Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Keating

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (CTH)  INFORMANT

AND

KELLI ANNE KEATING  DEFENDANT

Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Keating

[2013] HCA 20

8 May 2013

M5/2013

ORDER

1.The questions in the stated case dated 19 December 2012 be answered as follows:

Question 1

Does section 66A of the Administration Act create a duty, from 20 March 2000, for the purposes of section 4.3(b) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, such that a failure to inform the Department of the occurrence of an event or a change of circumstances as required by section 66A of the Administration Act amounts to "engaging in conduct" for the purposes of section 135.2(1)(a) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code?

Answer

No.

Question 2

If yes to Question 1, is section 66A of the Administration Act invalid, insofar as it has retrospective effect, because it

infringes the separation of judicial and legislative powers mandated by the Constitution?

Answer

Does not arise.

Question 3

Did the notices issued to the defendant, as identified in paragraphs 13 and 15 of the stated case, or any of them, create a duty for the purposes of section 4.3(b) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, such that a failure to perform the act or acts required by the notice or notices amounts to "engaging in conduct" for the purposes of section 135.2(1)(a) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code?

Answer

The notices issued to the defendant, as identified in paragraphs 13 and 15 of the stated case, were, in each case, capable of creating a duty for the purposes of s 4.3(b) of the Code such that a failure to perform the act or acts required by the notice or notices amounts to "engaging in conduct" for the purposes of s 135.2(1)(a) of the Code.

Question 4

What order for costs, if any, should be made?

Answer

Each party should bear its own costs of the stated case.

2.Remit the whole of the cause in Action No A13050181 in which Kelli Anne Keating is the defendant and the Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) appears for the informant to the Magistrates' Court of Victoria.

Representation

W J Abraham QC with G A Hill for the informant (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth))

D S Mortimer SC with K L Walker and F I Gordon for the defendant (instructed by Victoria Legal Aid)

Interveners

J T Gleeson SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with R C A Higgins and D M Forrester for the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, intervening (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

M G Hinton QC, Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia with C Jacobi for the Attorney-General for the State of South Australia, intervening (instructed by Crown Solicitor (SA))

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ.   On 14 December 2012, the whole of the cause pending…

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Details
Case
[2013] HCA 20
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) appealed to the High Court of Australia concerning charges laid against Kelli Anne Keating. Keating was charged with obtaining financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity contrary to s 135.2(1) of the *Criminal Code* (Cth). The dispute centred on whether Keating's failure to advise the Department of changes in her income constituted the physical element of the offence, specifically an omission to perform an act that she was by law required to perform.

The High Court was required to determine two primary legal issues. First, whether s 66A of the *Social Security (Administration) Act 1999* (Cth) created a duty for the purposes of s 4.3(b) of the *Criminal Code* (Cth) prior to the date on which the Act inserting s 66A received Royal Assent. Second, whether notices issued to Keating under ss 67(2) and 68(2) of the *Social Security (Administration) Act 1999* (Cth) were capable of creating a duty for the purposes of s 4.3(b) of the *Criminal Code* (Cth).

The Court reasoned that s 66A of the *Social Security (Administration) Act 1999* (Cth) did not create a duty for the purposes of s 4.3(b) of the *Criminal Code* (Cth) from 20 March 2000, as it had not yet received Royal Assent and therefore could not impose a legal duty retrospectively. However, the Court held that notices issued under ss 67(2) and 68(2) of the *Social Security (Administration) Act 1999* (Cth) were capable of creating a duty for the purposes of s 4.3(b) of the *Criminal Code* (Cth). The Court found that s 74(1) of the *Social Security (Administration) Act 1999* (Cth) imposed a legal obligation to comply with such notices to the extent that the recipient was capable of doing so, subject to having a reasonable excuse. The limitations on this duty did not negate the existence of a legal obligation.

