Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ

CONSTRUCTION FORESTRY MINING &
ENERGY UNION  APPELLANT

AND

MAMMOET AUSTRALIA PTY LTD  RESPONDENT

Construction Forestry Mining & Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd

[2013] HCA 36

14 August 2013

P26/2013

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside the orders of the Federal Court of Australia made on 14 August 2012 and, in their place, order that:

(a)the appeal from the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia to the Federal Court be allowed;

(b)the order of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 20 October 2011 be set aside; and

(c)the application be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to be heard and determined according to law.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

J K Kirk SC with T J Dixon for the appellant (instructed by Construction Forestry Mining & Energy Union)

S J Wood SC with C O H Parkinson for the respondent (instructed by Lander & Rogers Lawyers)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Construction Forestry Mining & Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd

Industrial law (Cth) – Payments relating to periods of industrial action – Where employer provided employees with accommodation under enterprise agreement – Where employees took "protected industrial action" within meaning of s 408 of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ("Act") – Where employer ceased to provide accommodation to employees for duration of "protected industrial action" – Whether provision of accommodation a "payment to an employee in relation to the total duration of the industrial action" under s 470(1) of Act.

Industrial law (Cth) – Enterprise agreement – Whether employees entitled to accommodation under terms of enterprise agreement when not ready, willing and available to work.

Words and phrases – "adverse action", "enterprise agreement", "in relation to", "payment", "protected industrial action", "ready, willing and available to work".

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 323, 332, 340, 342, 408, 470.

  1. CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ.   The appellant, an organisation of employees registered under the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth), represents the industrial interests of a number of employees of the respondent who worked on construction at the Woodside Pluto Liquefied Natural Gas Project ("the Project") located on the Burrup Peninsula in the remote north‑west of Western Australia. The Project principal was Woodside Burrup Pty Ltd ("Woodside").

  2. The employees worked pursuant to "fly in/fly out" arrangements, under which the respondent provided their accommodation while on location.

  3. The respondent was notified of the intention of some of its employees, including the four employees who are the subject of these proceedings ("the relevant employees"), to engage in industrial action as part of the process of negotiating an enterprise agreement with the respondent under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ("the Act"). It is common ground that this action was "protected industrial action" within the meaning of s 408 of the Act.…

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Details
Case
[2013] HCA 36
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal concerning the Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union and Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd. The dispute arose when Mammoet Australia ceased providing accommodation to employees during periods of protected industrial action, despite the employees being classified as "Distant Workers" under their enterprise agreement. The agreement stipulated that Distant Workers were entitled to either suitable board and lodging or a living away from home allowance.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the provision of accommodation constituted a "payment to an employee in relation to the total duration of the industrial action" under section 470(1) of the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth), and whether employees were entitled to accommodation under the terms of their enterprise agreement when they were not ready, willing, and available to work. The union argued that ceasing to provide accommodation during protected industrial action was unlawful adverse action and a contravention of the Act.

The High Court reasoned that the employer's decision to withdraw accommodation was not an automatic legal consequence of the employees' conduct but rather a deliberate response to their protected industrial action. The Court found that this action by the employer was a choice, which section 340(1) of the *Fair Work Act* prohibited. Therefore, the employer's refusal to provide accommodation was considered a contravention of the Act, irrespective of whether the employees' actions breached the enterprise agreement.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Court of Australia, and remitted the application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to be heard and determined according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the orders of the Federal Court of Australia made on 14 August 2012 and, in their place, order that:

(a) the appeal from the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia to the Federal Court be allowed;

(b) the order of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 20 October 2011 be set aside; and

(c) the application be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to be heard and determined according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow, the appeal to this Court should be allowed. Background The employment of the relevant employees was regulated by an enterprise agreement entitled the Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd Pluto Project Greenfields Agreement 2008 ("the Agreement"). The Agreement was an employer greenfields agreement made under s 330 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ("the WR Act"). The operation of the Agreement was continued as a collective agreement-based transitional instrument by Item 2 of Sched 3 of the Fair Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009 (Cth) ("the Transitional Act"). The Agreement passed its nominal expiry date on 19 September 2009 and had not been terminated or replaced by April 2010. The case proceeded on the footing that the terms of the Agreement continued to regulate the employment relationship. Clause 38 of the Agreement was headed "Contract of Service". It contained the following relevant sub-clauses:"STAND DOWNS(6)The Company is entitled to deduct payment for any day or part of a day an Employee cannot be usefully employed because of any strike or any breakdown in machinery or any stoppage of work by any cause for which the Company cannot be reasonably held responsible, as long as the Company has no useful alternative work available.…GENERAL CONDITIONS…(13)Employees shall have no right to be paid for any time that they are not ready, willing and available to follow all lawful directions of the Company or to carry out all duties that they are capable of performing.…ABANDONMENT OF EMPLOYMENT(16)Should an Employee have three (3) consecutive days of unauthorised absence from work, the Employee shall be deemed to have abandoned their employment, unless, through exceptional circumstances they have been unable to communicate their absence to the Company." Clause 42 of the Agreement provided that "Employees classified as Distant Workers as defined … shall be entitled to the conditions contained at Appendix 7". "Distant Worker" was defined as: "An Employee who is engaged or selected or advised by the Company to proceed from their Usual Place of Residence within Australia to construction work on the Burrup Peninsula and the Employee does so and that work is at such a distance that the Employee cannot return to their Usual Place of Residence each night." "Usual Place of Residence" was defined as:"The Employee's place of residence at which they would usually reside and to which they cannot return to [sic] each night because they have proceeded to work on the Project at the direction of the Company." Appendix 7 contained the following relevant clauses:"(6)The Company shall have the choice of providing each Distant Worker with either suitable board and lodging or paying the Living Away from Home Allowance set out in this Appendix.…(16)A Distant Worker shall, for the return journey to the location of their initial engagement, receive the same time, fares and meal payments … provided that no return payments shall be made if the Distant Worker:(a)terminates or discontinues their employment before completing four hundred and eighty (480) Project Working Hours of service on the Site (or prior to the job completion if the work is for less than two months); or(b)is dismissed for incompetence within eight (8) ordinary weeks of commencing on the job; or(c) is dismissed for misconduct."

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ
The refusal of the accommodation was not an automatic consequence of the operation of the law upon the conduct of the relevant employees. The denial of the use of accommodation resulted from the respondent's action by way of response to the protected industrial action of the relevant employees. Even if that action put them in breach of the Agreement, the respondent's action in response was a matter of choice by it, a choice which s 340(1) of the Act denied to it.Conclusion The appeal should be allowed. The orders below should be set aside. The application should be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court to be heard and determined according to law.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ

Full text does not contain this section.