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Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd v May

Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd v May

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., Gibbs, Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ.

GERALDTON BUILDING CO. PTY. LTD. v. MAY.

(1977) 136 CLR 379

15 March 1977

Workers' Compensation—Statutes

Workers' Compensation (W.A.)—Lump sum payments in case of incapacity—Election to accept lump sum—Effect of amending legislation—Determination of amount of lump sum—Whether as at date of injury or date of election—Workers' Compensation Act, 1912-1975 (W.A.), ss. 4, 7 (1), (3) (a), Sch. 1 and 2—Workers' Compensation Act Amendment Act, 1973 (W.A.)—Interpretation Act, 1918 (W.A.), s. 16 (1). Statutes—Interpretation—Construction—Enactments prima facie to be construed as having only prospective operation.

Decisions

1977, March 15.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. An employer, Geraldton Building Co. Pty. Ltd. ("the appellant"), appeals against a decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia which allowed the appeal of its employee ("the respondent") against a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board of that State unfavourable to the respondent. The respondent had lost almost complete sight of one eye in circumstances entitling him to claim under the workers' compensation legislation. The dispute between the parties is as to the amount of compensation to be paid. The respondent's compensable injury occurred on 11th March 1971 when in the employ of the appellant. (at p381)

2. Loss of the sight of an eye is an injury mentioned in the first column of the table set out in the Second Schedule of the Workers' Compensation Act, 1912-1975 (W.A.) ("the Act"), a table providing what may properly be called lump sum compensation for the loss of specified parts or functions of the body. At the date of the receipt of the injury, the appropriate amount of such compensation for the loss of an eye, calculated according to the prescription of the legislation then operative ("the 1970 Act"), was the sum of $3,902. However, the respondent elected to be paid a lump sum compensation on 18th October 1974: see s. 7 (3) of the Act, and claimed to be entitled, and the Supreme Court held that he was entitled, to the sum of $11,147, being the sum appropriate for such an injury according to the provisions of the Act as they became by reason of amendment effected by No. 96 of 1973. To understand the area of dispute it is essential to examine relevant parts of the Act and the course of its amendment, chiefly as effected by No. 18 of 1970. (at p381)

3. Like workers' compensation legislation generally, the Act operates in general by imposing obligations on employers in respect of injuries which satisfy a formula determining compensability. The right of the worker to compensation is not expressly given: it derives from the existence of the employer's obligation to pay compensation. The extent of the right is coterminous with the extent of the obligation. The quantification of the compensation to be paid is to be in accordance with the provisions of schedules to the Act. (at p381)

4. Prior to the passing of the amendment in 1970, s. 7 of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1977] HCA 17
Decision Date: 15 March 1977

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd (the appellant) appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a building contract and the appellant's liability for alleged defects in the construction of a hotel. The appellant contended that the respondent, the owner of the hotel, had waived its right to claim for certain defects and had accepted the work as substantially completed.

The High Court was required to determine whether the respondent had, by its conduct, waived its right to rely on the contractual provisions relating to defects. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the respondent's acceptance of the building and its subsequent use of the hotel constituted a waiver of its right to claim for defects that were apparent or discoverable at the time of acceptance. The court also had to consider the meaning and effect of the contractual term "substantial completion" and whether the building had achieved this status.

The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the respondent had not waived its right to claim for defects. The court reasoned that the acceptance of the building and its use did not necessarily imply an acceptance of the work as free from defects, particularly where the contract provided for a defects liability period. The court emphasised that a waiver requires a clear and unequivocal intention to abandon a known right, which was not demonstrated by the respondent's actions. Furthermore, the court found that the building was not substantially completed at the time of purported acceptance, as significant defects remained which prevented the hotel from being used for its intended purpose without further work.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders