AB v Chief Commissioner of Police

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AB v Chief Commissioner of Police [2020] FCA 14

File number: VID 1338 of 2019
Judge: WHEELAHAN J
Date of judgment: 10 January 2020
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review – permission for registered sex offenders to leave Australia –
– review of decision of competent authority in response to an application for permission to travel for the purposes of s 271A.1 of the Criminal CodeAct 1995 (Cth) – terms of permission – relevant considerations – whether decision unreasonable – whether irrelevant considerations taken into account – whether relevant considerations not taken into account – whether merits of the case not addressed – whether denial of natural justice – whether decision contrary to law – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 25D, 33(1)

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(a), (b), (e), (f), (h) and (j), 5(2)(a), (b), (c), (f) and(g), 13(1)

Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth), ss 12(1A), 22AA

Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 49A, 55

Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2016 (Vic)

Crimes (Sexual Offences) Act 1980 (Vic)

Crimes (Sexual Offences) Act 1991 (Vic)

Criminal CodeAct 1995 (Cth) s 271A.1

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37G(1)(a) and (d), 37AJ, 37AG(1)(c)

Passports Legislation Amendment (Overseas Travel by Child Sex Offenders) Act 2017 (Cth)

Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2G)

Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic)

Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (Vic) ss 1, 4A, 14, 16-21A, 34, Division 6, 46, 47, 61A-61G, 62, 63, 70

Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (US)

Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (US)

Cases cited:

Ammouche v Chief Commissioner of Police [2018] FCA 1703; 266 FCR 430

Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1

Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2005) 148 FCR 446

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; 187 CLR 384

Coco v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (1993) 43 FCR 140

Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 293; 49 FCR 576

CPB Contractors Pty Limited v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union[2019] FCAFC 70

Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212

DKG v Commissioner of Police [2019] NSWSC 523

Dornan v Riordan (1990) 24 FCR 564

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; 250 CLR 503

Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203; 160 ALD 123

Hindi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 1

Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20; 263 CLR 338

Kaufman v Chief Commissioner of Police [2019] FCA 1996

Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1

Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70

Mentink v Commissioner for Queensland Police [2018] QSC 151; 353 FLR 64

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 14
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AB v Chief Commissioner of Police, the applicant, a registered sex offender, sought judicial review of the Chief Commissioner of Police's decision to deny his application for permission to travel outside Australia. The applicant, who had been convicted of indecent assault of a minor in 1973, sought to travel to several countries, including some that provide less protection for children than Australia. The Chief Commissioner exercised his power under section 271A.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) to refuse the applicant's application based on the risk he posed to children.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Chief Commissioner's decision was unreasonable and whether there was a breach of the rules of natural justice. The applicant argued that the decision was unreasonable because the Chief Commissioner failed to consider relevant factors, took into account irrelevant factors, did not address the merits of the case, and breached natural justice by not allowing the applicant to respond to concerns about his case manager's comments and the potential presence of children on the cruise.

The court found that the Chief Commissioner's decision was not unreasonable. The Chief Commissioner had appropriately considered the applicant's sexual offending history, the expert opinion on the risk of re-offending, and other factors relevant to the decision. The court also found that there was no breach of natural justice, as the Chief Commissioner was not required to provide the applicant with an opportunity to respond to every concern raised in the decision-making process.

The court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review and made orders for anonymity, leave to amend the originating application, and no order as to costs. The court found that the Chief Commissioner's decision was not contrary to law and did not breach the rules of natural justice.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the name of the applicant be replaced by a pseudonym, being ‘AB’, and the name of the applicant’s wife be replaced by a pseudonym, being ‘CD’ for the purposes of the transcript, and there not for a period of 45 years be publication of any information relating to this proceeding tending to identify the applicant or his wife.

