Transcon Holding Pty Ltd v Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission

Link copied
Case Copied 12 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Transcon Holding Pty Ltd v Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission [2020] FCA 780

Review of: Transcon Holding Pty Ltd and Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner [2020] AATA 90 (23 January 2020)
File number: NSD 187 of 2020
Judge: ABRAHAM J
Date of judgment: 5 June 2020
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Application for extension of time to appeal from interlocutory decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) pursuant to s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) – Whether decision by the Tribunal to refuse an application for stay is a “decision” to which s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) applies – Whether appeal is competent – Where substantive appeal has no merit because the appeal is incompetent – Application for an extension of time in which to appeal is dismissed
Legislation:

Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) s 10-3(7)

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 41(2), 44(1), 44(2A)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 4.01(2)

Cases cited:

Chief of Navy v Angre [2016] FCAFC 171; (2016) 244 FCR 457

Director-General of Social Services v Chaney [1980] FCA 87; (1980) 31 ALR 571

Frugtniet v Tax Practitioners Board [2013] FCA 752; (2013) 136 ALD 324

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344

Kishore v Tax Practitioners Board [2016] FCA 1328; (2016) 244 FCR 320
Kowalski v Repatriation Commission [2009] FCAFC 107; (2009) 259 ALR 444

Kumar v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2019] FCA 202

Mahaffy v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2015] FCA 251

MDXJ v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2019] FCA 2163

Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133

Date of hearing: 2 June 2020
Date of last submission: 3 June 2020
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 28
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms J Wu appeared on behalf of the Applicant
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr K Eskerie of Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 187 of 2020
BETWEEN:

TRANSCON HOLDING PTY LTD

Applicant

AND:

AGED CARE QUALITY AND SAFETY COMMISSION

Respondent

JUDGE:

ABRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 JUNE 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time in which to appeal is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent to be agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ABRAHAM J:

  1. The applicant was an approved home care provider under the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) (Aged Care Act), and on 8 August 2019, that approval was revoked pursuant to the then sub-section 10-3(7) of the Aged Care Act. On 4 October 2019, the applicant sought a formal reconsideration of the revocation decision, however, that decision was affirmed on 29 November 2019. By notice on 6 December 2019, the respondent notified the applicant that its…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Transcon Holding Pty Ltd v Aged Care Quality and Safety Comm... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2020] FCA 780
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Transcon Holding Pty Ltd v Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission, the applicant sought an extension of time to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) to refuse a stay of a decision revoking the applicant’s approval as a provider of aged care. The Federal Court had to determine whether the decision to refuse a stay was a decision to which section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) applied, and if so, whether the appeal was competent.

The primary legal issue was whether the decision by the Tribunal to refuse a stay was a “decision” that could be appealed under section 44 of the AAT Act. Section 44 allows an appeal “on a question of law, from any decision of the Tribunal in that proceeding.” The court had to consider if the refusal of a stay constituted a final decision of the Tribunal. The respondent argued that the appeal was incompetent because the refusal of a stay was not a final decision and therefore not appealable under section 44. The court had to examine whether the decision to refuse a stay was a final decision or a preliminary order that did not dispose of the substantive merits of the application for review.

The court found that the decision to refuse a stay was not a final decision of the Tribunal but rather an interim order made for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing and determination by the Tribunal of the substantive application for review. This conclusion was based on the Full Court’s decision in Director-General of Social Services v Chaney, where it was held that an appeal under section 44(1) of the AAT Act lies only from a final decision or determination of the Tribunal. The court concluded that the refusal of a stay was not a final decision because it did not effectively dispose of the proceeding before the Tribunal. As a result, the appeal was incompetent, and the application for an extension of time was dismissed.

The court made an order dismissing the application for an extension of time and directed that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs. This decision reinforced the narrow interpretation of what constitutes a decision appealable under section 44 of the AAT Act and highlighted the importance of understanding the legislative framework for appeals from the Tribunal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time in which to appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent to be agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

