Morant v Ryan (The State Coroner)

Case [2023] QCA 109

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Morant v Ryan (The State Coroner) [2023] QCA 109

PARTIES:

ANGUS WILLIAM MORANT
(applicant)
v
TERRY RYAN (THE STATE CORONER)
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 11676 of 2022
DC No 3189 of 2021

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Extension of Time s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane – [2022] QDC 134 (Loury KC DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

26 May 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

13 March 2023

JUDGES:

Bond JA and Boddice AJA and Wilson J

ORDERS:

1.   The time for filing of the application for leave to appeal is extended to 28 September 2022.

2.   The application for leave to appeal is refused.

CATCHWORDS:

MAGISTRATES – CORONERS – INQUESTS AND INQUIRIES – GENERALLY – where the applicant made application to the District Court to hold an inquest into the death of his late step-mother in circumstances where the Deputy State Coroner and State Coroner had refused to do so – where the District Court judge (primary judge) was not satisfied under s 30(8) of the Coroners Act 2003 (Qld) that holding an inquest would be in the public interest, and dismissed the application – where the Deputy State Coroner specifically determined the deceased died by suicide as a consequence of acute carbon monoxide poisoning, in circumstances where she was counselled and aided in that suicide by her husband – where the Deputy State Coroner also concluded there was no evidence that any other person was involved in the deceased’s death – where the appellant submits the primary judge (and earlier decision-makers) failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement to determine “how the person died” – whether the primary judge failed to fully exercise the coronial jurisdiction in terms of making a finding of that jurisdictional fact – whether the primary judge’s finding as to the public interest was based on reasoning for which there was no evidence or on facts which did not exist – whether the primary judge took into account irrelevant considerations that were not submitted upon by the applicant – whether an inquest would be in the public interest

APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – NATURE OF RIGHT – SCOPE AND EFFECT OF APPEAL – where the question arises as to which approach the Court of Appeal should take in respect of an application for leave to appeal from a District Court judge’s decision pursuant to s 30(8) of the Coroners Act 2003 (Qld) – where the application for leave to appeal is made pursuant to s 118 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) – whether the primary judge’s finding is reviewable upon the applicant establishing error in the House v The King sense or upon establishing jurisdictional error in the formation of the primary judge’s state of satisfaction in accordance with the legislative requirement

Coroners Act 2003 (Qld), s 28, s 30, s 45
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 118
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s…

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AGLC
Morant v Ryan (The State Coroner) [2023] QCA 109
Case
[2023] QCA 109
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the applicant sought leave to appeal the refusal of the primary judge to hold an inquest into the death of his late step-mother. The deceased died from acute carbon monoxide poisoning, and the Deputy State Coroner determined that her death was a suicide, aided by her husband. The applicant believed that the deceased was not alone when she died and that she must have been aided at the scene by a person or persons unknown. The primary judge dismissed the application on the grounds that holding an inquest would not be in the public interest.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge failed to fully exercise the coronial jurisdiction in terms of making a finding of the jurisdictional fact of how the person died, whether the primary judge's finding as to the public interest was based on reasoning for which there was no evidence or on facts which did not exist, whether the primary judge took into account irrelevant considerations in making the decision, and whether an inquest would be in the public interest.

The court found that the primary judge did not err in determining that an inquest was not in the public interest. The court noted that the primary judge's finding was based on the evidence presented, and that there was no evidence to suggest that anyone other than the deceased's husband was involved in her death. The court also found that the primary judge did not take into account any irrelevant considerations in making the decision.

The court refused the application for leave to appeal, stating that there was no substantial injustice to the applicant and no reasonable argument that there was an error to be corrected. The court held that the primary judge's finding was reviewable upon the applicant establishing error in the House v The King sense or upon establishing jurisdictional error in the formation of the primary judge's state of satisfaction in accordance with the legislative requirement. However, the applicant had not established any such error or jurisdictional error in this case.

In conclusion, the court refused the application for leave to appeal the primary judge's decision not to hold an inquest into the death of the deceased. The court found that the primary judge's decision was based on the evidence presented and that there was no substantial injustice to the applicant. The court also found that the primary judge did not take into account any irrelevant considerations in making the decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The time for filing of the application for leave to appeal is extended to 28 September 2022.

