CPB Contractors Pty Limited v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union
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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CPB Contractors Pty Limited v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union [2019] FCAFC 70
File number:
NSD 1960 of 2018
Judges:
FLICK, O'CALLAGHAN AND WHEELAHAN JJ
Date of judgment:
2 May 2019
Catchwords:
INDUSTRIAL LAW – enterprise agreements – whether coverage clause unlawful for the purposes of s 194(ba) of the Fair Work Act – clause was not inconsistent with s 58(2) of the FW Act – s 194(ba) directed to clauses that provide for methods of election for employees or employers to opt out of enterprise agreements – clause 3.3 of the agreement did not engage s 194(ba) as it did not provide for any method of election – the making and approval of a new enterprise agreement does not constitute election – application allowed in part.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – reference to secondary and extrinsic materials – when such reference is necessary to identify the context and purpose of a statutory provision
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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CPB Contractors Pty Limited sought approval from the Fair Work Commission (FWC) for an enterprise agreement, which was opposed by the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (CFMMU). The Australian Workers Union (AWU) supported the approval of the agreement but argued that the Full Bench's decision should not be quashed for other reasons. The Full Bench had allowed an appeal by the CFMMU, finding that a clause in the agreement was unlawful under section 194(ba) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act), and that another clause operated to exclude the National Employment Standards contrary to section 55(1) of the FW Act. CPB Contractors sought special leave to appeal against the Full Bench's decision, arguing that the Full Bench erred in concluding that clause 3.3 of the agreement was inconsistent with section 58(2) of the FW Act and that it was rendered unlawful by section 194(ba) of the FW Act.
The central issue before the court was whether clause 3.3 of the agreement was inconsistent with section 58(2) of the FW Act, and if so, whether it was rendered unlawful by section 194(ba) of the FW Act. The court found that the Full Bench's conclusion that clause 3.3 was inconsistent with section 58(2) was based on an error of law. The Full Bench had conflated the concepts of coverage and application of the enterprise agreement, which are distinct under the FW Act. The court held that clause 3.3 was concerned with coverage, not application, and that there was no proper foundation for the Full Bench's conclusion that clause 3.3 offended section 58(2)(d)(i). The court further found that clause 3.3 did not engage section 194(ba) of the FW Act because it did not provide for any method of election for employees or employers to opt out of the enterprise agreement. The court held that the making and approval of a new enterprise agreement did not constitute an election for the purposes of section 194(ba). The application for special leave to appeal was allowed in part.
The court ordered that the decision of the Full Bench be quashed, and that the application for approval of the enterprise agreement be remitted to another Commissioner for rehearing, on which occasion the applicant would have the opportunity to offer an undertaking to remove, or to treat clause 3.3 as being of no effect. The court's decision highlights the importance of distinguishing between the concepts of coverage and application of enterprise agreements, and the need for careful consideration of the language used in enterprise agreements to ensure compliance with the FW Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
The CFMMEU opposed the relief sought by the applicant. The AWU joined the applicant in submitting that clause 3.3 of the Agreement was not an unlawful term, but submitted that for other reasons the decision of the Full Bench should not be quashed. The FWC filed a submitting notice.Background The applicant is engaged in the building and construction industry. On 7 November 2017, the applicant applied to the FWC under s 185 of the FW Act for approval of the Agreement, which was a single-enterprise agreement. At the time of the application for approval, the number of employees who would have been covered by the Agreement was 12, but that number has since increased. The AWU gave notice under s 183 of the Act that it wished to be covered by the Agreement, and in approving the Agreement, the Commissioner noted that the Agreement covered the AWU. The CFMMEU sought to be heard in opposition to approval of the Agreement, but the Commissioner denied the CFMMEU’s request to be heard. The CFMMEU then appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the Full Bench. The Full Bench allowed the appeal on two grounds. First, the Full Bench held that the terms of clause 3.3 of the Agreement were rendered unlawful by s 194(ba) of the FW Act, with the consequence that the Commissioner could not have been satisfied for the purposes of