Lynch v Commissioner of Police

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Lynch v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 213

PARTIES:

DEBRA LEIGH LYNCH

(appellant)

v

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

(respondent)

FILE NO:

D20/20

DIVISION:

Appeals

PROCEEDING:

Appeal pursuant to s 222 of the Justice Act 1886

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Beenleigh

DELIVERED ON:

10 September 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Beenleigh

HEARING DATE:

31 May 2021

JUDGE:

Chowdhury DCJ

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL FROM MAGISTRATES COURT – DRUG OFFENCES – WHETHER EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY – WHETHER MISTAKE OF FACT

LEGISLATION:

Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)
Criminal Code1899 (Qld)
Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld)

Justices Act1886 (Qld)

CASES:

Graham v Queensland Nursing Council [2009] QCA 280
R v Dimitropoulos [2020] QCA 75
R v Gardner [2012] QSC 73
R v Quayle & Ors [2005] 1 WLR 3642
R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542

Warnakulasuriya v The Queen (2012) 261 FLR 260

COUNSEL:

M. Horvath with S. Lamb for the appellant

A. Baker-Smith for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Kingsley Lawson Lawyers for the appellant

The Commissioner of Police for the respondent

Introduction

  1. On 10 November 2020, the appellant was convicted in the Beenleigh Magistrates Court of the following offences:

    1.   That on the 19th day of June 2017 at Cornubia in the state of Queensland, [the appellant] unlawfully produced a dangerous drug, namely cannabis.

    2.   That on the 19th day of June 2017 at Cornubia in the State of Queensland, [the appellant] unlawfully had possession of a dangerous drug, namely cannabis.

    3.   That on the 19th day of June 2017 at Cornubia in the Magistrates Court District at Beenleigh in the State of Queensland [the appellant] had in her possession an ultra-sonic cleaner, 2 x grinders, a heat lamp, a capsule manufacturer, a Magical Butter Machine that she had used in connection with the commission of a crime as defined in Pt II of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 namely producing a dangerous drug.

    4.   That on the 19th day of June 2017 at Cornubia in the Magistrates Court’s District at Beenleigh in the State of Queensland [the appellant] unlawfully had in her possession a thing namely two vaporisers that she had used in connection with the administration of a dangerous drug.

    5.   That on the 19th day of June 2017 at Cornubia in the Magistrates Court’s District Court at Beenleigh in the State of Queensland [the appellant] unlawfully had in her possession a thing namely 2 water pipes she had used in connection with the smoking of a dangerous drug.

  2. A single fine of $1,000 was imposed for the five offences and no convictions were recorded.

  3. By way of a notice of appeal filed on 8 December 2020, the appellant appeals against her convictions on the following grounds:

    1.   In the course of the judgment, her Honour made the following findings (collectively Ground 1);

    (a)    the appellant’s Buerger’s disease was not diagnosed until after the day of the offences (reasons page 3, line 5). The appellant gave evidence that…

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Details
Case
[2021] QDC 213
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Lynch v Commissioner of Police, the appellant contested her convictions for drug offences, arguing that she held a mistaken belief in an extraordinary emergency, which negated the element of unlawfulness. The appeal centred on whether the appellant's medical conditions justified her use of cannabis, given her severe pain and chronic suicidal thoughts. The Court of Appeal considered whether the magistrate erred in not recognising the appellant's circumstances as substantially different from those in a prior case, Dimitropoulos, where a similar defence was rejected. The court evaluated the appellant's medical evidence, her attempts to access medical cannabis, and the impact of her physical and mental health conditions on her decision-making.

The legal issues revolved around whether the magistrate correctly applied the law regarding the defence of an extraordinary emergency, and whether the appellant's belief in such an emergency was honest, reasonable, and mistaken. The court scrutinised the magistrate's findings, which included the appellant's diagnosis timeline, her belief about the Queensland Medical Cannabis Scheme, and the adequacy of her attempts to obtain a medical cannabis prescription. The appellant argued that her conditions warranted a finding of an extraordinary emergency, which she believed justified her actions, despite not being legally permitted.