2. The application for leave to appeal is refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant seeks leave to appeal that refusal. Should leave be given, the applicant relies on five grounds of appeal. First, jurisdictional error. Second, error of law as to the standard of proof. Third, no evidence to justify the decision. Fourth, the decision was not the “correct and preferable” decision. Fifth, the primary judge took into account irrelevant considerations in making the decision.Background Prior to her death, the deceased endured persistent and long-standing back pain, which was debilitating and adversely affected her quality of life. As a consequence, the deceased had investigated ways of taking her life and had expressed an intention to commit suicide. She had also previously attempted suicide. On the day prior to her death, the deceased purchased a small, petrol generator. Her husband assisted her to place the generator into their vehicle. Upon returning to their home, the deceased’s husband removed the generator from the vehicle and unpacked it from its box, before assisting the deceased to place it back in the deceased’s motor vehicle. On 30 November 2014, the deceased’s husband attended church. The deceased remained at home. Upon return from church, the deceased was not at the residence. Her motor vehicle was not at the property. The deceased’s husband also found a note written by the deceased in contemplation of her death by suicide. Later on the evening of 30 November 2014, police located the body of the deceased in her motor vehicle. It contained the generator, although it was not operating at that time. An autopsy was conducted and the cause of death listed as acute carbon monoxide poisoning. Following a police investigation, the deceased’s husband was charged with counselling and aiding the deceased’s suicide. A jury found the deceased’s husband guilty of those offences. The deceased’s husband appealed that conviction to this Court. The appeal was dismissed on 19 June 2020. On 14 July 2020, the applicant applied to the Coroner’s Court of Queensland for an inquest into the death of the deceased. That application was made on the basis that the applicant believed the deceased was not alone when she died, and that she must have been aided at the scene by a person or persons unknown. On 30 July 2020, the Deputy State Coroner issued formal findings, pursuant to s 45 of the Coroners Act2003 (Qld) (“the Act”), in relation to the death of the deceased. Relevantly, the Deputy State Coroner found the deceased died from carbon monoxide poisoning and that her death was due to suicide. In the letter advising of that decision, the Deputy State Coroner stated:“I do not propose to hold an inquest as the coronial investigation has revealed sufficient information to enable me to make findings about Ms Morant’s death and there does not appear to be any prospect of making recommendations that would reduce the likelihood of similar death occurring in future or otherwise contribute to public health and safety or the administration of justice.My findings include information about how Ms Morant died and the involvement of Graham Morant in her death. There is no evidence that any other person was involved in her death. It is clear that Ms Morant obtained the generator from Bunnings. The unidentified DNA found on the generator could be that of any number of unknown persons who could have come into contact with the generator at any time. Further, the evidence at the trial of Mr Morant, accepted by the Court of Appeal, was that Ms Morant’s hand, when placed on the generator, could have contained mixed DNA through coming into contact with some other object or person.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 30(8) of the Act provides that in the case of such an application, the State Coroner or the District Court may order that an inquest be held “if satisfied it is in the public interest to hold the inquest.”Primary decision The primary judge observed that the apparent basis for the applicant’s application, that it was in the public interest for there to be an inquest, was his belief that somebody other than the deceased’s husband aided the deceased’s suicide at the scene of her death, or that somebody caused her death. The primary judge recorded that the State Coroner had regard to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the appeal against conviction, and in particular, evidence that:(a)the deceased was found dead in her motor vehicle by police at 9.50 pm on 30 November 2014;(b)the motor vehicle was parked in a street, over 10 kilometres from home;(c)the doors and windows of the motor vehicle were all closed and the engine was not running;(d)the deceased was seated in the driver’s seat, wearing sunglasses;(e)a “stick-it” note, with the words “do not resuscitate me” written on it, was found stuck next to the automatic gear lever of the motor vehicle;(f)the deceased’s husband had contacted police at 8.02 pm that evening to advise he had returned home from church to find a note from his wife, indicating she intended to do herself some harm;(g)when a police officer attended the scene, he opened the door of the motor vehicle and smelled a strong odour of carbon monoxide;(h)the police officer observed that the back seat of the car was folded down; there was a Ryobi brand petrol generator in the boot of the vehicle, which was not running and was cold to touch; and there was a little bit of petrol still in the bottom of the generator;(i)a forensic examination revealed that the generator switch was in the “on” position; that the handle of the generator revealed a mixed DNA profile with more than one contributor present, with the DNA profile being greater than 100 billion times more likely to have occurred if the deceased contributed DNA, rather than if she had not, and approximately four times more