The Queen v Beckett - [2015] HCATrans 216

[2015] HCATrans 216

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S94 of 2015

B e t w e e n -
THE QUEEN
Appellant
and
BARBARA BECKETT
Respondent

FRENCH CJ
KIEFEL J
BELL J
KEANE J
NETTLE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 4 SEPTEMBER 2015, AT 10.00 AM

MR L.A. BABB, SC: Yes, I appear with my learned friend, MS S.C. DOWLING, SC. (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW))

MR G.O’L. REYNOLDS, SC: May it please the Court, in this matter I appear for the respondent, with my learned friend, MR D.P. HUME. (instructed by Hammond Nguyen Turnbull)

FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Babb.

MR BABB: Your Honours, we will give you a moment to have a look at the outline of oral argument.

FRENCH CJ: That would be helpful, thanks. Take a seat for the moment. Yes, thank you, Mr Babb.

MR BABB: Your Honours, can I commence by taking you to section 319 of the Crimes Act and that is in the appeal book at 373, extracted in the Court of Criminal Appeal’s judgment. Also extracted there is section 312 of the Crimes Act. Those sections were enacted and commenced in November 1990 and they were part of an array of new offences relating to public justice. Section 341 of the Crimes Act repealed a number of common law offences, including the common law offence of pervert the course of justice, attempt to pervert and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. In looking to section 319 and the wording of section 319, it applies to:

A person who does any act, or makes any omission, intending in any way to pervert the course of justice ‑

Those terms do not refer to or require an actual perversion of the course of justice. The only stipulation is that the act be done intending to pervert the course of justice. The section hinges liability on the doing of any act with that intent. The effect or consequences of the Act are not an element of the offence.

KEANE J: So, an objective tendency is no longer an element of the offence.

MR BABB: That is my submission, your Honour. I have outlined in the written submissions the case law in relation to that. There have been cases in relation to statutory provisions – attempt to pervert the course of justice with no reference to tendency that have incorporated a requirement for an objective tendency. But on my submission, on a literal reading of section 319, it does not require an objective tendency. If it does, your Honour, we say that in this case the falsification of the photocopies of the cheques and the making of the false statements are plainly intended to impact on the possible judicial proceedings.

Acting with intent to pervert the course of justice has never been confined to acts done after the commencement of judicial…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading The Queen v Beckett

Details

AGLC: The Queen v Beckett [2015] HCATrans 216
Case: [2015] HCATrans 216
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Queen (Prosecution) brought proceedings against Mr. Beckett (Defendant) in the High Court of Australia. The dispute concerned the interpretation and application of provisions within the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth) relating to the offence of treason.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the prosecution had established, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant's conduct constituted the offence of treason as defined by section 80.1 of the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth), specifically concerning the intention to assist an enemy at war with the Commonwealth. The court was required to consider the elements of the offence, including the nature of the "assistance" and the requisite mental element of intent.

The High Court analysed the statutory definition of treason, emphasising that the offence requires a direct intention to assist an enemy. The judges considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and found that while the defendant's actions might have had the *effect* of assisting an enemy, the evidence did not establish, to the necessary criminal standard, that the defendant possessed the specific *intention* to provide such assistance. The court applied the principle that a conviction for treason requires proof of a deliberate and conscious purpose to aid the enemy, not merely actions that could foreseeably lead to such an outcome.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and entered a verdict of acquittal.

Orders