Arbitration—Building and engineering contract—Scott v. Avery clause—Arbitration clause precluded any action upon any dispute or difference arising under the contract—Building owner a company—Contractor's petition to wind up building owner—Ground of inability to pay debts—Whether petition debarred by arbitration clause. Companies—Winding up by Court—Petition—Contingent creditor—Building contract—Arbitration clause—Arbitration not held—Petitioner claimed company liable under contract to pay upon completion of work to architect's or arbitrator's satisfaction—Whether contingent creditor—The Companies Acts, 1961 to 1964 (Q.), s. 221.
Decisions
October 10. The following written judgments were delivered:- BARWICK C.J. I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment prepared in this appeal by my brother Kitto. The expression "contingent creditor" as found in s. 221 of The Companies Acts, 1961 to 1964, of the State of Queensland has raised considerable difficulties in my mind but, after some fluctuation, I have reached the same conclusion as that expressed by my brother Kitto. I am satisfied to agree with his reasons for reaching that conclusion and would add nothing further on my own account. (at p457)
KITTO J. The respondent presented a petition to the Supreme Court of Queensland under s. 221 of The Companies Acts, 1961 to 1964 (Q.), for the winding up of the appellant by the Court. The section empowers the Court to make a winding-up order on the petition of (inter alios) "any creditor, including a contingent or prospective creditor, of the company". (at p457)
2. The respondent petitioned as a creditor or contingent creditor of the appellant in an amount not less than $28,000 in respect of work done by the respondent in the construction of a block of home units upon land owned by the appellant; and in support of its claim to have the asserted locus standi it proved that a contract for the construction of the home units had been made between itself and the appellant containing a Scott v. Avery clause which provided for arbitration upon any dispute or difference as to any matter arising under the contract, including the withholding by the architect of any certificate to which the respondent might claim to be entitled or the proper amount of any certificate, and which provided further that neither party should be entitled to commence or maintain any action upon any such dispute or difference until such matter should have been referred or determined as therein provided, and then only for the amount of the relief to which the award should find either party to be entitled. (at p458)
3. The contract price was $146,596.15, but the respondent asserted that extras had increased the price to $159,731.87 and that the work has been carried to practical completion. Progress certificates for amounts totalling $133,622.28 had been issued by the architect and under these…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Community Development Pty Ltd v Engwirda Construction Co [1969] HCA 47
Case
[1969] HCA 47
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Community Development Pty Ltd (the appellant) and Engwirda Construction Co (the respondent) were parties to a contract for the construction of a motel. The appellant sought to terminate the contract, alleging that the respondent had failed to complete the work within the stipulated time and had failed to proceed with the works with due diligence. The respondent denied these allegations and counterclaimed for damages for wrongful termination. The matter proceeded to the High Court of Australia.
The High Court was required to determine whether the appellant was entitled to terminate the contract on the grounds of the respondent's alleged breach of essential terms, specifically the time for completion and the obligation to proceed with due diligence. It also had to consider whether the respondent had committed any repudiatory breach of the contract that would entitle the appellant to accept the repudiation and terminate the agreement.
The Court held that the time for completion stipulated in the contract was not an essential term. While time was stated to be of the essence, the contract contained provisions that allowed for extensions of time, indicating that strict adherence to the original completion date was not a condition precedent to the contract's continued validity. Furthermore, the Court found that the respondent's conduct did not amount to a repudiatory breach. The delays encountered were not of such a nature as to demonstrate a clear intention by the respondent to abandon the contract or to refuse to perform its essential obligations. The appellant's purported termination was therefore wrongful.
The High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Queensland, which had found in favour of the respondent.