Sun v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue

Case

[2025] NSWCATAD 103

07 May 2025

No judgment structure available for this case.

Civil and Administrative Tribunal


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Sun v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2025] NSWCATAD 103
Hearing dates: 24 April 2025
Date of orders: 07 May 2025
Decision date: 07 May 2025
Jurisdiction:Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division
Before: EA MacIntyre, Senior Member
Decision:

The assessment under review is confirmed

Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – administrative review – assessment - objection – review by Civil and Administrative Tribunal

STATE TAXES - land tax - surcharge land tax - exemption - whether exemption under Land Tax Act 1956 applies to surcharge land tax - permanent resident - statutes read and construed together - unfairness

Legislation Cited:

Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW)

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW)

Duties Act 1997 (NSW)

Land Tax Act 1956 (NSW)

Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Taxation Administration Act 1996 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Azam Mohammed & Sarah Azam v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2023] NSWCATAD 38

Commissioner of Taxation v Ryan (2001) 201 CLR 109

Leah v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2025] NSWCATAD 57

Texts Cited:

None cited

Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Wai Ping Sun (Applicant)
Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (Respondent)
Representation:

Counsel:
A Ogborne (Applicant)
J Nixon (Respondent)

Solicitors:
CFC Lawyers (Applicant)
Crown Solicitor (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2024/00437737
Publication restriction: None

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Chief Commissioner of State Revenue ("the Respondent") to assess surcharge land tax for land tax years 2020 to 2023 on Wai Ping Sun. She is the applicant in this matter (“Applicant”).

  2. The Applicant says that she is not liable for surcharge land tax. She says that she benefits from the exemption for land tax applying to a taxpayer’s principal place of residence allowed under the Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW) (“LTMA”). In the Applicant’s submission, the consequence is that she is also exempt from surcharge land tax. The Applicant also says that she qualifies for exemption by reason of s 5B of the Land Tax Act 1956 (NSW) (“LTA”) because she is a “permanent resident”.

  3. The Respondent disagrees. The Respondent says that exemption from surcharge land tax can only apply if it can be claimed under s 5B of the LTA, regardless of exemption applying under the LTMA. The Respondent’s further submission is that exemption does not apply under s 5B of the LTA because the Applicant was not a “permanent resident” during the relevant land tax years.

  4. It was not disputed that the Applicant had satisfied the requirements of s 5B, other than that of being a “permanent resident”.

  5. Whether exemption from surcharge land tax can apply therefore depends on the answers to two questions. These questions are:

  1. whether exemption under the LTMA for a taxpayer’s principal place of residence has the consequence of also allowing exemption from surcharge land tax with nothing more;

  2. if not, whether the Applicant was a “permanent resident” within the meaning of s 5B of the LTA during the land tax years in issue, such that she could claim exemption from surcharge land tax for those land tax years.

Background

  1. On 30 June 2015, the Applicant was granted a Student (Class TU) Student Guardian (Subclass 580) visa. Subsequently, she came to Australia with her husband and daughter.

  2. On 17 September 2015, the Applicant had obtained the approval of the Foreign Investment Review Board to purchase a residence pursuant to the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeover Act 1975 (Cth).

  3. On 22 January 2016, the Applicant purchased land in New South Wales. That land contained a residence.

  4. The Applicant moved to the residence on that land on 22 January 2016. It remained her only residence until 31 December 2024. It was used for no purpose other than as the residence of the Applicant, her husband and daughter.

  5. The Applicant’s evidence is that in 2016, her husband and her were sponsored by the NSW government to live and work in Australia permanently by applying for a Business Innovation and Investment visa. In the Applicant's evidence, this required that provisional visas first be obtained. On 18th December 2017, she was granted such a visa. It was a Business Skills (Provisional) (class EB) Business Innovation and Investment (Provisional) (subclass 188) visa. On 27 September 2023, the Applicant was granted a Business Innovation and Investment (Permanent) (sub class 888) visa.

  6. On 15 July 2024, the Respondent assessed the Applicant to surcharge land tax for the 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023 tax years in respect of the land in New South Wales where the Applicant resided. The header of the notice of assessment also refers to the 2024 land tax year. However, on page three of the notice of assessment, it deals with each of the 2020-2023 land tax years only. The amount assessed on the first page is the total of the land tax assessed for these four years even if the header also refers to the 2024 land tax year. What is in dispute is the land tax for 2020-2023.