likely to have occurred if the deceased’s husband had not contributed, rather than if he did;(j)the DNA scientist accepted there was a possibility the tape had picked up two separate pieces of DNA on the handle of the generator, but it was also possible the deceased had placed her hand on the handle of the generator, with that hand already containing mixed DNA through coming into contact with some other object or person;(k)an autopsy confirmed the deceased died of acute carbon monoxide poisoning, but also referred to seven blue coloured bruises on the medial aspect of the mid-right upper arm, measuring up to 10 millimetres in diameter, with that finding being recorded under the heading “Signs of recent injury”;(l)the medical records accessed by the pathologist indicated the deceased had chronic thoracic spine pain, which was not assisted by surgery, having previously had a compression fracture for which she had a fusion and vertebroplasty in 2011. Further, the deceased had been prescribed large doses of opioids since May 2013, and had a history of depression and anxiety;(m)a police officer conducted a test of the generator at the scene, to determine how many pulls it would take before starting the generator. That police officer did not add any petrol to the generator to conduct the test, and the generator remained in the boot of the deceased’s vehicle. That test established it did not take a lot of resistance in pulling the cord. The generator started with one pull. In his view, the generator stopped because the engine was starved of oxygen;(n)the evidence revealed the generator had been purchased by the deceased on 29 November 2014, when her husband had travelled with her to the Bunnings Warehouse store, although he remained in the car park whilst the deceased went inside and purchased the generator;(o)the deceased’s husband told police, in an interview, subsequent to her death, that he understood the deceased went to buy a generator that she could start, that the generator was sufficiently heavy that neither of them could lift it into the boot on their own, and that the following day he removed the generator from its box and then assisted the deceased to put the generator back into the motor vehicle. The deceased’s husband denied putting fuel into the generator, saying the deceased had access to fuel at their home; and(p)the deceased’s sister and two friends gave extensive evidence of statements the deceased had made to them, in which she indicated, in effect, that the deceased’s husband was pressuring her to commit suicide.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge further found that having reviewed all of the material before the State Coroner, neither the Deputy State Coroner nor the State Coroner failed to determine how the deceased died. Further, the applicant’s suspicions that others were involved in causing the deceased’s death were unreasonable, and an inquest should not be held in order to allay unreasonable suspicions.ConsiderationGenerally The question arises as to the approach which the Court of Appeal should take on an application for leave to appeal from a judge of the District Court who makes a decision pursuant to s 30(8) of the Act. In principle a statute may confer on a court jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision of an administrative character, and, if it does so, the necessary implication is that the Court will determine the appeal as a court, and all the usual incidents of that Court will apply to that determination.[3][3]State of Queensland v Mowburn Nominees Pty Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 195. Section 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act does, on its proper construction, confer on the present applicant a right to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision made by the primary judge. It does so whether or not the decision by the primary judge should properly have been regarded as a decision of an administrative character. It follows that the usual incidents of an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal apply. Leave to appeal under s 118(3) will usually be granted only where an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice to the applicant, and there is a reasonable argument that there is an error to be corrected.[4][4]Davis v Ryan, State Coroner [2019] QCA 282 at [3] per Holmes CJ (with whom Gotterson JA and Flanagan J agreed), quoting Pickering v McArthur [2005] QCA 294 at [3] per Keane JA (with whom McMurdo P and Dutney J agreed). If leave to appeal is granted, pursuant to s 118(8) the appeal to the Court of Appeal is to be conducted by way of rehearing. The High Court has explained that where an appeal is conducted by way of rehearing, the powers of the appellate court are exercisable only where the appellant can demonstrate that, having regard to all the evidence before the appellate court, the order that is the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error.[5][5]Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at 180-181 per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. Section 30(8) of the Act empowers the judge of the District Court to order an inquest to be held “if satisfied it is in the public interest to hold the inquest”. Thus, the jurisdiction to exercise the power only exists if a judge forms that state of satisfaction. If the power had been exercised it would have been the product of two decisions: first, the formation of the requisite state of satisfaction, and second, the exercise of the discretion to make the order.[6] In the present case, the power was not exercised because the requisite state of satisfaction was not formed.[6]Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194 at 205, applied in this context in Davis v Ryan, State Coroner [2019] QCA 282 at [3] per Holmes CJ (with whom Gotterson JA and Flanagan J agreed).