s 186(4) that the Agreement did not include any unlawful terms. Second, the Full Bench held that clause 9 of the Agreement operated to exclude the National Employment Standards contrary to s 55(1) of the FW Act, and that an undertaking given by the applicant and accepted by the Commissioner did not extend far enough to cure the difficulty. The second ground on which the appeal to the Full Bench was allowed is not in issue in this application, but was a sufficient foundation for the orders quashing the decision of the Commissioner and remitting the application to another Commissioner for rehearing.The legislation The FW Act draws a distinction between the coverage of enterprise agreements, and their application. Under s 53 of the FW Act, an enterprise agreement covers an employee if it is expressed to cover an employee. Further, s 53(6) provides in the following terms that an enterprise agreement covers an employee in relation to particular employment –(6)A reference in this Act to an enterprise agreement covering an employee is a reference to the agreement covering the employee in relation to particular employment. Section 51 of the FW Act provides that an enterprise agreement does not impose obligations on a person, or give a person an entitlement, unless it applies to the person. Section 52 of the FW Act is concerned with when an enterprise agreement applies to a person, and provides –52When an enterprise agreement applies to an employer, employee or employee organisationWhen an enterprise agreement applies to an employee, employer or organisation(1)An enterprise agreement applies to an employee, employer or employee organisation if:(a)the agreement is in operation; and(b)the agreement covers the employee, employer or organisation; and(c)no other provision of this Act provides, or has the effect, that the agreement does not apply to the employee, employer or organisation.Enterprise agreements apply to employees in relation to particular employment(2)A reference in this Act to an enterprise agreement applying to an employee is a reference to the agreement applying to the employee in relation to particular employment.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
The last sentence of clause 3.3 is similar to the terms of clause 1.2 of the coverage clause considered by the Full Court in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v John Holland Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 16; 228 FCR 297 (at [9]), and similar in concept to clause 2(b) of the agreement considered in MI&E Holdings Pty Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2015] FCAFC 15; 228 FCR 483 (at [22]).The decision of the Full Bench The contentious feature of clause 3.3 of the Agreement is the last paragraph, and its provision for greenfields or project-specific agreements to cover the applicant and any employees at a particular project or site to the exclusion of the Agreement. There are two elements of the Full Bench’s reasons that are material. First, the Full Bench held that the last paragraph of clause 3.3 purported to exclude the coverage of the Agreement in favour of a later agreement for a specific project or site, and that this feature offended s 58(2) of the FW Act. The Full Bench stated at [16] that –It is clear, we consider, that the final paragraph of clause 3.3 of the Agreement, properly construed, offends s 58(2)(d)(i). In the terms in which the paragraph is expressed, it operated before as well as after the nominal expiry date of the Agreement. It provides that a later enterprise agreement approved by the Commission will cover CPB and its employees at a particular project or site “to the exclusion of this Agreement”. The provision is premised on the proposition that such a project or site is one which falls within the coverage of the Agreement as set out in the first paragraph of clause 3.3, since the rationale of the provision is plainly to resolve a situation in dual coverage. The final paragraph purports to exclude the coverage of the Agreement (being the earlier agreement) in favour of the later agreement for a specific project or site. As earlier explained, an agreement cannot apply to employees unless it covers them. The intended effect of the final paragraph of clause 3.3 is therefore that the later agreement will apply and the Agreement will not at the specific project or site in question. While the Agreement remains within its nominal term, that is a result which is directly contrary to that mandated by s 58(2).