  7. The Applicant was not an Australian citizen during the land tax years in issue (2020 to 2023).

Applicant’s rights of review

  1. Where tax has been assessed, s 86 of the Taxation Administration Act 1996 (NSW) (“Administration Act”), allows rights of objection to a taxpayer dissatisfied with an assessment, including an assessment of the kind made in this matter. This is an internal review process under which the Chief Commissioner of State Revenue, the Respondent in these proceedings, must consider and determine the objection (s 91 of the Administration Act).

  2. A taxpayer who is dissatisfied with the decision made upon the Respondent’s determination of an objection, may apply to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“Tribunal”) for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) (“ADR Act”)of the decision of the Chief Commissioner of State Revenue.

  3. These circumstances have arisen in the present matter as set out in the background above, so bringing the matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

  4. The onus of proving her case lies with the Applicant (s 100(3) of the Administration Act).

  5. The Tribunal, dealing with the taxpayer’s application, may do one or more of the following under s 101 of the Administration Act:

“(a) confirm or revoke the assessment or other decision to which the application relates,

(b) make an assessment or other decision in place of the assessment or other decision to which the application relates,

(c) make an order for payment to the Chief Commissioner of any amount of tax that is assessed as being payable but has not been paid,

(d) remit the matter to the Chief Commissioner for determination in accordance with its finding or decision,

(e) make any further order as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit.”

Consideration

Exemption for principal place of residence under LTMA

  1. The LTMA levies land tax on the taxable value of all land situated in New South Wales which is owned by taxpayers, other than land which is exempt from taxation under that Act (s 7). Among the exemptions allowed is that applicable to a taxpayer’s “principal place of residence”. That exemption is provided for in s 10(1) (r) in the following terms:

“Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Act the following lands shall, subject to sections 10B, 10D, 10E and 10P, be exempted from taxation under this Act -

……….

(r)  land that is exempt from taxation under the principal place of residence exemption, as provided for by Schedule 1A”.

  1. Schedule 1A in turn sets out the terms on which the principal place of residence exemption applies.

  2. There was no dispute that the Applicant satisfied the terms of the principal place of residence exemption under s 10(1)(r). Sections 10B, 10E and 10P were not applicable to the circumstances at hand. The consequence was that she was not liable for land tax at the rates applicable for land subject to taxation under the LTMA.

  3. The Applicant’s submission was that a consequence of exemption under s 10(1)(r) and Schedule 1A was that she was also exempt from surcharge land tax. The Applicant’s submission was that the LTA and the LTMA operated as a single scheme with the consequence that exemption under s 10(1)(r) from tax levied under the LTMA also resulted in exemption from surcharge land tax levied under the LTA.

  4. The relevant provisions levying tax and allowing exemption for a principal place of residence under the LTMA are set out at [18] and [19] above. They levy land tax on the taxable value of all land situated in New South Wales which is owned by taxpayers, other than land which is exempt from taxation under the LTMA.

  5. Surcharge land tax is levied under s 5A of the LTA. It is levied on certain land owned by a “foreign person”. The Applicant did not dispute that she was at the relevant times a “foreign person” subject to taxation under s 5A. The matter in issue was whether exemption applied. At the times relevant to the assessment under review, s 5A provided as follows:

5A   Levy of surcharge land tax on residential land owned by foreign persons—2017 and subsequent land tax years

(1)  Land tax is payable under this section in respect of residential land owned by a foreign person (surcharge land tax).

(2)  In respect of the taxable value of all the residential land owned by the foreign person at midnight on 31 December in any year (commencing with 2016), surcharge land tax is to be charged, levied, collected and paid under the provisions of the Principal Act and in the manner prescribed under that Act for the period of 12 months commencing on 1 January in the next succeeding year at the rate of—

(a)  in the case of all residential land owned by the foreign person at midnight on 31 December 2016—0.75% of that taxable value as assessed under the Principal Act, and

(b)  in the case of all residential land owned by the foreign person at midnight on 31 December in the years 2017–2021—2% of that taxable value as assessed under the Principal Act, and

(c)  in the case of all residential land owned by the foreign person at midnight on 31 December in any other year, commencing with 2022—4% of that taxable value as assessed under the Principal Act.

