to embark upon the truncated merits review mandated.(4)The truncated and non-voluntary form of review provided for by Pt 7AA is insufficient to cure a denial of procedural fairness, in contrast to the appeal under consideration in Twist v Randwick Municipal Council [1976] HCA 58; (1976) 136 CLR 106 and the merits review of the Refugee Review Tribunal considered in Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 906; (2000) 100 FCR 495.(5)The FCCA judge relied incorrectly on SZGME v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 91; (2008) 168 FCR 487 (“SZGME”) in support of a general proposition that merits review bodies exercise power over valid and invalid decisions alike. SZGME concerned merits review by the Refugee Review Tribunal, an inquisitorial tribunal whose jurisdiction was invoked by failed applicants and which provided full merits review, in contrast to the fast track process in which the IAA provides “truncated compulsory ‘merit’ review”.(6)The FCCA judge wrongly held (at [11], [12], [29], [35] and [41] of his Honour’s reasons) that he was unable to consider whether jurisdictional error (in the form of a denial of procedural fairness) attended the delegate’s decision because the FCCA did not have jurisdiction to review that decision.Minister’s submissions

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister argued that:(1)The IAA’s jurisdiction operates upon the fact of a decision of the kind referred to in s 473CC having been made. The Minister noted that the alleged defect in the delegate’s decision was not as to a jurisdictional fact and argued that it “only concerned the asserted relevance of the SZSSJ assumption”.(2)The IAA statutory processes in Pt 7AA were capable of “curing” that alleged defect because the IAA could, if it considered it necessary and in the proper exercise of its powers, make the SZSSJ assumption.(3)In SZWAJ, Griffiths J considered a relevantly similar case and rejected the proposition that the procedural fairness obligations to the applicant were affected by the reasoning in SZSSJ, saying (at [26]):It is critical to note that, in the proceeding here, the Data Breach occurred prior to the appellant applying for a protection visa. The processes which then ensued before both the Minister’s delegate and the Tribunal provided the appellant with an opportunity to say whatever she wished to say concerning the implications of the Data Breach for her entitlement to protection. Subject to relevant provisions in the Migration Act the statutory processes of considering and determining her application for a protection visa, both by the delegate and on review by the Tribunal, attracted procedural fairness obligations. The appellant did not point to any aspect of those processes which involved procedural unfairness to her. Nor is her case strengthened by her reliance on SZSSJ High Court because of the findings made there concerning the different process which had commenced in respect of the aggrieved persons in those proceedings.(4)Before both the delegate and the IAA, the appellant was able to make submissions about the data breach and, if he had wished at any time prior to the delegate’s decision, seek any further information that might assist him about the data breach. Common law principles of procedural fairness did not require the delegate to make the SZSSJ assumption.(5)The IAA did make the SZSSJ assumption, as the primary judge found.Consideration The IAA’s jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision is only in doubt if there was a denial of procedural fairness by the delegate. The FCCA judge did not decide whether the delegate had denied the appellant procedural fairness, considering that he did not have jurisdiction to do so (at [35]-[42]). The parties did not argue the correctness of the FCCA judge’s conclusions on that point, but their submissions put in issue whether the delegate had denied the appellant procedural fairness. In my view, the FCCA judge was not precluded from addressing this question in order to address the argument raised by the appellant about the IAA’s power. In my view, the FCCA judge should have concluded that the delegate did not fail to accord the appellant procedural fairness in the fashion contended for by the appellant in accordance with SZWAJ. The appellant had an opportunity, which he availed himself of, to make submissions to the delegate about the implications of the data breach for his claims for protection. The delegate addressed those claims, without reference to the KPMG report. In those circumstances, the appellant was not deprived of any opportunity to address the delegate on any relevant matter.