The High Court answered the questions in the stated case. It determined that s 66A of the *Social Security (Administration) Act 1999* (Cth) did not create a duty for the purposes of s 4.3(b) of the *Criminal Code* (Cth) from 20 March 2000. Conversely, it found that the notices issued to Keating were capable of creating such a duty. The Court ordered that each party bear its own costs of the stated case and remitted the matter to the Magistrates' Court of Victoria.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The questions in the stated case dated 19 December 2012 be answered as follows:

Question 1

Does section 66A of the Administration Act create a duty, from 20 March 2000, for the purposes of section 4.3(b) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, such that a failure to inform the Department of the occurrence of an event or a change of circumstances as required by section 66A of the Administration Act amounts to "engaging in conduct" for the purposes of section 135.2(1)(a) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code?

Answer

No.

Question 2

If yes to Question 1, is section 66A of the Administration Act invalid, insofar as it has retrospective effect, because it

infringes the separation of judicial and legislative powers mandated by the Constitution?

Answer

Does not arise.

Question 3

Did the notices issued to the defendant, as identified in paragraphs 13 and 15 of the stated case, or any of them, create a duty for the purposes of section 4.3(b) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, such that a failure to perform the act or acts required by the notice or notices amounts to "engaging in conduct" for the purposes of section 135.2(1)(a) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code?

Answer

The notices issued to the defendant, as identified in paragraphs 13 and 15 of the stated case, were, in each case, capable of creating a duty for the purposes of s 4.3(b) of the Code such that a failure to perform the act or acts required by the notice or notices amounts to "engaging in conduct" for the purposes of s 135.2(1)(a) of the Code.

Question 4

What order for costs, if any, should be made?

Answer

Each party should bear its own costs of the stated case.

2. Remit the whole of the cause in Action No A13050181 in which Kelli Anne Keating is the defendant and the Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) appears for the informant to the Magistrates' Court of Victoria.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ

The receipt of any of the information notices by the defendant is an issue between the parties.The duty imposed under s 74 of the Administration Act Section 74 of the Administration Act provides: "Offence—failure to comply with notice (1)A person must not refuse or fail to comply with a notice under section 67, 68, 69, 70 or 70A. Penalty: Imprisonment for 6 months.(2)Subsection (1) applies only to the extent to which the person is capable of complying with the notice. (3)Subsection (1) does not apply if the person has a reasonable excuse. (4)Subsection (1) is an offence of strict liability." The defendant offers three reasons in support of her contention that the act which an information notice requires the recipient to perform is not "an act that by law there is a duty to perform" within the exclusion provided by s 4.3(b) of the Code. First, she submits that a legal duty to act must be certain and it is unclear when the duty under an information notice arises and when it ceases. Secondly, the duty is "qualified" in that it does not apply to the extent that a person is incapable of complying with the notice, and does not apply to a person who has a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. Thirdly, the creation of the lesser offence under the Administration Act for a failure to comply with an information notice is inconsistent with the same conduct attracting criminal responsibility for the more serious offence under the Code. The defendant says that to interpret the offence under s 74 as providing a "general duty" for the purposes of s 4.3(b) would subvert the scheme of the Administration Act. Section 74(1) of the Administration Act imposes a duty on a person to comply with an information notice. The limitations on the duty for which s 74 provides do not deny that there is a legal obligation on a person to comply with an information notice to the extent that the person is capable of so doing, subject only to the person having a reasonable excuse for refusing or failing to comply with the notice. A conviction for an offence under s 135.2(1) based on the intentional failure to comply with an information notice may bar a subsequent prosecution for an offence under s 74(1) of the Administration Act based on the same omission[24]. This is not to say that the Code and the Administration Act are inconsistent merely because the conduct that constitutes the offence under the Administration Act also constitutes an element of the more serious offence under the Code. Imposing liability under s 135.2(1) does not "subvert" the scheme of the Administration Act because the offence under s 135.2(1) contains different elements. [24]Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 at 616-620 [18]-[28] per McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ; [1998] HCA 57. The recipient of an information notice is under a legal duty to comply with the notice. What is required in order to discharge the duty will depend upon the terms of the notice. The intentional failure to comply with the notice, where the failure results in the recipient obtaining a financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity knowing or believing that he or she is not eligible to receive the financial advantage, is an offence contrary to s 135.2(1) of the Code.