(3)  Surcharge land tax is payable in addition to any land tax payable in respect of the residential land under the other provisions of this Act, and is so payable even if no land tax is payable under those other provisions”.

  1. The exemption allowed under s 10(1)(r) provides for exemption “from taxation under this Act”, namely the LTMA. Surcharge land tax, however, is levied under a different Act, namely under the LTMA. The plain language of s 10, in my opinion, evinces an intention to allow exemption under s 10(1)(r) only for tax levied under the LTMA and not also for tax levied under the LTA. I do not see how exemption expressed to be “from taxation under this Act” can mean that the exemption also extends to tax levied under a provision of a different Act.

  2. Section 5A provides: “Land tax is payable under this section in respect of residential land owned by a foreign person (surcharge land tax)” (emphasis added). Counsel for the Applicant submits that a consequence of the description of the tax levied under s 5A as “land tax” makes surcharge land tax itself “land tax” for the purposes of the scheme jointly created by the LTA and the LTMA. He says that as a result of the description of the tax levied under s 5A as “land tax”, the LTA “expressly provides that the LTM Act (and, hence, the s. 10(1)(r) exemption) applies to “surcharge land tax” (and not merely to “land tax”.

  3. The mere naming of the tax levied under s 5A as a “land tax” does not, in my opinion, result into the conflation of that tax and tax levied under s 7 of the LTMA, so that they become a single tax described as “land tax” within the statutory scheme. The source of the obligation to pay each tax is found in different provisions of different Acts. Surcharge land tax is levied “under” s 5A. Land tax under the LTMA is levied under s 7 of that Act. I cannot in these circumstances see how tax levied under s 5A of the LTA can be said to be “land tax” levied pursuant to s 7 and exempted under s 10 where applicable.

  4. The exemption allowed under s 10(1)(r) is for land that is exempt from taxation under the principal place of residence exemption, as provided for by Schedule 1A of the LTMA. Schedule 1A, in turn, provides for the requirements a taxpayer needs to satisfy to claim that exemption. There is, however, nothing in Schedule 1A that refers to surcharge land tax. The absence of any mention of surcharge land tax in Schedule 1A is consistent with a scheme that contemplates that exemption under s 10(1)(r) applies only to land tax levied under s 7 and not also to surcharge land tax.

  5. The interrelationship between the LTA and the LTMA is addressed in s 1 of the LTA. It provides as follows:

“This Act may be cited as the Land Tax Act 1956 and shall be read and construed with the Land Tax Management Act 1956, in this Act hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act”.

  1. Section 1, in other words, requires that the LTA be “read and construed” with the LTMA. The requirement to do so, however, does not produce the result that the tax levied under each Act becomes one tax subject to the same exemptions. I consider the effect of s 1 on the operation of s 5A of the LTA further at [49] below.

  2. The Applicant relies on s 5A(4) in support of her claim for exemption from surcharge land tax. It relevantly provides as follows:

(4)  The Principal Act applies to surcharge land tax in respect of residential land owned by a foreign person subject to the following —

……

(g) the person is exempt from liability to pay surcharge land tax in respect of the land for a land tax year because the land is the principal place of residence of the foreign person (and accordingly sections 9C and 9D of the Principal Act operate to reduce the land value of the land if it is the principal place of residence of the person) only if the person is eligible for the exemption under section 5B”.

  1. The “Principal Act” referred to in s 5A(4) is the LTMA (s 1 of the LTA). Section 5A(4), in other words, provides that the LTMA “applies to surcharge land tax in respect of residential land owned by a foreign person” subject to the terms of s 5A(4). The consequence is that the provisions of the LTMA can apply to surcharge land tax, including any exempting provisions.

  2. However, the application of the LTMA to surcharge land tax is subject to a number of matters set out in each of the paragraphs within subsection 5A(4) that qualify the application of the LTMA to surcharge land tax, including paragraph (g). Paragraph (g), if it applies, allows exemption from liability to pay surcharge land tax only if the taxpayer is eligible for the exemption under s 5B of the LTA.