The Court of Appeal found that the magistrate's decision contained errors, including findings contrary to evidence, inadequate findings, and a misunderstanding of the relevance of certain facts. The magistrate failed to recognise that the appellant's circumstances, particularly her chronic pain and suicidal thoughts, were sufficiently different from those in Dimitropoulos. The court held that the magistrate should have considered whether the appellant's belief in an extraordinary emergency was honest, reasonable, and mistaken, or whether there were reasonable grounds to believe such an emergency existed. However, the appeal was ultimately dismissed, as the court determined that the magistrate's errors did not lead to an unreasonable verdict.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

By way of a notice of appeal filed on 8 December 2020, the appellant appeals against her convictions on the following grounds:1. In the course of the judgment, her Honour made the following findings (collectively Ground 1);(a) the appellant’s Buerger’s disease was not diagnosed until after the day of the offences (reasons page 3, line 5). The appellant gave evidence that she was diagnosed with Beurger’s disease at around the same time that she was diagnosed with scleroderma, which was in 2013;(b) for producing and possessing of cannabis, and possessing of items was for medical, habitual or recreational purposes (reasons page 7, line 8). The appellant did not give that evidence;(c) that there was limited evidence about the Queensland Medical Cannabis Scheme with the appellant believing she qualified for it from May 2016 after a change in the law, while Dr Lotz considered the scheme was not available at the time (reasons page 7, lines 12-17). The scheme became available for the appellant’s conditions in August 2018. This was mentioned in oral submissions and stated in the written submissions at page 4, paragraph [25];(d) The appellant believed that she exhausted all her medical options (reasons page 8, line 9). It is unclear whether either that belief was accepted, or that fact was accepted;(e) It was an option for the appellant to move to New South Wales to access a scheme (reasons page 8, line 14), contrary to the appellant’s evidence that she couldn’t afford it (being on a pension) and it would move her away from her support network (T1.27.19-21) (reasons page 4, line 12);(f) there was vague evidence by the appellant, no supporting evidence and no timeframe regarding her attempts to obtain a medical cannabis prescription in Queensland (reasons page 8, lines 15-18). The appellant gave evidence of her attempts to access medical cannabis, including applying to NSW, applied to various doctors in Queensland and lodging appeals which were rejected;(g) the appellant had a longstanding cannabis addiction over and above pain relief and mental health issues (reasons page 8, line 21). There was no evidence of addiction. The appellant gave evidence that she only took cannabis for her medical conditions;(h) the appellant seemed to accept that sometimes she combined cannabis and medication (reasons page 8, line 28). While that is true, on such occasions, she was nauseous and would vomit from the opiates and even anti-nausea medication did not stop the vomiting. To her, the side effects of medication were overwhelming;(i) the appellant was living independently, there is little evidence on that issue and it was of little weight (reasons page 8, lines 35-38). This is a misunderstanding of this factor. It was to be a comparison to how Mr Dimitropoulos was living at the time of his offending;(j) rejecting that medical cannabis was the appellant’s only option, because it did not cure her medical or physical conditions, and that there was no medical evidence to support this (reasons page 8, lines 40-42). The appellant gave evidence that she had no other options for her medical and psychiatric conditions. The cannabis did not need to cure her conditions. There is medical evidence to support that it controlled her pain and reduced her suicidal thoughts;(k) there was no medical evidence that the cannabis was a lifesaving substance in the medical sense (reasons page 8, line 44). The cannabis did not need to cure her conditions. There was medical evidence to support that it controlled her pain and reduced her suicidal thoughts;(l) the suicidal ideations were long standing even before the use of cannabis (reasons page 9, line 1), which is correct but was misunderstood as being a factor against the appellant. 2. Her Honour ought to have found that, as at the date of the alleged offending:(a) the appellant was suffering from several physical conditions causing her extreme pain daily;(b) the appellant required painkilling medication for the pain;(c) the painkilling medication was not effective in controlling the pain;(d) cannabis was effective in controlling the pain;(e) the painkilling medication was causing side effects resulting in a reduction of the appellant’s quality of life;(f) the appellant was suffering from a series of psychiatric conditions;(g) the appellant tried various psychiatric medications but they were causing side effects including suicidal thoughts;(h) independently of psychiatric medication, the appellant was suffering from suicidal thoughts that were pain related;(i) cannabis was controlling the appellant’s suicidal thoughts;(j) without the cannabis [sic] the plaintiff would have committed suicide;(k) the appellant sought medical cannabis from NSW, obtained support from Dr Landsberg for that application, but was rejected from the scheme because she was not a resident of