Burt v University of Sydney (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Burt v University of Sydney (No 2) [2025] 596

File number(s): NSD 89 of 2025
Judgment of: OWENS J
Date of judgment: 5 June 2025
Catchwords: COSTS – application for costs under s 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – respondent alleged applications instituted without reasonable cause – respondent also alleged the maintenance of the applications after offer of compromise an unreasonable act causing it to incur costs – whether circumstances in ss 570(2)(a) or 570(2)(b) applied – whether discretion to order costs should be exercised – significance of fact that applicant is unrepresented – whether indemnity costs should be ordered – whether costs should be assessed in a lump sum – quantification of amount payable – amount of discount to be applied – where proceedings simple and confined
Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 570

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43(1)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 25.01, 40.02(b)

Cases cited:

Ashby v Slipper (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 67

Australasian Performing Rights Association Ltd v Marlin [1999] FCA 1006

Australian Workers Union v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (No 2) (2013) 232 FCR 428; [2013] FCAFC 23

Baker v Patrick Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 166

BDR21 v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2) [2021] FCA 1347

Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119

Bhagat v Royal and Sun Alliance Life Assurance Australia Ltd [2000] NSWSC 159

Burt v University of Sydney [2025] FCA 393

Byrnes v Brisconnections Management Co Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 1432

Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93

Council of Kangan Batman Institute of Technology and Further Education v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2006) 156 FCR 275; [2006] FCAFC 199

Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd (Costs) [2023] FCAFC 102

Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology (No 2) [2023] FCA 422

Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (No 3) [2006] FCA 916

Ginos Engineers Pty Ltd v Autodesk Australia Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1051

Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc [2000] FCA 628

Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738; [2002] NSWCA 213

Innes v AAL Aviation Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 130

Melbourne Stadium Ltd v Sautner [2015] FCAFC 20

Ogawa v The University of Melbourne (No 2) [2004] FCA 1275

Ryan v Primesafe [2015] FCA 8

Sabapathy v Jetstar Airways (No 2) [2021] FCAFC 68

Salfinger v Niugini Mining (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 5) [2008] FCA 1119

Sandalwood Properties Ltd v Huntley Management Ltd (No 2) [2019] FCA 647

Saxena v PPF Asset Management Ltd [2011] FCA 395

Seafolly Pty Ltd v Madden (No 6) [2015] FCA 1369

Shea v Energy Australia Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 14

Soden v Croker (No 3) [2016] FCA 249

Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 8) [2006] FCA 1537

Tamu v World Vision Australia (No 2) [2021] FCA 565

Trustee for The MTGI Trust v Johnston (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 190

Division: Fair…
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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 596
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Burt v University of Sydney (No 2), the Court was called upon to consider an application for costs under section 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The application was brought by the Commonwealth against Dr Burt, who had instituted proceedings against the University of Sydney. The Commonwealth argued that the applications were instituted without reasonable cause and were maintained unreasonably after a compromise offer was made. The primary legal issues for the Court were whether the circumstances described in sections 570(2)(a) and 570(2)(b) applied, and if so, whether the Court should exercise its discretion to order costs. The Court also needed to consider whether indemnity costs should be awarded and whether the costs should be assessed in a lump sum. The significance of Dr Burt being unrepresented was also a factor in the Court's consideration.

The Court found that the applications were instituted without reasonable cause and that maintaining them after the offer of compromise was also unreasonable. The Court concluded that the circumstances described in sections 570(2)(a) and 570(2)(b) applied. The Court exercised its discretion to order costs, noting that Dr Burt's failure to identify any practical utility in the applications, even if they had succeeded, demonstrated a lack of reasonable cause. The Court rejected the argument that indemnity costs should be awarded, stating that the proceedings were relatively simple and confined. The Court assessed the costs payable by Dr Burt in a lump sum of $26,400, taking into account the unrepresented status of Dr Burt.