(emphasis in original) We take the Full Bench’s statement that clause 3.3 offended s 58(2) to mean that the Full Bench considered that clause 3.3 was inconsistent with, or repugnant to s 58(2) of the FW Act: Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd v Marmara [2014] FCAFC 84; 222 FCR 152 at [74], [94]-[97]. The Full Bench did not in terms state that clause 3.3 would therefore be void for the reason it was inconsistent with s 58(2), but held that clause 3.3 would be rendered unlawful by s 194(ba) of the FW Act, which is the second material element of the Full Bench’s reasons. The Full Bench held that the last paragraph of clause 3.3 provided for a method by which the applicant and a sub-set of employees might elect not to be covered by the Agreement, which rendered the term unlawful. At [18] of its reasons the Full Bench stated –Section 194(ba) could not, of course, be understood as proscribing a term which merely contemplates the making, in accordance with the FW Act, of a new enterprise agreement which overlaps in coverage with an existing agreement and has application after the nominal term of the existing agreement has passed in accordance with s 58 of the FW Act. That would not constitute a method for an election not to be covered by an agreement, but simply the taking of a course expressly permitted by the FW Act under which an existing agreement may wholly or partially be replaced in its operation by a new agreement made in accordance with the FW Act once its nominal expiry date has passed. However, the final paragraph of clause 3.3 does something different: it uses the mechanism of the making and approval of a new project or site/specific enterprise agreement as a means by which CPB and a subset of employees covered by the Agreement may cease to be covered by the Agreement before its nominal expiry date. This would clearly involve a mutual election not to be covered on the part of CPB and the relevant employees (effected, in the case of CPB, by proposing a new agreement and, in the case of the relevant employees, by voting to approve the new agreement). That an election under a method proscribed by s 194(ba) may be mutual is made clear by the words “unilaterally or otherwise” in the provision.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Full Bench determined that the unlawful nature of the last paragraph of clause 3.3 could be remedied by an undertaking by the applicant to remove, or to treat the last paragraph as being of no effect, and that the appropriate course was to quash the decision, and to remit the application for approval to another Commissioner for rehearing, on which occasion the applicant would have the opportunity to offer such an undertaking.ConsiderationSection 58(2) of the FW Act There are two difficulties with the reasoning of the Full Bench in relation to the suggestion that the last paragraph of clause 3.3 was inconsistent with or repugnant to s 58(2) of the FW Act. First, clause 3.3 is concerned with coverage, and not application. By operation of s 53(6), coverage under an enterprise agreement is coverage in relation to particular employment, which directs attention to the job description in the enterprise agreement: Aldi at [31]. The last paragraph of clause 3.3 expresses an objective intent that future greenfields or site specific agreements will cover the applicant and any employees at that particular project or site to the exclusion of the Agreement. That objective might be achieved by the use of job descriptions in a greenfields or site-specific agreement that identify the employment which is the subject of coverage under that agreement as being specific to the relevant project or site, as the last paragraph of clause 3.3 would suggest. Any such agreement would be subject to the approval of the FWC, which must be satisfied that a group of employees covered by the agreement is fairly chosen, taking into account whether the group is geographically, operationally or organisationally distinct: FW Act, s 186(3), (3A). On the assumption that such a greenfields or site specific agreement might thereby cover different jobs, it is an error to suppose, as the Full Bench did at [16] of its reasons, that employment at such a project or site would otherwise fall within the Agreement. This is particularly so when clause 3.3 specifically contemplates that such employment would not be covered by the Agreement. The second difficulty, which is related to the first, is that without knowing the terms of any greenfields or site-specific agreement, and without examining the circumstances of any particular employees, there was no proper foundation for the Full Bench’s conclusion that clause 3.3 offended s 58(2)(d)(i). As senior counsel for the AWU submitted, if a new employee commenced employment at a greenfields site that was subject to a greenfields agreement, then because that employee would be excluded from coverage under the Agreement by clause 3.3, no question of coverage by the Agreement would arise, and the circumstances contemplated by s 58(2) could not arise. This is the type of situation to which Buchanan J (with whom Besanko J agreed, and Barker J generally agreed) referred in MI&E Holdings at [42] –The enterprise agreement applied (subject to cl 2(b)) to an identified range of employees in Western Australia. In the case of persons who were to be employed at a new project, but had not yet been engaged, the enterprise agreement could not apply to them until they became employed. If, before then, a valid greenfields agreement was made which covered their employment I see no reason at present why cl 2(b) would not be effective. The condition in s 58(2)(a) (that the earlier agreement applies) would not be engaged in relation to such employees. At the time of employment the greenfields agreement would apply and the enterprise agreement would not cover them. Section 58 would not operate in those circumstances.