FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd (Costs) [2023] FCAFC 102
File number(s): NSD 373 of 2022 Judgment of: RANGIAH, GOODMAN AND MCELWAINE JJ Date of judgment: 30 June 2023 Catchwords: COSTS – application for costs pursuant to s 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) – no reasonable prospects of success on the appeal – appeal instituted without reasonable cause (s 570(2)(a) of the FW Act) – maintenance of the appeal was an unreasonable act of the appeal that caused the respondent to incur costs (s 570(2)(b) of the FW Act) – discretion in s 570(1) of the FW Act exercised so as to require the appellant to pay the second respondent’s costs of the appeal Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 569, 569A, 570
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43
Cases cited: Australian and International Pilots Association v Qantas Airways Ltd (No 3) [2007] FCA 879; (2007) 162 FCR 392
Australian Workers Union v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCAFC 23; (2013) 232 FCR 428
Baker v Patrick Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 166; (2014) 145 ALD 548
BHP Coal Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2014] FCAFC 138; (2014) 226 FCR 240
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clarke [2008] FCAFC 143; (2008) 170 FCR 574
Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] FCA 416
Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2022] FCA 1553
Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 65
Fair Work Ombudsman v Grouped Property Services Pty Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCA 810
Melbourne Stadiums Ltd v Sautner [2015] FCAFC 20; (2015) 229 FCR 221
Shea v Energy Australia Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 14
Trustee for The MTGI Trust v Johnston (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 190
Division: Fair Work Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations Number of paragraphs: 34 Date of last submission/s: 13 June 2023 Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr M Seck Solicitor for the Respondents: Solve Legal ORDERS
NSD 373 of 2022 BETWEEN: JEAN DAHDAH
Appellant
AND: PLATINUM DISTRIBUTORS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 151 351 059
First Respondent
JAMES DAHDAH
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RANGIAH, GOODMAN AND MCELWAINE JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
30 JUNE 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
A. INTRODUCTION
On 5 May 2023, we dismissed the appellant’s appeal and published our reasons for doing so: Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 65 (appeal judgment). Some familiarity with the appeal judgment is assumed in these reasons and we…
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- Case
- [2023] FCAFC 102
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the appeal had no reasonable prospects of success, as the findings in the primary judgment that were challenged on appeal were based on the primary judge's views as to the credit of the appellant, the respondent, and various witnesses. The primary judge did not rely upon the uncorroborated evidence of the appellant or the respondent and made his findings based on the evidence of other witnesses. The Court concluded that the appellant's appeal was instituted without reasonable cause or that an unreasonable act or omission of the appellant caused the respondent to incur the costs, thereby enlivening the discretion under s 570(1) of the FW Act to award costs. Consequently, the Court exercised its discretion in s 570(1) of the FW Act and made an order requiring the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant contends that: (1) the discretion under s 570 of the FW Act to award costs is enlivened only if the Court considers that his appeal was vexatious; (2) the respondent has not established that the appeal was vexatious; and (3) thus, the discretion to award costs does not arise and no costs order should be made. He did not otherwise address the respondent’s submissions.Consideration As is apparent from the text of s 570, and contrary to the appellant’s submissions, it is not necessary for the Court to be satisfied that the appellant instituted the appeal vexatiously in order to enliven the discretion in s 570(1) of the FW Act. As noted at [5] above, other means of enlivening the discretion include, relevantly, the Court being satisfied that the appeal was instituted without reasonable cause (s 570(2)(a)) or the Court being satisfied that an unreasonable act or omission of the appellant caused the respondent to incur the costs in respect of which an order is sought (s 570(2)(b)). These two criteria have a considerable factual overlap in the present case and it is convenient to consider them together. The starting point is to consider what facts were apparent to the appellant (objectively) at the time that the appeal was instituted. At that time the appellant had: (1) the primary judge’s detailed reasons in the primary judgment; (2) the primary judge’s reasoning in the primary costs judgment; and (3) the notice of appeal. In our view, taking these matters into account, the appeal had no reasonable prospects of success, for the following reasons. The findings in the primary judgment that were challenged on appeal related to three issues. These are described in a summary form in the appeal judgment at [5] to [14]. The first issue and the primary judge’s findings concerning that issue were described in the appeal judgment as follows:5. The first and central issue was whether the appellant’s employment by Platinum ended on 26 June 2015 as a result of a conversation of that date between the appellant and the respondent (26 June 2015 conversation) as the respondent contended, or continued past that date and until October 2017 (as the appellant contended).6. The primary judge found that the appellant’s employment ended as a result of the 26 June 2015 conversation. He reached that finding by: accepting the evidence of two other participants in that conversation as to what was said; relying upon minutes of a meeting between the respondent and his accountant on 30 June 2015 (30 June 2015 minutes) which record the respondent’s statement that the appellant had resigned; accepting the evidence of John (the appellant’s uncle and the respondent’s father), that during a conversation with the appellant on 5 July 2015 (5 July 2015 conversation) the appellant asked John for employment with John’s company Veejay Pty Ltd and that the appellant thereafter worked for Veejay; and finding that group certificates for the 2016 and 2017 financial years (2016 and 2017 group certificates) – which suggested that the appellant was in the employ of Platinum during those financial years – were false documents which the respondent caused to be prepared because of a request of the appellant, his sister (Jousephine) and niece (Jouliana) made during a family meeting on 13 September 2017 (13 September 2017 family meeting) so as to assist the appellant to satisfy a condition of his visa and thereby assist in his application for permanent residency in Australia.7. These key findings were squarely based upon the primary judge’s views as to the credit of the appellant, the respondent and various witnesses. The primary judge was not prepared to accept the evidence of the appellant or the respondent without corroboration. He did not rely upon their uncorroborated evidence and made his findings: (1) as to the 26 June 2015 conversation upon his acceptance of the evidence of two other witnesses, Mr Boustany and Mr Atie; (2) as to the 5 July 2015 conversation on his acceptance of John’s evidence; and (3) as to the 2016 and 2017 group certificates upon the evidence of Jousephine and Jouliana.(emphasis in original)