  3. The Applicant’s submission is that paragraph (g) does not apply to her. In her submission, it only applies in circumstances where ss 9C and 9D of the LTMA operate. These are provision dealing with mixed development land or mixed use land. Section 9C could apply to both. Section 9D relevantly applies to mixed use land only. These are provisions that allow for reductions in the value of land for the purposes of land tax. That is, exemption from land tax can be claimed only for the proportion of land occupied by a principal place of residence where there is mixed use or mixed development subject to ss 9C and 9D.

  4. The Applicant says that neither ss 9C or 9D apply to her. The consequence, in the Applicant’s submission, is that she remains outside the reach of paragraph (g). The Applicant submits that what follows is that s 5A(4) allows the application to her of LTMA, including the exemption allowed under s 10(1)(r), without being subject to paragraph (g). The Applicant says that as a result of s 5A(4)(g) not applying to her, she does not need to satisfy the requirements of s 5B of the LTA in order to qualify for exemption from surcharge land tax.

  5. The Respondent, on the other hand, says that the only basis on which exemption can be claimed from surcharge land tax is by satisfying s 5B of the LTA. He says that the effect of s 5A(4)(g) is to prevent the Applicant from relying on exemption allowed under the LTMA for a taxpayer’s principal place of residence, unless the requirements of s 5B are satisfied for surcharge land tax.

  6. In the Respondent’s submission, paragraph (g) applies both to cases where ss 9C or 9D of the LTMA apply and also to cases where neither of these provisions have application. In other words, the Respondent’s construction of paragraph (g) would allow that paragraph to operate in all circumstances where surcharge land tax is levied and not just in circumstances where ss 9C and 9D of the LTMA have operation.

  7. The dispute between the parties concerning s 5A(4)(g) turns on the effect upon s 5A(1)(g) of words within the provision placed in parentheses. These words are: “(and accordingly sections 9C and 9D of the Principal Act operate to reduce the land value of the land if it is the principal place of residence of the person)”.

  8. The word “accordingly” as used within the parentheses is an adverb connecting the preceding words referring to the relevant exemption outside the parentheses with what follows within the parentheses. Determining what kind of connection is intended between the words preceding the word “accordingly” and what follows requires consideration of the meaning of the connecting word.

  9. In its ordinary sense, the word “accordingly” means "in accordance; correspondingly. ….. “in due course; therefore; (The Macquarie Dictionary, online). It follows that the word “accordingly” in its ordinary meaning, denotes something in the nature of accordance or result.

  10. I do not consider that the use of language connoting accord or result connecting the words describing the exemption in issue to circumstances where s 9C and 9D operate, means that paragraph (g) can only apply in circumstances where s 9C and 9D operate. The language used denotes accord or result and not limitation. The language of accord or result as used in paragraph (g), in my opinion, allows for the application of ss 9C and 9D where relevant but does not limit the application of the provision only to mixed development land or mixed use land.

  11. In other words, the words in parentheses have operation if they have work to do. Where they have no work to do, I cannot find anything in the text of the provision that shows an intention for the words in parentheses to disable the operation of the remaining parts of paragraph (g) outside the parentheses where the words in parentheses themselves have no operation.

  12. I am of the view that the purpose of the words in parentheses within s 5A(4)(g) is to allow a claim for exemption or put beyond doubt that a claim for exemption remains available, in the circumstances where s 9C and 9D apply, without stopping the application of the remainder of paragraph (g) in accordance with its terms, where ss 9C and 9D do not apply.

  13. The language of accord or result as used (“and accordingly”) are not words of exclusion, limiting the operation of s 5A(4)(d) only to circumstances where ss 9C and 9D apply. Where exclusionary language is used in paragraph (g), it is found in its last phrase, stipulating that exemption is allowed “only if” the taxpayer is eligible for the exemption under s 5B of the LTA.

  14. The construction proposed by the Applicant would leave a taxpayer who engages in mixed development or mixed use having to comply with s 5B but not other taxpayers claiming exemption from surcharge land tax for their principal place of residence. Counsel for the Applicant submitted that legislative intent for imposing additional requirements upon an owner engaging in mixed development or mixed use could be inferred from the context. In the absence of evidence in support of this submission, such as in explanatory memoranda or second reading speeches, I am unable to reach any such conclusion as to the legislative intent. The text of s 5A(4)(g), whether read with s 5B or not, does not allow for such a conclusion for the reasons set out above at [40] to [43].

