Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission (No 2) [2018] FCA 473

File number: NSD 948 of 2017
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 9 April 2018
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for judicial review of decision by the Australian Human Rights Commission not to inquire into the applicant’s complaints -general principles governing summary dismissal under r 26.01, Federal Court Rules 2011 - where no requirement for proof of service of notices under s 79B, Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), where no arguable constitutional issue raised - where applicant seeks review of issues litigated unsuccessfully before the Federal Circuit Court - whether proceedings constitute an abuse of process - where pleadings consist of baseless, unparticularised claims of legal error – whether failure to establish reasonable prospects of success – application for judicial review dismissed
Legislation:

Constitution subs 51(xxii), (xxix)

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 18

Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth)

Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) ss 37(1) and 38

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 20

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.42, 26.01

Cases cited:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis [2013] FCA 641; (2013) 220 FCR 256

Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117; (2009) 178 FCR 401

Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2017] FCA 540

Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273

R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex Parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13

Shammas v Canberra Institute of Technology [2014] FCA 71

Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; (2007) 232 CLR 189

Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 242; (2004) 146 FCR 10

Date of hearing: 31 January 2018
Date of last submissions: 19 February 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 48
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr J Hutton of the Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 948 of 2017
BETWEEN:

MIROSLAW PRZYBYLOWSKI

Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

First Respondent

ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 APRIL 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The whole of the application for judicial review is dismissed pursuant to rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the second respondent as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRY J:

1......... INTRODUCTION

[1]

2......... PRINCIPLES GOVERNING SUMMARY DISMISSAL

[6]

3......... EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS

[8]

4......... THE DELEGATE’S DECISION

[11]

5......... NO CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE ARISES

[17]

6.........…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 473
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission (No 2) was heard by the Federal Court and involved an application for judicial review by the applicant against the decisions of the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) not to inquire into his complaints. The applicant sought to challenge the AHRC’s decisions related to child support, allegations against the Family Court of Australia, and claimed that his application raised constitutional matters. The applicant's pleadings were deemed baseless and unparticularised, leading to the court considering whether the application had any reasonable prospects of success. Additionally, the court assessed whether the applicant had properly served the required notices under s 79B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and whether the proceedings constituted an abuse of process.

The court found that the applicant's claims were not supported by any material facts or evidence, rendering the application hopeless. The allegations of fraud against the Commission were not substantiated and were therefore considered an abuse of process. The court also noted that the applicant had not raised any issues under the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth), and the Commission's decision to refer the applicant to the Commonwealth Ombudsman was justified and within its statutory powers. Furthermore, the court found no arguable constitutional issues in the application, and the required notices under s 79B had not been served.

