FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Burt v University of Sydney (No 2) [2025] 596
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 596
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the applications were instituted without reasonable cause and that maintaining them after the offer of compromise was also unreasonable. The Court concluded that the circumstances described in sections 570(2)(a) and 570(2)(b) applied. The Court exercised its discretion to order costs, noting that Dr Burt's failure to identify any practical utility in the applications, even if they had succeeded, demonstrated a lack of reasonable cause. The Court rejected the argument that indemnity costs should be awarded, stating that the proceedings were relatively simple and confined. The Court assessed the costs payable by Dr Burt in a lump sum of $26,400, taking into account the unrepresented status of Dr Burt.
The Court's decision was grounded in the well-established principle that the failure to accept a reasonable offer of compromise may constitute an unreasonable act. The Court held that Dr Burt's applications lacked reasonable cause because there was no substantial injustice that would have resulted from a refusal to grant leave to appeal, and the primary judge's interlocutory judgment was not attended by sufficient doubt. The Court also found that an extension of time would not have been granted due to an insufficient explanation for the delay in filing the application out of time. The Court concluded that the lump sum costs order was appropriate and fixed the costs payable by Dr Burt at $26,400.
In summary, the Court ordered that Dr Burt pay the Commonwealth's costs in proceedings NSD 89 of 2025 on a party-and-party basis, fixed the costs payable as a lump sum in the amount of $26,400, and provided that the entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Applicant pay the Second Respondent’s costs in proceedings NSD 89 of 2025 on a party-and-party basis.
2. The costs payable pursuant to Order 1 above be fixed, pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), as a lump sum in the amount of $26,400.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Of particular relevance for present purposes, it is also well-established that the failure to accept a reasonable offer of compromise may constitute an unreasonable act for the purposes of s 570(2)(b): Melbourne Stadium Ltd v Sautner [2015] FCAFC 20 at [166] (Tracey, Gilmour, Jagot and Beach JJ).Consideration: Sub-Section 570(2)(a) The Commonwealth submitted, relying on the reasoning set out in my judgment, that the applications were instituted without reasonable cause because (a) there was no substantial injustice that would have resulted from a refusal to grant leave to appeal (Burt at [3]-[13]), (b) the primary judge’s interlocutory judgment was not attended by sufficient doubt (Burt at [14]-[22]), and (c) an extension of time would not have otherwise been granted because there was an insufficient explanation for the delay in filing the application out of time (Burt at [28]-[32]). In response, Dr Burt submitted, correctly, that the mere fact he had failed on each of those matters did not mean that the applications were commenced without reasonable cause (see, e.g., Leighton Contractors at [7(3)]; Kangan at [60]). He submitted that a different judge might have taken a different view, leading to a different result. He submitted that “[t]he matter always had reasonable prospects of success: the delay of the Applicant could be reasonably explained; there were reasonable arguments as to the incorrectness of the primary judge’s decision; and there were reasonable arguments as to there being substantial injustice to the applicant and the class if leave to appeal were not granted.” A significant portion of Dr Burt’s submissions were devoted to the expression of disagreement with my judgment, both as to the correctness of my reasoning and conclusions, and in the identification of matters that it was suggested I had overlooked or ignored. It is not necessary for me to engage with those submissions, however, because one matter that they do not address, and which would be necessary to address in order to demonstrate the existence of reasonable cause in bringing the applications, is the complete lack of any practical utility in the applications even if they had succeeded. That is to say, although Dr Burt submitted that there were “reasonable arguments as to there being substantial injustice to the applicant and the class if leave to appeal were not granted”, I could detect nothing in his submissions that identified any such argument. In my judgment at [4], I listed the three matters that Dr Burt had identified as the practical consequences of success on any appeal. For the reasons I gave, none of those matters could have been achieved, or even advanced, by way of appeal of the primary judge’s judgment. Dr Burt’s latest submissions did not identify any reason or argument why the contrary conclusion was arguable. Rather, he sought to identify various injustices that he considers to have flowed from the primary judge’s judgment. Even on the assumption, which is a very large assumption indeed, that those matters can be regarded as a consequence of the primary judge’s judgment (as opposed to the consequence of forensic decisions taken by the applicant and his then lawyers), and that they can be characterised as injustices, an appeal would not have provided any remedy for them.