Li v Chief of Army

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL AND GAGELER JJ

TING LI  APPELLANT

AND

CHIEF OF ARMY  RESPONDENT

Li v Chief of Army

[2013] HCA 49

27 November 2013

S162/2013

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed with costs.

2.Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 26 February 2013 and, in its place, order that:

(a)      the appeal to that Court be allowed;

(b)the appellant's conviction be quashed and the sentence imposed on 8 April 2011 be set aside; and

(c)the matter be remitted to the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal for the making of further orders, if any.

3.Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court made on 19 April 2013 and, in its place, order that the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to that Court, including the costs of submissions concerning the issue of costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

A W Street SC with A K Flecknoe-Brown for the appellant (instructed by Wyatt Attorneys)

S B Lloyd SC with S G Callan for the respondent (instructed by Clayton Utz)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Li v Chief of Army

Defence – Military forces – Discipline – Service offences ­– Offence of creating a disturbance on service land – Meaning of "disturbance" – Physical and fault elements of "creating" a disturbance – Whether violence or threat of violence necessary to existence of "disturbance" – Whether "creating" a disturbance has one or two physical elements.

Words and phrases – "creating a disturbance", "disturbance".

Criminal Code (Cth), Ch 2.
Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth), s 33(b).
Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth).

FRENCH CJ, CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL AND GAGELER JJ.

Introduction

  1. Major Ting Li, a member of the Australian Defence Force ("the ADF"), was involved one morning in an incident in the Campbell Park Offices in the Australian Capital Territory.  He was subsequently charged before a restricted court martial constituted under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) ("the DFDA") with the service offence of having created a disturbance on service land contrary to s 33(b) of the DFDA and, in the alternative, with the service offence of having acted in a manner likely to bring discredit on the ADF contrary to s 60(1) of the DFDA.

  2. The particulars of each charge were identical.  They were that Major Li, after entering the office of Mr Snashall, a Commonwealth public servant:  refused to leave that office when Mr Snashall requested him to do so; continued speaking to Mr Snashall in a raised voice; followed Mr Snashall and continued the conversation when Mr Snashall walked out of that office; forcefully pushed against the office door placing his head and shoulder in the doorway when Mr Snashall had returned to the office and was inside the office trying to…

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Details
Case
[2013] HCA 49
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal concerning the discipline of military personnel, specifically the offence of creating a disturbance on service land. The appellant, Major Li, sought to challenge his conviction for this offence, which had been upheld by the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal. The Chief of Army was the respondent in the proceedings.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the judge advocate at the court martial had misdirected the tribunal on a critical element of the offence, and whether this misdirection gave rise to a substantial miscarriage of justice. The court was required to consider the meaning of "creating a disturbance" and the fault elements associated with it, particularly whether violence or a threat of violence was a necessary component of a "disturbance" and whether "creating" a disturbance involved one or two physical elements.

The High Court found that the judge advocate's direction to the court martial had indeed involved a material error of law by treating a critical fault element – recklessness as to the result of intentional acts – as irrelevant. The Court held that the language of the "substantial miscarriage of justice" provision in the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) did not require the same stringent approach as the common law criminal proviso. It was sufficient that there was a real risk that the court martial's finding of guilt was influenced by the misdirection. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed Major Li's conviction, and remitted the matter to the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal for further orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 26 February 2013 and, in its place, order that:

(a) the appeal to that Court be allowed;

(b) the appellant's conviction be quashed and the sentence imposed on 8 April 2011 be set aside; and

(c) the matter be remitted to the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal for the making of further orders, if any.

3. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court made on 19 April 2013 and, in its place, order that the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to that Court, including the costs of submissions concerning the issue of costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL AND GAGELER JJ (dissent)
Secondly, it was not in any event open to the Tribunal to conclude that the misdirection by the judge advocate did not give rise to "a substantial miscarriage of justice" within the meaning of the DFDAA. Contrary to the premise on which the argument of the Chief of Army proceeded[54], the identity of that statutory language with the language of the common form "criminal proviso" deriving from the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 (UK) does not import an identity between the approach to be adopted by the Tribunal and the approach to be adopted by a Court of Criminal Appeal[55]. It was enough to establish "a substantial miscarriage of justice" within the meaning of the DFDAA that there was a real risk that the court martial was influenced in its finding of guilt by the misdirection[56]. In circumstances where the misdirection treated as irrelevant a critical fault element of the offence – recklessness as to the result of intentional acts – it is impossible to conclude that such a risk did not exist.[54]Relying on Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300; [2005] HCA 81.[55]Hembury v Chief of the General Staff (1998) 193 CLR 641 at 656-657 [41], 673-674 [84].[56]Hembury v Chief of the General Staff (1998) 193 CLR 641 at 656 [38]-[40], 673-674 [84]; Jones v Chief of Navy (2012) 205 FCR 458 at 471 [54].Conclusion The Full Court of the Federal Court ought to have found that the Tribunal made a material error of law in finding that the direction given by the judge advocate involved no error. The appropriate order for the Full Court to have made was to quash the conviction and to remit the case to the Tribunal to allow the Tribunal to consider what, if any, further order should be made. The fact that the Tribunal was not previously asked to consider making further orders in the event that it quashed the conviction is a consideration to be weighed by the Tribunal in considering whether any further order should be now made but is insufficient to preclude remitter. The appeal is to be allowed. The orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court are to be set aside. In place of those orders, it is to be ordered that Major Li's appeal to that Court be allowed, his conviction quashed and the case remitted to the Tribunal for the making of further orders, if any. The Chief of Army is to pay Major Li's costs in this Court and in the Full Court of the Federal Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

Full text does not contain this section.