Przybylowski v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Przybylowski v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCA 862

File number: NSD 443 of 2025
Judgment of: STEWART J
Date of judgment: 25 July 2025
Catchwords:

HUMAN RIGHTS – application for leave to commence
proceeding pursuant to s 46PO(3A)(a) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – where substance of applicant’s complaint is that his overseas child and spousal maintenance obligations arising under the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) have been subject to misadministration by the respondent – where complaint to Australian Human Rights Commission
terminated on the basis that the forms of discrimination alleged were not apparent on the information provided and generally lacked particulars – whether the applicant’s claims have any merit and leave should be granted

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where applicant has been a serial litigant in the federal courts since 2015 in relation the same substratum of facts – where applicant has another proceeding on foot seeking administrative law remedies – whether there is occasion for an order under s 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) prohibiting the bringing of further proceedings by the applicant

Legislation:

Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth)

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss 3, 46P(1A), 46PF(1)(b), 46PH(1)(c), 46PO(1), (3), (3A)(a), 46PSA(5), (6)

Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth), ss 4, 18A, 25(1), (1A), (2), (2A), 37B

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), ss 5, 6, 11, 122

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 570

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 37AO

Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)

Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)

Child Support (Registration and Collection) Regulations 1988 (Cth) Sch 2

Cases cited:

Burt v University of Sydney (No 2) [2025] FCA 596

James v Workpower Inc [2018] FCA 2083

Lu v University of New South Wales (No 2) [2022] FCA 1010

Matthews v Markos [2019] FCA 1827

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission (No 2) [2018] FCA 473

Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 276 CLR 579

Weir v Telstra Ltd [2023] FCAFC 196; 301 FCR 261

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 35
Date of hearing: 25 July 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: P Barker of the Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

 

ORDERS

NSD 443 of 2025
BETWEEN:

MIROSLAW PRZYBYLOWSKI

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AS REPRESENTED BY SERVICES AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

STEWART J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s originating application for leave to proceed pursuant to s 46PO(3A)(a) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) filed 26 March 2025 be dismissed with costs.

2.The applicant have leave to file his submissions dated 25 July 2025 and supporting documents (49 pages in total).

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 862
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Przybylowski v Commonwealth of Australia was brought before the Federal Court, where the applicant, Przybylowski, sought leave to commence proceedings pursuant to section 46PO(3A)(a) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986. The applicant's complaint centred on the alleged misadministration of his overseas child and spousal maintenance obligations, which arise under the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988. Przybylowski contended that the respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia, had discriminated against him in the registration and enforcement of these maintenance obligations, claiming that the agency's actions constituted unlawful discrimination. The Australian Human Rights Commission had previously terminated Przybylowski's complaint on the grounds that the forms of discrimination alleged were not apparent from the information provided and lacked particulars.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether Przybylowski's claims had any merit and whether leave should be granted for him to proceed with his application. The court also considered the question of whether there was occasion for an order under section 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, prohibiting Przybylowski from bringing further proceedings in relation to the same substratum of facts, given his history as a serial litigant in the federal courts since 2015. The Full Court in Weir highlighted the need to conduct a detailed evaluation of the merits of Przybylowski's claims, particularly in light of the lengthy unexplained delay and the reasoning of the High Court in Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs.

In dismissing Przybylowski's application, the court emphasised that it lacked the power to grant leave in relation to breaches of or obligations under international instruments. The applicant's claims under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Framework Agreement between the European Union and Australia were not within the scope of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act. The court also found the applicant's domestic statutory discrimination claims to be without merit and not reasonably arguable. The applicant's sex discrimination claim, which alleged that the respondent's defaults with regard to the maintenance orders were a form of sex discrimination, was dismissed as it was not sufficiently set out or explained. The delegate's conclusion that the complaint did not appear to support the applicant's assertions was upheld by the court. Consequently, the court dismissed the application with costs and granted Przybylowski leave to file his submissions and supporting documents.

ORDERS:
1. The applicant's originating application for leave to proceed pursuant to s 46PO(3A)(a) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) filed 26 March 2025 be dismissed with costs.
2. The applicant have leave to file his submissions dated 25 July 2025 and supporting documents (49 pages in total).
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s originating application for leave to proceed pursuant to s 46PO(3A)(a) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) filed 26 March 2025 be dismissed with costs.

2. The applicant have leave to file his submissions dated 25 July 2025 and supporting documents (49 pages in total).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Her Honour cautioned that the Court should avoid embarking on “a detailed consideration and determination of the merits of the applicant’s underlying arguments about unlawful discrimination”: at [39]. Nevertheless, the Full Court in Weir noted at [58] that this ought to be qualified by the reasoning of the High Court in Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 276 CLR 579 at [18]-[19], [28] and [41]; that is, the Court may appropriately engage in more than an “impressionistic assessment of the merits” and instead conduct a “detailed evaluation of the merits”, such as where there is lengthy, unexplained delay.Consideration As a threshold matter, it is not within the power of the Court to grant leave to the applicant to proceed under s 46PO insofar as his application relates to breaches of or obligations under international instruments. By way of salient example, the applicant claims breaches under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and the Framework Agreement between the European Union and Australia (2017). The applicant’s originating application and complaint invoke various others. Even putting aside the question of the applicability of those instruments to the applicant’s circumstances in terms, as the respondent correctly notes, the terms of the Act do not permit such leave. Section 46PO(1) provides that following the termination of a complaint, an application may be made to the Federal Court “alleging unlawful discrimination by one or more of the respondents to the terminated complaint”. Subsection (3) requires that the unlawful discrimination alleged in the application must be the same or substantially the same as that in the terminated complaint or otherwise arise out of the same or substantially the same acts, omissions or practices. “Unlawful discrimination” is defined at s 3 as “any acts, omissions or practices that are unlawful under” certain parts of the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth), Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) or Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). The definition’s scope does not extend beyond the domestic statutory regime. It is then necessary to turn to the residual sex and disability discrimination claims referred to by the applicant under the terms of the domestic statutes. Those matters, in the manner expressed by the applicant, appear to be without merit and not reasonably arguable on their face. The applicant’s sex discrimination case is essentially that the defaults of the respondent with regard to the registration and enforcement of the Polish spousal and child maintenance orders against him are a form of sex discrimination – namely, that is being treated less favourably than his ex-spouse on account of his sex. That was also the understanding of the delegate, who concluded that the complaint was “not sufficiently set out or explained” and that what was provided did not “appear to support that decisions or acts of the Agency referenced in the complaint were because of your sex, or that you have been treated less favourably than a person of a different sex would be treated in the same, or not materially different circumstances.”