FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Transcon Holding Pty Ltd v Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission [2020] FCA 780
Review of: Transcon Holding Pty Ltd and Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner [2020] AATA 90 (23 January 2020) File number: NSD 187 of 2020 Judge: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 5 June 2020 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Application for extension of time to appeal from interlocutory decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) pursuant to s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) – Whether decision by the Tribunal to refuse an application for stay is a “decision” to which s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) applies – Whether appeal is competent – Where substantive appeal has no merit because the appeal is incompetent – Application for an extension of time in which to appeal is dismissed Legislation: Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) s 10-3(7)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 41(2), 44(1), 44(2A)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 4.01(2)
Cases cited: Chief of Navy v Angre [2016] FCAFC 171; (2016) 244 FCR 457
Director-General of Social Services v Chaney [1980] FCA 87; (1980) 31 ALR 571
Frugtniet v Tax Practitioners Board [2013] FCA 752; (2013) 136 ALD 324
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344
Kishore v Tax Practitioners Board [2016] FCA 1328; (2016) 244 FCR 320
Kowalski v Repatriation Commission [2009] FCAFC 107; (2009) 259 ALR 444Kumar v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2019] FCA 202
Mahaffy v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2015] FCA 251
MDXJ v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2019] FCA 2163
Date of hearing: 2 June 2020 Date of last submission: 3 June 2020 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 28 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms J Wu appeared on behalf of the Applicant Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr K Eskerie of Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 187 of 2020 BETWEEN: TRANSCON HOLDING PTY LTD
Applicant
AND: AGED CARE QUALITY AND SAFETY COMMISSION
Respondent
JUDGE:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 JUNE 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time in which to appeal is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM J:
The applicant was an approved home care provider under the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) (Aged Care Act), and on 8 August 2019, that approval was revoked pursuant to the then sub-section 10-3(7) of the Aged Care Act. On 4 October 2019, the applicant sought a formal reconsideration of the revocation decision, however, that decision was affirmed on 29 November 2019. By notice on 6 December 2019, the respondent notified the applicant that its…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 780
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the decision by the Tribunal to refuse a stay was a “decision” that could be appealed under section 44 of the AAT Act. Section 44 allows an appeal “on a question of law, from any decision of the Tribunal in that proceeding.” The court had to consider if the refusal of a stay constituted a final decision of the Tribunal. The respondent argued that the appeal was incompetent because the refusal of a stay was not a final decision and therefore not appealable under section 44. The court had to examine whether the decision to refuse a stay was a final decision or a preliminary order that did not dispose of the substantive merits of the application for review.
The court found that the decision to refuse a stay was not a final decision of the Tribunal but rather an interim order made for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing and determination by the Tribunal of the substantive application for review. This conclusion was based on the Full Court’s decision in Director-General of Social Services v Chaney, where it was held that an appeal under section 44(1) of the AAT Act lies only from a final decision or determination of the Tribunal. The court concluded that the refusal of a stay was not a final decision because it did not effectively dispose of the proceeding before the Tribunal. As a result, the appeal was incompetent, and the application for an extension of time was dismissed.
The court made an order dismissing the application for an extension of time and directed that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs. This decision reinforced the narrow interpretation of what constitutes a decision appealable under section 44 of the AAT Act and highlighted the importance of understanding the legislative framework for appeals from the Tribunal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time in which to appeal is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As explained below, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter. Consideration The power to extend time in which to appeal is unfettered, however, the authorities identify a number of matters bearing upon the exercise of the discretion to extend time. In Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349, Wilcox J identified a number of factors which are often cited in this regard. The matters to which the Court will usually have regard to, identified in that judgment, are: (1) the length of the extension sought; (2) the explanation for the delay, including consideration of any action taken by the applicant, other than by way of making an application for review; (3) the prejudice to the applicant if the extension of time is refused; (4) any relevant prejudice to a respondent if the extension of time is granted; (5) the conduct of the parties in the litigation; (6) the merits of the substantial application; and (7) the interests of justice more generally: see for example, Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] and [17] - [19] per Spender, O’Loughlin and Dowsett JJ. Although the respondent takes issue that no adequate explanation for the delay has been provided, it accepts that no prejudice is suffered from the delay. It also accepted that the delay was only four days. Regardless of any explanation for the delay, there is a more fundamental issue as to the merit of the substantive appeal if the extension were granted. As noted above, the respondent filed a notice of objection to competency. This is an application in relation to a refusal by the Tribunal to grant a stay of the decision revoking the applicant’s approval as a provider of aged care pending the hearing of the substantive review. As noted above, the appeal is pursuant to s 44 of the AAT Act, which relevantly is limited to appeals “on a question of law, from any decision of the Tribunal in that proceeding”: s 44(1) (emphasis added). In Director-General of Social Services v Chaney [1980] FCA 87; (1980) 31 ALR 571 (“Chaney”) the Full Court (Deane and Fisher JJ) held that “decision” in the context of s 44(1) is to be given a narrow meaning and refers to a final decision or determination of the Tribunal. Deane J at 593 (with Fisher J agreeing) concluded that:…an appeal under s 44(1) of the Act lies only from a decision of the Tribunal which constitutes the effective decision or determination of the application for review. Further at 594 Deane J stated: Nor, in my view, was the interim order made by the Tribunal suspending the operation of the decision of the Director-General, a decision of the Tribunal from which an appeal properly lay to this Court pursuant to s.44 of the Act. The fact that such an order has independent operative effect does not, in the circumstances, warrant further qualification of the general rule that an appeal under s.44(1) only lies from the determination effectively disposing of the proceeding before the Tribunal. Indeed, the power to make such an interim order pursuant to s.41(2) of the Act is, in terms, for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing and determination by the Tribunal of the application for review and could hardly have been intended to provide the occasion whereby the hearing and determination of an application for review could be frustrated and delayed by preliminary appeals brought, as a matter of right, upon any question of law that might happen to be involved in the making of an interim order.