HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA APPELLANT
AND
GWENDA BLANCHE RYAN RESPONDENT
Commissioner of Taxation v Ryan [2000] HCA 4
3 February 2000
M126/1998
ORDER
Appeal allowed.
Set aside par 1 of the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia entered on 30 April 1999 and in lieu order:
(a)appeal allowed;
(b)set aside pars 1, 2 and 3 of the order of Spender J entered on 15 September 1997 and in lieu order that the appeal is dismissed.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation:
G A A Nettle QC with T P Murphy for the appellant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
D G Russell QC with J J Batrouney for the respondent (instructed by Hall & Wilcox)
Notice: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
CATCHWORDS
Commissioner of Taxation v Ryan
Income tax – Assessment – Notice stating no tax payable – Subsequent assessment showing assessable income and tax payable thereon – Whether initial notice an "assessment" for the purposes of s 170(3) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – Whether subsequent assessment therefore unauthorised – Whether any tax became "due and payable" upon issue of initial notice.
Words and phrases – "assessment" – "due and payable".
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), ss 6(1), 166, 170, 171, 204.
GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ. The respondent ("the taxpayer") lodged a return of her income for the year ending 30 June 1987 in which she stated her taxable income for the year to be $4,470, an amount below the threshold at which income tax was levied. On 11 December 1987, the appellant ("the Commissioner") issued to the taxpayer a document entitled "Refund Notice", which stated that the tax on her taxable income was "$0.00" and that the "Amount of Refund" was $3,653.40. (It is convenient to refer to this notice as the "1987 notice".)
More than six years later, on 11 February 1994, the Commissioner issued to the taxpayer a Notice of Assessment for the year ended 30 June 1987 stating that her taxable income had been assessed to be $14,470 and that tax, Medicare levy and additional tax in stated amounts were payable. (It is convenient to refer to this assessment as the "1994 assessment".) An adjustment sheet accompanying the 1994 assessment said that a deduction of $10,000 claimed by the taxpayer in her 1987 return had been disallowed.
The taxpayer objected to the 1994 assessment. She contended that she had made a full and true disclosure to the Commissioner of all the material facts necessary for the Commissioner's assessment, that the 1987 notice was an assessment made after that disclosure, and that it followed that the Commissioner was not authorised to issue the 1994 assessment. The objection was disallowed by the Commissioner and then, at the request of the taxpayer, the…
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- Case
- [2000] HCA 4
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court were whether the 1987 notice issued by the Commissioner qualified as an "assessment" for the purposes of section 170(3) of the Act, and consequently, whether the subsequent 1994 assessment was unauthorised. A related question was whether any tax became "due and payable" upon the issue of the initial 1987 notice, particularly in light of section 204(1) of the Act which prescribes the timing for tax to become due and payable. The taxpayer argued that having made a full and true disclosure of all material facts, the 1987 notice, which repeatedly referred to itself as an "assessment" and resulted in a refund, effectively finalised her tax liability for that year, and the time limits under section 170(3) had expired.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Federal Court. The Court reasoned that the 1987 notice, despite resulting in zero tax payable and a refund, was indeed an "assessment" within the meaning of the Act. The Court found that the ascertainment of tax payable as zero was a valid assessment, and the repeated use of the term "assessment" in the notice, coupled with its explanatory notes, supported this conclusion. Consequently, the Commissioner was bound by section 170(3) of the Act, which prevents the amendment of an assessment to increase a taxpayer's liability after a certain period has elapsed, provided the taxpayer has made a full and true disclosure of all material facts, which was common ground in this case. The Court therefore concluded that the 1994 assessment was unauthorised.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
Appeal allowed.
2.
Set aside par 1 of the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia entered on 30 April 1999 and in lieu order:
(a) appeal allowed;
(b) set aside pars 1, 2 and 3 of the order of Spender J entered on 15 September 1997 and in lieu order that the appeal is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ, CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ, CALLINAN J
Full text does not contain this section.