  1. Section 5B itself makes no mention of mixed development land or mixed use land. It deals with various other matters relevant to claiming exemption including residency status and period of occupation. The absence from s 5B of references to mixed development land or mixed use land does not assist the Applicant’s submission that the scheme for exemption contemplated by s 5A(4)(g) together with s 5B, limits the operation of that scheme to mixed development or mixed use land.

  2. The express purpose of s 5A(4) is to make provision for the application of the LTMA to surcharge land tax, subject to the terms set out in s 5A(4). One of those terms as set out in paragraph (g) is that exemption for a taxpayer’s principal place of residence can apply “only if” s 5B is satisfied. These words are a clear statement of the statutory intent. The question remaining is whether the Applicant satisfies the requirements of s 5B.

Can the Applicant claim exemption under s 5B of the LTA?

  1. Section 5B of the LTA provides an exemption from surcharge land tax for a taxpayer’s principal place of residence. Section 5B as in force for the relevant land tax years provided as follows:

Surcharge land tax—residence requirement applying to principal place of residence exemption

(1)  A person is eligible for an exemption from liability to pay surcharge land tax in respect of residential land for a land tax year because the land is the principal place of residence of the person only if—

(a)  the person is a permanent resident at midnight on 31 December of the previous year, and

(b)  the Chief Commissioner is satisfied that, during the land tax year, the person intends to use and occupy the land as the principal place of residence of the person in accordance with the residence requirement, and

(c)  the person lodges a declaration with a land tax return required to be furnished under section 12 of the Principal Act for the land tax year to the effect that the person has that intention.

(2)  The person must use and occupy the land as the person’s principal place of residence for a continuous period of 200 days in the land tax year. This requirement is referred to as the residence requirement”.

  1. Section 5B alone does not determine whether or not exemption applies. It contemplates exemption “because the land is the principal place of residence of the person”. In other words, it operates on the basis that the land in question already is subject to exemption because the land is the principal place of residence of the person. However, the LTA does not itself explain what a “principal place of residence” is and when the exemption it refers to applies.

  2. The LTA is to be read and construed with the LTMA (s 1 of the LTA). The LTMA defines what is a “principal place of residence” in s 3. It goes on in s 10(1)(r) to allow exemption under the principal place of residence exemption, as provided for by Schedule 1A. In these circumstances, the exemption referred to in s 5B can only be the exemption available under s 10(1)(r) of the LTMA.

  3. What follows is that to obtain exemption from surcharge land tax under s 5B, the taxpayer must fall within the terms of the exemption allowed under s 10(1)(r) but also satisfy the further requirements set out in s 5B. In other words, s 5B itself operates on the basis that exemption for principal place of residence is already available under the LTMA but adding further requirements a taxpayer needs to satisfy to obtain exemption from surcharge land tax. Section 5B does not refer to s 5A(4)(g) or in its express terms depend on that provision for its own operation. Section 5A(4)(g), on the other hand, is expressed to apply “only if” if a person is eligible for the exemption under s 5B.

  4. There was no dispute that the Applicant satisfied the requirements of the exemption under s 10(1)(r). There was also no dispute that she satisfied the requirements of s 5B, except for the requirement set out in s 5B(1)(a) that she be a “permanent resident”. The Applicant said that she satisfied this requirement. The Respondent says that she did not. Whether or not the Applicant was a “permanent resident” within the meaning of s 5B is the remaining question for determination.

  5. The expression “permanent resident” is not defined in the LTA. In Azam Mohammed & Sarah Azam v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2023] NSWCATAD 38, Bishop SM considered whether the definition of “permanent resident” in the Duties Act 1997 (NSW) (“Duties Act”) applied to s 5B. She considered that it did. She said, at [14] and [55]:

“… the expression “permanent resident” also appears in the provisions concerning the principal place of residence exemption for surcharge duty: s 104ZKA. The expression “permanent resident” is defined in the Dictionary to the Duties Act”

….

The amendments introduced Chapter 2A of the Duties Act (as referred to above) to be applied for both surcharge purchaser duty and surcharge land tax. As far as the two Acts implement surcharges of NSW taxes to foreign persons, they are part of the same legislative scheme, and deal with the same subject matter. In the absence of clear evidence of any such intention, it is likely that parliament intended like terms to have like meanings.

