Commissioner of Taxation v Ryan

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA  APPELLANT

AND

GWENDA BLANCHE RYAN  RESPONDENT

Commissioner of Taxation v Ryan [2000] HCA 4
3 February 2000
M126/1998

ORDER

  1. Appeal allowed.

  1. Set aside par 1 of the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia entered on 30 April 1999 and in lieu order:

(a)appeal allowed;

(b)set aside pars 1, 2 and 3 of the order of Spender J entered on 15 September 1997 and in lieu order that the appeal is dismissed.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

G A A Nettle QC with T P Murphy for the appellant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

D G Russell QC with J J Batrouney for the respondent (instructed by Hall & Wilcox)

Notice:  This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Commissioner of Taxation v Ryan

Income tax – Assessment – Notice stating no tax payable – Subsequent assessment showing assessable income and tax payable thereon – Whether initial notice an "assessment" for the purposes of s 170(3) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – Whether subsequent assessment therefore unauthorised – Whether any tax became "due and payable" upon issue of initial notice.

Words and phrases – "assessment" – "due and payable".

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), ss 6(1), 166, 170, 171, 204.

  1. GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ.   The respondent ("the taxpayer") lodged a return of her income for the year ending 30 June 1987 in which she stated her taxable income for the year to be $4,470, an amount below the threshold at which income tax was levied.  On 11 December 1987, the appellant ("the Commissioner") issued to the taxpayer a document entitled "Refund Notice", which stated that the tax on her taxable income was "$0.00" and that the "Amount of Refund" was $3,653.40.  (It is convenient to refer to this notice as the "1987 notice".)

  2. More than six years later, on 11 February 1994, the Commissioner issued to the taxpayer a Notice of Assessment for the year ended 30 June 1987 stating that her taxable income had been assessed to be $14,470 and that tax, Medicare levy and additional tax in stated amounts were payable.  (It is convenient to refer to this assessment as the "1994 assessment".)  An adjustment sheet accompanying the 1994 assessment said that a deduction of $10,000 claimed by the taxpayer in her 1987 return had been disallowed.

  3. The taxpayer objected to the 1994 assessment.  She contended that she had made a full and true disclosure to the Commissioner of all the material facts necessary for the Commissioner's assessment, that the 1987 notice was an assessment made after that disclosure, and that it followed that the Commissioner was not authorised to issue the 1994 assessment.  The objection was disallowed by the Commissioner and then, at the request of the taxpayer, the…

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Details
Case
[2000] HCA 4
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concerning a dispute between the Commissioner of Taxation and the respondent taxpayer, Mrs. Gwenda Ryan. The core of the disagreement revolved around a notice issued by the Commissioner in 1987, which indicated no tax was payable for the 1987 income year, and a subsequent assessment issued in 1994 that sought to amend the initial calculation and impose tax. The taxpayer contended that the 1987 notice constituted a binding assessment under the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1936* (Cth) ("the Act"), and therefore, the Commissioner was precluded by section 170(3) of the Act from issuing an amended assessment that increased her liability.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the 1987 notice issued by the Commissioner qualified as an "assessment" for the purposes of section 170(3) of the Act, and consequently, whether the subsequent 1994 assessment was unauthorised. A related question was whether any tax became "due and payable" upon the issue of the initial 1987 notice, particularly in light of section 204(1) of the Act which prescribes the timing for tax to become due and payable. The taxpayer argued that having made a full and true disclosure of all material facts, the 1987 notice, which repeatedly referred to itself as an "assessment" and resulted in a refund, effectively finalised her tax liability for that year, and the time limits under section 170(3) had expired.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Federal Court. The Court reasoned that the 1987 notice, despite resulting in zero tax payable and a refund, was indeed an "assessment" within the meaning of the Act. The Court found that the ascertainment of tax payable as zero was a valid assessment, and the repeated use of the term "assessment" in the notice, coupled with its explanatory notes, supported this conclusion. Consequently, the Commissioner was bound by section 170(3) of the Act, which prevents the amendment of an assessment to increase a taxpayer's liability after a certain period has elapsed, provided the taxpayer has made a full and true disclosure of all material facts, which was common ground in this case. The Court therefore concluded that the 1994 assessment was unauthorised.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Appeal allowed.

2.

Set aside par 1 of the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia entered on 30 April 1999 and in lieu order:

(a) appeal allowed;

(b) set aside pars 1, 2 and 3 of the order of Spender J entered on 15 September 1997 and in lieu order that the appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