2. Until further order, the court file in this proceeding not be available for public inspection.

3. The applicant have leave to amend his originating application in the form filed with the Court on 9 January 2020.

4. The application be dismissed.

5. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the circumstances, I have not considered whether there was any merit in the Chief Commissioner’s submission in reliance on O’Donoghue v Ireland, and I express no view about it.Background The applicant is in his late 60s, has been married to his wife since the early 1970s, and has four adult children. In 2012, the applicant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria to three charges of unlawfully and indecently assaulting a girl. The offences occurred on two separate days in 1973 when the applicant was aged about 23. The applicant was convicted and placed upon a good behaviour bond, and ordered to pay $2,000 into the Court fund. The victim of the applicant’s offending was 8 or 9 years of age at the time of the offending, and was his sister-in-law, that is, his wife’s sister. The child victim of the offending informed some of her family members of the offending at various times in later years. In 2007, the applicant and the victim communicated about the offending, and the applicant apologised to the victim. In 2008, the victim reported the offending to the police, subsequent to which the applicant was arrested and interviewed. During the interview, the applicant made some admissions. At the end of 2011, the applicant was charged with six offences, and at the beginning of 2012 he was charged with a seventh offence. Four of the charges were later withdrawn, and the applicant pleaded guilty to three charges of unlawful and indecent assault of a girl. The evidence does not disclose the reason for the delay in bringing the charges following the applicant’s arrest and interview. In July 2007, the applicant commenced seeing a forensic psychologist with specialist expertise in assessing and treating persons who have sexually offended. The applicant was referred to the psychologist before the police became involved in 2008. The applicant attended 18 sessions with the psychologist between 2007 and 2012. In 2012, the psychologist prepared a report that was before the sentencing Magistrate. The report is lengthy and it is unnecessary fully to summarise it for present purposes. The material features of the report are as follows –·The applicant’s developmental history was such that he matured late, was socially awkward, had an avoidant type personality, and probably lacked emotional regulation skills.·By reason of his acceptance into his wife’s family, the applicant had access to his young victim with the power and control that the situation set up.·The applicant’s offending was predatory, opportunistic and impulsive, and at the time, he showed no regard or empathy to the victim.·There was no further criminal history, sexual or non-sexual, recorded or suggested, so it appeared that the applicant’s offending was situational.·As to the risk of re-offending, the psychologist employed the “Static-99” risk assessment, which is designed to assist in the prediction of sexual recidivism amongst adult males. Using that instrument, the psychologist considered that the applicant fell into the low risk category, as the applicant had a score of 0 on a scale of 0 to 6. That score corresponded statistically with groups that have about a 6% likelihood of being convicted of a new sexual offence within five years, 7% within ten years, and 7% within 15 years “post release”. The psychologist also referred to research on the Static-99 calculations that showed that a lengthy period of living offence-free in the community, and being over the age of 60 years, reduced the recidivism rates to about 2%. The psychologist stated that given that the applicant’s sexual offending was (at the time of the report) 39 years earlier, and that there had been no further offending since 1973, he agreed that the applicant was a low risk of sexually reoffending.·The psychologist was also of the opinion that the risk factors referrable to the applicant were all past risk factors, and that he showed no evidence of any present or future risk factors for consideration.·The psychologist was of the opinion that the applicant’s sexual offending appeared to be a situational and opportunistic offending that was facilitated by his lack of maturity, emotional regulation, and social skills, rather than driven by any deviant sexual interests. He expressed the opinion that after his lengthy therapeutic interventions the applicant understood his motivation to offend as well as the full impact of that behaviour on his victim, and was sincerely repentant.·The psychologist also referred to the applicant’s social supports, namely his wife and four adult children, who, although they did not condone the applicant’s behaviour, supported him. The psychologist stated that the applicant had a thorough understanding of the negative impact of sexual offending on his victim and society as well as his family, and that he was unlikely to repeat any type of future offending.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 33(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) has the effect that the power impliedly conferred by s 271A.1 of the Criminal Code may be exercised from time to time as the occasion requires. The Chief Commissioner did not seek to defend the first decision, and submitted that the second decision is the operative decision because it is a fresh decision on the merits in response to the new information that was furnished by the applicant. In my view, the second decision is a supervening event, and the consideration of any question whether the first decision should be quashed would be inutile: see, Coco v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (1993) 43 FCR 140 at 143 (Lockhart J). During argument, counsel for the applicant accepted that the relevant decision was the second decision, and I shall therefore confine my consideration to the second decision.The second decision I have set out the material parts of the reasons for the second decision at [22] above. In summary –(1)The Chief Commissioner placed weight on the applicant’s sexual offending history. By the fact of the conviction for the offences, the Chief Commissioner concluded that there was a risk that the applicant may offend against children in the future. The Chief Commissioner also accepted the opinion of the applicant’s psychologist, which was the only expert opinion before the Chief Commissioner on the question of risk, that the applicant had a low ongoing risk of sexual re-offending, and the Chief Commissioner concluded that there remained an appreciable risk, albeit low.