The Court's decision was grounded in the well-established principle that the failure to accept a reasonable offer of compromise may constitute an unreasonable act. The Court held that Dr Burt's applications lacked reasonable cause because there was no substantial injustice that would have resulted from a refusal to grant leave to appeal, and the primary judge's interlocutory judgment was not attended by sufficient doubt. The Court also found that an extension of time would not have been granted due to an insufficient explanation for the delay in filing the application out of time. The Court concluded that the lump sum costs order was appropriate and fixed the costs payable by Dr Burt at $26,400.

In summary, the Court ordered that Dr Burt pay the Commonwealth's costs in proceedings NSD 89 of 2025 on a party-and-party basis, fixed the costs payable as a lump sum in the amount of $26,400, and provided that the entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Applicant pay the Second Respondent’s costs in proceedings NSD 89 of 2025 on a party-and-party basis.

2. The costs payable pursuant to Order 1 above be fixed, pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), as a lump sum in the amount of $26,400.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Overall, therefore, I assess the costs payable by Dr Burt in a lump sum of $26,400.CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons:I am satisfied that the Court’s discretion to order costs is enlivened, on the basis that both ss 570(2)(a) and 570(2)(b) apply.(a)I am satisfied that it is appropriate to order Dr Burt to pay the Commonwealth’s costs of the applications.(b)I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to order that any part of the Commonwealth’s costs be assessed on an indemnity basis.(c)I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make a lump sum costs order.(d)I assess the lump sum payable in the amount of $26,400.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Of particular relevance for present purposes, it is also well-established that the failure to accept a reasonable offer of compromise may constitute an unreasonable act for the purposes of s 570(2)(b): Melbourne Stadium Ltd v Sautner [2015] FCAFC 20 at [166] (Tracey, Gilmour, Jagot and Beach JJ).Consideration: Sub-Section 570(2)(a) The Commonwealth submitted, relying on the reasoning set out in my judgment, that the applications were instituted without reasonable cause because (a) there was no substantial injustice that would have resulted from a refusal to grant leave to appeal (Burt at [3]-[13]), (b) the primary judge’s interlocutory judgment was not attended by sufficient doubt (Burt at [14]-[22]), and (c) an extension of time would not have otherwise been granted because there was an insufficient explanation for the delay in filing the application out of time (Burt at [28]-[32]). In response, Dr Burt submitted, correctly, that the mere fact he had failed on each of those matters did not mean that the applications were commenced without reasonable cause (see, e.g., Leighton Contractors at [7(3)]; Kangan at [60]). He submitted that a different judge might have taken a different view, leading to a different result. He submitted that “[t]he matter always had reasonable prospects of success: the delay of the Applicant could be reasonably explained; there were reasonable arguments as to the incorrectness of the primary judge’s decision; and there were reasonable arguments as to there being substantial injustice to the applicant and the class if leave to appeal were not granted.” A significant portion of Dr Burt’s submissions were devoted to the expression of disagreement with my judgment, both as to the correctness of my reasoning and conclusions, and in the identification of matters that it was suggested I had overlooked or ignored. It is not necessary for me to engage with those submissions, however, because one matter that they do not address, and which would be necessary to address in order to demonstrate the existence of reasonable cause in bringing the applications, is the complete lack of any practical utility in the applications even if they had succeeded. That is to say, although Dr Burt submitted that there were “reasonable arguments as to there being substantial injustice to the applicant and the class if leave to appeal were not granted”, I could detect nothing in his submissions that identified any such argument. In my judgment at [4], I listed the three matters that Dr Burt had identified as the practical consequences of success on any appeal. For the reasons I gave, none of those matters could have been achieved, or even advanced, by way of appeal of the primary judge’s judgment. Dr Burt’s latest submissions did not identify any reason or argument why the contrary conclusion was arguable. Rather, he sought to identify various injustices that he considers to have flowed from the primary judge’s judgment. Even on the assumption, which is a very large assumption indeed, that those matters can be regarded as a consequence of the primary judge’s judgment (as opposed to the consequence of forensic decisions taken by the applicant and his then lawyers), and that they can be characterised as injustices, an appeal would not have provided any remedy for them.