At the beginning of the hearing the applicant requested an adjournment for a week on the basis that it had not seen the respondent’s submission until that day and wanted time to address the issues in it. However, as became apparent, the respondent had served its submission on the applicant on 26 May 2020 in an email thread between the parties, as required by the order, and the applicant accepted that was so. However, the applicant said that it had not realised the submission was there and did not know if it related to these or the Tribunal proceedings. I note that it is clear from the document that the submission relates to these proceedings, as it clearly states “Federal Court of Australia” and the relevant file number is included in the document on more than one occasion. Moreover, the submission relates to an extension of time in relation to the stay application which, as the applicant acknowledged, was only before this Court. The adjournment was opposed for several reasons including that the applicant was put on notice of the issue in relation to the competency of the matter (which was the focus of the respondent’s written submission) as early as 8 April 2020, and the assertion that an email was received by the applicant’s email address but not looked at because no one checked it, had been raised by the applicant on a number of previous occasions. The adjournment was refused but leave was given for the applicant to file an additional written submission which addressed the respondent’s written submission. That submission focussed on the competency of the application. Stay decision The Tribunal, having set out the relevant background of the matter, evidence before it, and the legislative framework for making a stay decision pursuant to section 41(2) of the AAT Act, concluded: the prospects of success at the final merits hearing were “limited”; the applicant failed to demonstrate it faced substantial adverse consequences other than those already sustained; and while acknowledging the applicant’s claim that there may be limited opportunities for aged persons in some ethnic or multicultural communities to access quality aged care, and that such people may develop a special attachment to such providers, there was a substantial public interest in ensuring that no person in an aged care facility was exposed to the risk of care from non-compliant providers. The Tribunal did not accept that a refusal of a stay would render nugatory the continuing processes of the Tribunal and the applicant’s appeal or that the grant of a stay would restore the applicant to anything like the position it was in prior to the revocation decision coming into effect. Lastly, as required by the AAT Act, the Tribunal considered the “interests of any persons who may be affected by the review” and contemplated the impact upon the applicant’s clients and employees. The Tribunal concluded that having considered the relevant considerations, and found that none of them carried sufficient weight in the applicant’s favour, the application for a stay was refused.Submissions

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As explained below, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter. Consideration The power to extend time in which to appeal is unfettered, however, the authorities identify a number of matters bearing upon the exercise of the discretion to extend time. In Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349, Wilcox J identified a number of factors which are often cited in this regard. The matters to which the Court will usually have regard to, identified in that judgment, are: (1) the length of the extension sought; (2) the explanation for the delay, including consideration of any action taken by the applicant, other than by way of making an application for review; (3) the prejudice to the applicant if the extension of time is refused; (4) any relevant prejudice to a respondent if the extension of time is granted; (5) the conduct of the parties in the litigation; (6) the merits of the substantial application; and (7) the interests of justice more generally: see for example, Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] and [17] - [19] per Spender, O’Loughlin and Dowsett JJ. Although the respondent takes issue that no adequate explanation for the delay has been provided, it accepts that no prejudice is suffered from the delay. It also accepted that the delay was only four days. Regardless of any explanation for the delay, there is a more fundamental issue as to the merit of the substantive appeal if the extension were granted. As noted above, the respondent filed a notice of objection to competency. This is an application in relation to a refusal by the Tribunal to grant a stay of the decision revoking the applicant’s approval as a provider of aged care pending the hearing of the substantive review. As noted above, the appeal is pursuant to s 44 of the AAT Act, which relevantly is limited to appeals “on a question of law, from any decision of the Tribunal in that proceeding”: s 44(1) (emphasis added). In Director-General of Social Services v Chaney [1980] FCA 87; (1980) 31 ALR 571 (“Chaney”) the Full Court (Deane and Fisher JJ) held that “decision” in the context of s 44(1) is to be given a narrow meaning and refers to a final decision or determination of the Tribunal. Deane J at 593 (with Fisher J agreeing) concluded that:…an appeal under s 44(1) of the Act lies only from a decision of the Tribunal which constitutes the effective decision or determination of the application for review. Further at 594 Deane J stated: Nor, in my view, was the interim order made by the Tribunal suspending the operation of the decision of the Director-General, a decision of the Tribunal from which an appeal properly lay to this Court pursuant to s.44 of the Act. The fact that such an order has independent operative effect does not, in the circumstances, warrant further qualification of the general rule that an appeal under s.44(1) only lies from the determination effectively disposing of the proceeding before the Tribunal. Indeed, the power to make such an interim order pursuant to s.41(2) of the Act is, in terms, for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing and determination by the Tribunal of the application for review and could hardly have been intended to provide the occasion whereby the hearing and determination of an application for review could be frustrated and delayed by preliminary appeals brought, as a matter of right, upon any question of law that might happen to be involved in the making of an interim order.