This appeal[26] raises two points. The first concerns the binding authority controlling decision-makers, administrative and judicial, who determined the controversy between the parties before it reached this Court. The second, which arises if the matter is not governed by binding authority, concerns an issue of statutory construction. The statute in question is the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ("the Act"). If the second point is reached, the appeal neatly illustrates the choice, hitherto recognised in the decisions of this Court, between the literalist approach to statutory construction favoured forty years ago and the purposive approach now generally followed by the courts of the common law, including this Court.[26]From the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia: Commissioner of Taxation v Ryan (1998) 82 FCR 345.Facts, common ground and issues The facts giving rise to the problem before the Court and the applicable statutory provisions are stated in the reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ ("the joint reasons"). I shall not repeat them unnecessarily. It was common ground that the respondent, Mrs Gwenda Ryan ("the taxpayer"), when she lodged her return of income for the year ending 30 June 1987, made a full and true disclosure to the Commissioner of all material facts necessary for the Commissioner's ascertainment of the amount of taxable income and of the tax payable thereon under the Act[27]. It was undisputed that, following such disclosure by the taxpayer, the Commissioner, by an appropriate officer, proceeded to calculate the taxpayer's taxable income for the year in question. It was also undisputed that, following this calculation, on 11 December 1987 a notice titled "Refund Notice" was issued to the taxpayer accompanied by a cheque for $3,653.40. This was the refund of income tax to which the taxpayer was entitled under the Commissioner's calculation. The form of notice set out what were described as "[d]etails of your assessment". On the reverse side of the document were printed explanatory notes said to "help to explain your assessment". The document refers fourteen times to the product of the Commissioner's calculation as "your … assessment", "an … assessment", "the … assessment" or "this … assessment"[28]. [27]Commissioner of Taxation v Ryan (1998) 82 FCR 345 at 349. See the Act, s 6(1): definition of "assessment".[28]cf the Act, s 177(1). In these circumstances, not only would the taxpayer be entitled (as Callinan J observes[29]) to be surprised if she were told that she had not complied with the requirements for an "assessment" and fully acquitted her liability for tax under the Act in respect of the year in question. She would, I think, have been astonished to be told that her "assessment" was not an "assessment" at all. And that the protective provision of the Act (s 170(3) which prevents the Commissioner from amending an "assessment" in certain circumstances should the latter assessment increase the taxpayer's liability) did not apply in her case. This was supposedly so, despite its apparent purposes, self-description and repeated assertions, because the purported "assessment" issued by the Commissioner was nothing of the sort. Were this the law, a more misleading form must never have been devised in the history of federal administration in Australia. One would hesitate to commence the analysis of this case with such a presupposition.[29]Reasons of Callinan J at [88].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ KIRBY J (dissent) CALLINAN J
In this Court the taxpayer maintained the contentions that she had made below. In particular, she submitted that in 1987 the Commissioner had made an assessment of her taxable income for the year ending 30 June 1987 and of the amount of tax payable thereon. It being accepted that she had made a full and true disclosure of all the material facts, she submitted that s 170(3) precluded the Commissioner from amending that assessment in 1994. The taxpayer submitted that the period identified in s 170(3) had elapsed three years from the date which was the thirtieth day after the 1987 notice was served. The 30 day period was said to be fixed by s 204(1) of the Act. That sub-section (contained in Pt VI of the Act) provided that:"Subject to the provisions of this Part, any income tax assessed shall be due and payable by the person liable to pay the tax on the date specified in the notice as the date upon which tax is due and payable, not being less than 30 days after the service of the notice, or, if no date is so specified, on the thirtieth day after the service of the notice."The decisions below The primary judge, Spender J, described the issue for his decision as being whether the 1987 notice was an assessment under s 166 of the Act "with the consequence that the time limits under s 170 commence to run from the prescribed period after service of the notice"[4]. Little, if any, attention appears to have been directed to the operation of the time limit prescribed by s 170(3). Rather, it seems that the argument before the primary judge focused on two questions – how the 1987 notice was to be characterised, and whether that notice was an assessment of "the amount … of the tax payable" on the taxable income of the taxpayer. As to the first of these questions, the primary judge noted that the 1987 notice used the word "assessment" or the expression "your assessment" many times. But the issue that appears to have been treated as determinative was the second issue we have noted - whether the Commissioner had ascertained "the amount … of the tax payable" by the taxpayer. On that issue, the primary judge concluded that[5]:"[T]o require 'the ascertainment of the tax payable' to be a positive number is an impermissible gloss on the definition of assessment in s 6(1) of [the Act]. The ascertainment of the tax payable as zero is no less an ascertainment within the definition as is the ascertainment of the tax as a non‑zero number.The number zero is the beginning of and hence the first number of, and included in, the domain of natural numbers.…In the domain of the integers, the number line unarguably contains zero. That is, zero is a number, sum or amount, and an assessment of zero dollars is an assessment of a sum or amount of tax."[4](1997) 148 ALR 88 at 92.[5](1997) 148 ALR 88 at 98. In the Full Court, Merkel J (with whose reasons Burchett and French JJ agreed) said[6] that the question raised by the Commissioner's appeal was whether "a document issued by [the Commissioner] which gives notice of an assessment, but under which no tax is assessed or is ascertained to be payable by the taxpayer, is an assessment for the purposes of [the Act] and in particular s 170(3) of the Act". His Honour examined (as had Spender J) earlier decisions that were said to bear upon the question (including, in particular, the decision of this Court in Batagol v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[7]) but decided that Batagol (and other cases to which he referred[8]) did not conclude the issue. It will be necessary to return to Batagol. It is, however, important to note two other features of the reasons of Merkel J.[6](1998) 82 FCR 345 at 346.[7](1963) 109 CLR 243.[8]F J Bloemen Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 360; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Prestige Motors Pty Ltd (1994) 181 CLR 1; Prestige Motors Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 47 FCR 138; Webb v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (1993) 47 FCR 394; Stuart (No 2) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 96 ATC 4942; 34 ATR 31; Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Sheehan (1986) 86 ATC 4718; 18 ATR 194.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ, CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ, CALLINAN J

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