(2)As to factors mitigating the risk, the Chief Commissioner took account of, and gave weight to –(a)the fact that the sexual offending occurred 46 years ago; and(b)the applicant’s wife would be accompanying him on the proposed trip and was aware of his past offending.However, the Chief Commissioner did not consider these factors eliminated the risk.(3)The Chief Commissioner did not consider that the statement by the applicant’s case manager, Senior Constable Towner, that the overseas travel was not opposed, affected his assessment, and stated that he did not understand the basis on which Senior Constable Towner had stated that there would be “nil child contact”.(4)There were three other matters to which the Chief Commissioner gave weight in a way adverse to the applicant –(a)three of the countries which the applicant proposed to visit afforded children less protection than Australia, and were classed as “Tier 2” countries for the purposes of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (US);(b)the applicant would be away from Australia for a period of 44 days, and therefore outside the sex offender management schemes within Australia for that period; and(c)in relation to the 10-day cruise, it was not known if there would be any children on the vessel.(5)The protective purposes of the legislation outweighed –(a)the reasons that the applicant had given for the travel; and(b)the likelihood that the applicant would lose the monies that had been paid on account of the tour.In respect of both the above matters, the Chief Commissioner gave them little weight.Consideration of the applicant’s grounds(1)Breach of the rules of natural justice – ADJR Act, s 5(1)(a)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I have set out the material parts of the reasons for the second decision at [22] above. In summary –(1)The Chief Commissioner placed weight on the applicant’s sexual offending history. By the fact of the conviction for the offences, the Chief Commissioner concluded that there was a risk that the applicant may offend against children in the future. The Chief Commissioner also accepted the opinion of the applicant’s psychologist, which was the only expert opinion before the Chief Commissioner on the question of risk, that the applicant had a low ongoing risk of sexual re-offending, and the Chief Commissioner concluded that there remained an appreciable risk, albeit low.(2)As to factors mitigating the risk, the Chief Commissioner took account of, and gave weight to –(a)the fact that the sexual offending occurred 46 years ago; and(b)the applicant’s wife would be accompanying him on the proposed trip and was aware of his past offending.However, the Chief Commissioner did not consider these factors eliminated the risk.(3)The Chief Commissioner did not consider that the statement by the applicant’s case manager, Senior Constable Towner, that the overseas travel was not opposed, affected his assessment, and stated that he did not understand the basis on which Senior Constable Towner had stated that there would be “nil child contact”.(4)There were three other matters to which the Chief Commissioner gave weight in a way adverse to the applicant –(a)three of the countries which the applicant proposed to visit afforded children less protection than Australia, and were classed as “Tier 2” countries for the purposes of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (US);(b)the applicant would be away from Australia for a period of 44 days, and therefore outside the sex offender management schemes within Australia for that period; and(c)in relation to the 10-day cruise, it was not known if there would be any children on the vessel.(5)The protective purposes of the legislation outweighed –(a)the reasons that the applicant had given for the travel; and(b)the likelihood that the applicant would lose the monies that had been paid on account of the tour.In respect of both the above matters, the Chief Commissioner gave them little weight.Consideration of the applicant’s grounds(1)Breach of the rules of natural justice – ADJR Act, s 5(1)(a) The applicant submitted that there was a breach of the rules of natural justice in five respects.(a)The applicant was not afforded the opportunity to respond to the Chief Commissioner’s concerns in relation to the comments of the case manager, Senior Constable Towner, and the passengers who would be on board the vessel for the cruise. In considering the applicant’s request for permission to leave Australia for the purposes of s 271A.1 of the Criminal Code, the Chief Commissioner was required to accord the applicant procedural fairness: Ammouche at [95], citing Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 at 598. However, I express the tentative view that the content of those rules may be informed and shaped by the nature of the discretionary power, and its legal consequences. As I have indicated, the implied conferral of power to give permission to leave Australia is one that may be exercised from time to time. A refusal of permission does not have the legal consequence that the Commissioner may not re-consider the decision, as the decisions in Ammouche, Kaufman v Chief Commissioner of Police [2019] FCA 1996, and this case illustrate. Subject to the particular circumstances, a denial of procedural fairness might occur if the Chief Commissioner declined to reconsider a refusal of permission in light of answering material or new information.