The court concluded that the application for judicial review had no reasonable prospects of success and dismissed the application summarily under rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the second respondent as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The whole of the application for judicial review is dismissed pursuant to rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the second respondent as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The second complaint – the decisions of the DHS regarding child support: – In April 2011, a Polish Court made an order increasing the amount of child support payable by the applicant for his child. The Polish authorities made a request in October 2015 that the DHS seek additional child support payments from the applicant. The DHS decided to register that request on 3 May 2016 and an objection to that decision was disallowed by the DHS on 13 January 2017. On 11 and 13 November 2014, the applicant requested that the DHS make a child support assessment for his daughter. The DHS wrote to the applicant on 17 November 2014 advising that they could not make such an assessment. With respect to this complaint, the delegate found that a more appropriate remedy was available to the applicant, being review of the DHS decision by a tribunal, the FCC (upon the grant of appropriate extensions of time), or the Commonwealth Ombudsman. The third complaint – allegations against the Family Court of Australia: – In mid-2016, the applicant made a complaint to the Family Court in relation to the earlier FCC judgment. The applicant claimed that this complaint was not responded to by the Family Court. The delegate found this complaint was lacking in substance and/or misconceived for two reasons: first, it was unclear how a failure to respond to a complaint could constitute a breach of human rights; and secondly, judges and judicial officers are protected by judicial immunity and therefore against claims of unlawful discrimination.5. NO CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE ARISES The applicant contends that his application raises a number of matters arising under the Commonwealth Constitution (Constitution) and, as such, filed two s 78B notices on 27 November 2017 and on 7 December 2017. The applicant was also granted leave at the hearing of the summary dismissal application to file (but not serve) two further s 78B notices. Section 78B relevantly provides that:(1) Where a cause pending in a federal court … involves a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation, it is the duty of the court not to proceed in the cause unless and until the court is satisfied that notice of the cause, specifying the nature of the matter has been given to the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth and of the States, and a reasonable time has elapsed since the giving of the notice for consideration by the Attorneys-General, of the question of intervention in the proceedings or removal of the cause to the High Court.(emphasis added) It follows, by virtue of s 78B, that if a constitutional issue did arise, it would require the service of the s 78B notices on the State, Territory, and Commonwealth Attorneys-General, and this matter could not proceed unless and until that had occurred and a reasonable time had elapsed thereafter. Mr Przybylowski affirmed an affidavit on 15 January 2018 in which he alleged that he “delivered all Court documents to the parties” filed since 5 October 2017. No State or Territory Attorney-General is a party to this matter, and therefore this affidavit does not appear to be intended as proof of service of the s 78B notices upon them. In any event, even if Mr Przybylowski mistakenly referred to the State and Territory Attorneys-General as parties, he did not depose as to the date on which the s 78B notices were served, the means by which they were served, or any responses to the notices received from the Attorneys-General. In those circumstances, it is not possible for me to be satisfied either that the s 78B notices were served or that a reasonable time has elapsed since their service.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The points of claim allege without any specificity a breach of natural justice, errors of law, and that the Commission’s decision was induced or affected by fraud or was otherwise contrary to law. In addition, in the points of claim the applicant seeks a writ of mandamus “ordering the AHRC to attempt to conciliate my complaint and report to parliament without any delays”. 7. CONSIDERATION For the reasons set out below, I consider that this is a clear case in which the proceeding should be dismissed summarily on the grounds identified by the Attorney-General.7.1 No reasonable prospects of success established First, at a general level, the applicant’s pleadings consist at their highest of baseless, unparticularised claims of legal error of various kinds, and bare claims for judicial review. Where the applicant includes further detail allegedly of his claims, as explained above, that detail is incomprehensible. As such the pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action and there is no reasonable prospect of the applicant successfully prosecuting the proceeding. Indeed, even if the test remained the more stringent test which preceded the enactment of s 31A of the FCA Act, I would find that the proceedings were hopeless. Secondly and more specifically, the claim that the Commission was “acting on fraudulent view” is a claim of the utmost seriousness and as such must be clearly and distinctly pleaded: see r 16.42 of the FCR; see also e.g. SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; (2007) 232 CLR 189 at [15] (the Court). In the absence of any pleadings of material fact, let alone particulars of the claim or evidence to support the allegation of fraud, the pleading is an abuse of process and cannot be said to have any reasonable prospects of success. Thirdly, no issues relating to the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) appear to have been raised with the Commission. Therefore any failure by the Commission to deal with those issues cannot now give rise to reviewable error. Fourthly, the claim that the delegate “violated its obligations of independence and impartiality” in considering claims of judicial immunity is unarguable. It was plainly open to the delegate to decide not to enquire into complaints against judicial officers on the ground that judges and judicial officers, when hearing and determining cases are afforded judicial immunity and thereby protected from civil suits, including claims of unlawful discrimination and breaches of human rights. No basis for the allegation of a perception of bias or actual bias could arise on this ground. In the fifth place, the finding by the delegate that it was open to the applicant to make a complaint to the Commonwealth Ombudsman and her explanation that the Ombudsman has broad powers to investigate administrative actions including the exercise of statutory responsibilities and decisions, does not “exceeds incorrectly power on the Ombudsman.”The explanation correctly summarises the Ombudsman’s powers under the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth). That being so, the Commission has express power under s 20(2)(vi) of the AHRC Act to decide not to inquire into a complaint where, as here, the Commission is of the opinion that the subject matter of the complaint could be more effectively or conveniently dealt with by another statutory authority.