NSW;(l) the appellant could not move to NSW due to the cost and the loss of support network that would bring;(m) the appellant sought medical cannabis in Queensland, was rejected and appealed unsuccessfully;(n) the appellant was not eligible for medical cannabis in Queensland until August 2018;(o) the appellant could not afford the cost of the medical cannabis, given its cost to her being a pensioner;(p) the appellant had exhausted her medical options;(q) cannabis was the appellant’s only option for pain relief, and control of suicidal thoughts.3. In concluding, her Honour found that:“I do not accept the factual circumstances for Ms Lynch are substantially different to those of Mr Dimitropoulos. The evidence does not raise the possibility of a sudden or extraordinary emergency, or that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances of an extraordinary emergency existed. Therefore, I find that the element of unlawfulness has been established.” (reasons page 9, lines 2-7)4. In that passage, her Honour erred that:(a) the evidence did not raise the possibility of sudden or extraordinary emergency;(b) there were not reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances of an extraordinary emergency existed;(c) the factual circumstances for the appellant were not substantially different to Mr Dimitropoulos.5. Her Honour ought to have found that the appellant’s circumstances were sufficiently different to Mr Dimitropoulos and that:(a) the possibility of extraordinary emergency was raised by the appellant not negatived by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt; or(b) on balance, the appellant held an honest, reasonable but mistaken belief that there was an extraordinary emergency.6. The findings and conclusions above are a combination of:(a) findings contrary to the evidence;(b) failing to make adequate findings;(c) misunderstanding of the relevance of the findings made;(d) failing to provide adequate reasons;(e) reaching a verdict that is unreasonable.[1][1]I have not included all of the transcript references that are contained in the notice of appeal. I have had full regard to those passages.Evidence given before the Magistrate Exhibit 1 was a two page admissions of fact document, in which the appellant admitted the elements of each offence apart from the element of unlawfulness.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The decision of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia in Warnakulasuriya v The Queen, supra, concerned a defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency as provided by s 10.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code. While the first paragraph of that section has some similarity to s 25 of the Queensland Code, the whole section has significant differences. As the appellant accepts, I am bound to follow the law as set out by the Queensland Court of Appeal, particularly in the judgment of R v Dimitropoulus, supra.Consideration It is clear on the evidence that in the years up to the commission of the drug offences on 19 June 2017, the appellant had a combination of significant physical illnesses, which at times manifested in severe symptoms and pain. Dr Landsberg considered that the appellant had some form of vascular disease since about 2014. She developed scleroderma, Raynaud’s Phenomenon and Buerger’s disease, which Dr Lansberg stated in Exhibit 9 was “often seen in smoking, both normal smoking and marijuana smoking.”[34][34]Another disturbing warning about the dangers of smoking, if any further warning was actually needed. Dr Lotz stated that the appellant reported to him that she had been smoking cannabis since 1988 following spinal surgery, and consequent residual pain. She found that cannabis oils for topical and oral use had been helpful to her to manage dermatological problems and pain issues, and that they managed her general anxiety and calmed down features of post-traumatic stress disorder. Dr Lotz considered that the appellant suffered from a formally diagnosed complex post-traumatic stress disorder, with a history of social and general anxiety, obsessive compulsive disorder and an undiagnosed attention deficit disorder. She had no overt psychiatric symptoms, but the appellant did describe ongoing features of anxiety, and unresolved relationship issues. At page 8 of his report, he observed that the appellant’s symptoms of pain fluctuated, and that it appeared that the cannabis use had managed her pain and slowed deterioration related to scleroderma. Dr Lotz, in Exhibit 8, stated that the appellant had been struggling with anxiety, including social and generalised anxiety disorder, and depression since the age of 17. Significantly, the appellant described to him chronic suicidal ideation and intention, prior to cannabis use. In his evidence, Dr Lotz stated that the appellant reported to him that her anxiety was worse when taking prescription medication, and it also increased her suicidal feeling. She also “felt doped out and a bit spaced out which is typical with opiate medications but anti-depressants can do that too. So can mood stabilizers and anti-psychotics.”[35][35]R1-43, l 25. Dr Lotz said that the appellant stated that she had suicidal ideations when she started taking the prescription medication. He considered that suicidal ideation was an issue that needed to be dealt with, as it was an emergency. He said:“Well, firstly, I’d get the patient off the medication and depending on how determined they are to hurt themselves as whether they should be admitted either voluntarily or involuntarily into a place of safety such as a hospital.”[36][36]R1-44, l 20.