Therefore the phrase “permanent resident” when used in s 5B of the LTA should be construed as having the same meaning as used in the Duties Act – which cross-references to s 30 of the Migration Act’.

  1. Higgins SM in Leah v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2025] NSWCATAD 57 agreed that the phrase “permanent resident” as used in s 5B of the LTA should be construed as having the same meaning as used in the Duties Act. She followed the reasoning of Bishop SM (at, [44]).

  2. The Applicant on the other hand said that the schemes under the Duties Act and that under the LTA were different schemes. The Applicant said that the LTA did not incorporate the meaning of “permanent resident” found in the Duties Act. The Applicant’s submission was that the term “permanent resident” as used in s 5B instead took its ordinary meaning. She also provided evidence that she said showed that she was a “permanent resident” in the ordinary meaning.

  3. I am in agreement with the Respondent’s submission that the definition of “permanent resident” in the LTA is that referred to in the Duties Act. I adopt the reasoning of Bishop SM in Azam Mohammed as set out above, also followed by Higgins SM in Leah.

  4. The expression “permanent resident” is defined in the Dictionary to the Duties Act relevantly to include the holder of a permanent visa within the meaning of s 30 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”).

  5. Section 30 of the Migration Act provides:

“30  Kinds of visas

(1)  A visa to remain in Australia (whether also a visa to travel to and enter Australia) may be a visa, to be known as a permanent visa, to remain indefinitely.

(2)  A visa to remain in Australia (whether also a visa to travel to and enter Australia) may be a visa, to be known as a temporary visa, to remain:

(a)  during a specified period; or

(b)  until a specified event happens; or

(c)  while the holder has a specified status”.

  1. The Applicant did not hold a visa that allowed her to remain in Australia indefinitely during the land tax years in issue. The visa she held when the entered Australia was a Student (Class TU) Student Guardian (Subclass 580) visa. That visa stipulated a stay until 31 December 2017. The visa issued to the Applicant on 17 December 2017 stipulated an “Initial Stay Date” of 18 March 2022. The visa she received on 27 September 2023 stipulated an indefinite length of stay. The visas she held before 27 September 2023 were not “permanent visas” within the meaning of the Migration Act. Both had stipulated end dates and did not provide for an indefinite stay. At no time before 27 September 2023 did the Applicant hold any class of permanent visa within the meaning of s 30 of the Migration Act.

  2. In these circumstances, the Applicant was not a “permanent resident” within the meaning of s 5B during the land tax years in issue. The consequence is that that she does not satisfy all of the requirements set out in s 5B she must satisfy in order to claim exemption from surcharge land tax.

Valuation

  1. The Applicant had submitted that the value on which land tax had been assessed was excessive. However, at the hearing, the Applicant did not pursue any challenge to the assessment in issue on the basis of excessive land value.

Applicant’s circumstances

  1. The Applicant is aggrieved by the assessment under review. She says that in 2016 her husband and her were invited, encouraged and sponsored by the NSW government to live and work in Australia permanently by applying for a permanent visa. The Applicant says that this required first applying for provisional visas but a permanent visa did not issue until 2023. The Applicant claims that preventing her from claiming exemption from surcharge land tax, in these circumstances, is “grossly unfair and should be set aside”.

  2. Questions of fairness of the outcomes under a taxation law were considered by the High Court in Commissioner of Taxation v Ryan (2001) 201 CLR 109. The High Court said:

“But the question for decision is what are the circumstances in which an amended assessment may lawfully be issued? That question is not answered by asserting the existence of any “policy” or “general intention” unless that policy or intention is to be found reflected in the provisions of the Act. Appeals to general notions of “fairness” or “justice” do no more than attempt to mask the absence of any foundation in the legislation for the conclusion which is asserted.”

  1. The Tribunal has applied this principle in numerous cases, confirming that there is no discretion to relieve a taxpayer of a tax liability on grounds of unfairness.

  2. The Tribunal hears the Applicant on what she says about fairness. However, in the absence of jurisdiction to allow her relief, the Tribunal confirms the assessment under review.

Orders

  1. The assessment under review is confirmed

**********

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal.

Registrar

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.


Registrar

Decision last updated: 07 May 2025

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