Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd (Costs)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd (Costs) [2023] FCAFC 102  

File number(s): NSD 373 of 2022
Judgment of: RANGIAH, GOODMAN AND MCELWAINE JJ
Date of judgment: 30 June 2023
Catchwords: COSTS – application for costs pursuant to s 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) – no reasonable prospects of success on the appeal – appeal instituted without reasonable cause (s 570(2)(a) of the FW Act) – maintenance of the appeal was an unreasonable act of the appeal that caused the respondent to incur costs (s 570(2)(b) of the FW Act) – discretion in s 570(1) of the FW Act exercised so as to require the appellant to pay the second respondent’s costs of the appeal
Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 569, 569A, 570

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43

Cases cited:

Australian and International Pilots Association v Qantas Airways Ltd (No 3) [2007] FCA 879; (2007) 162 FCR 392

Australian Workers Union v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCAFC 23; (2013) 232 FCR 428

Baker v Patrick Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 166; (2014) 145 ALD 548

BHP Coal Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2014] FCAFC 138; (2014) 226 FCR 240

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clarke [2008] FCAFC 143; (2008) 170 FCR 574

Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] FCA 416

Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2022] FCA 1553

Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 65

Fair Work Ombudsman v Grouped Property Services Pty Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCA 810

Melbourne Stadiums Ltd v Sautner [2015] FCAFC 20; (2015) 229 FCR 221

Shea v Energy Australia Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 14

Trustee for The MTGI Trust v Johnston (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 190

Division: Fair Work Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Number of paragraphs: 34
Date of last submission/s: 13 June 2023
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr M Seck
Solicitor for the Respondents: Solve Legal

ORDERS

NSD 373 of 2022
BETWEEN:

JEAN DAHDAH

Appellant

AND:

PLATINUM DISTRIBUTORS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 151 351 059

First Respondent

JAMES DAHDAH

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RANGIAH, GOODMAN AND MCELWAINE JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

30 JUNE 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

A.       INTRODUCTION

  1. On 5 May 2023, we dismissed the appellant’s appeal and published our reasons for doing so: Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 65 (appeal judgment). Some familiarity with the appeal judgment is assumed in these reasons and we…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCAFC 102
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the appellant, Dahdah, appealed against the decision of the primary judge in Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd. The respondent, Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd, sought costs of the appeal pursuant to s 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The central issue for the Court was whether the appeal was instituted without reasonable cause or if an unreasonable act or omission of the appellant caused the respondent to incur the costs, thereby enlivening the discretion under s 570(1) of the FW Act to award costs. The appellant argued that the discretion under s 570 of the FW Act to award costs is enlivened only if the Court considers that his appeal was vexatious, and that the respondent had not established that the appeal was vexatious. However, the Court found that contrary to the appellant's submissions, it was not necessary for the Court to be satisfied that the appellant instituted the appeal vexatiously in order to enliven the discretion in s 570(1) of the FW Act.

The Court found that the appeal had no reasonable prospects of success, as the findings in the primary judgment that were challenged on appeal were based on the primary judge's views as to the credit of the appellant, the respondent, and various witnesses. The primary judge did not rely upon the uncorroborated evidence of the appellant or the respondent and made his findings based on the evidence of other witnesses. The Court concluded that the appellant's appeal was instituted without reasonable cause or that an unreasonable act or omission of the appellant caused the respondent to incur the costs, thereby enlivening the discretion under s 570(1) of the FW Act to award costs. Consequently, the Court exercised its discretion in s 570(1) of the FW Act and made an order requiring the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 5 May 2023, we dismissed the appellant’s appeal and published our reasons for doing so: Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 65 (appeal judgment). Some familiarity with the appeal judgment is assumed in these reasons and we will again refer to the second respondent as the respondent. On that day, we also made orders for the filing of evidence and submissions concerning costs and for the question of costs to be determined on the papers. Neither active party filed evidence, but each filed submissions. By those submissions the respondent seeks, and the appellant resists, the making of an order requiring the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. For the reasons set out below, such an order should be made.B. THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS Section 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) provides the Court with a wide discretion as to costs. However, that discretion is expressly limited by s 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act): s 43(1)(b) of the FCA Act; Melbourne Stadiums Ltd v Sautner [2015] FCAFC 20; (2015) 229 FCR 221 at 252 [140] (Tracey, Gilmour, Jagot and Beach JJ; White J agreeing). Section 570 of the FW Act provides:Costs only if proceedings instituted vexatiously etc.(1)A party to proceedings (including an appeal) in a court (including a court of a State or Territory) in relation to a matter arising under this Act may be ordered by the court to pay costs incurred by another party to the proceedings only in accordance with subsection (2) or section 569 or 569A.(2)The party may be ordered to pay the costs only if:(a)the court is satisfied that the party instituted the proceedings vexatiously or without reasonable cause; or(b)the court is satisfied that the party’s unreasonable act or omission caused the other party to incur the costs; or(c)the court is satisfied of both of the following:(i)the party unreasonably refused to participate in a matter before the FWC;(ii)the matter arose from the same facts as the proceedings. Section 570 of the FW Act applies when the Court is exercising its appellate jurisdiction, provided that the appeal involves a matter arising under the FW Act: BHP Coal Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2014] FCAFC 138; (2014) 226 FCR 240 at 243 [6] (Dowsett, Kenny and Flick JJ). It is common ground that the present appeal involved a matter arising under the FW Act and that s 570 of the FW Act applies.C. ENLIVENMENT OF THE DISCRETION The discretion in s 570(1) of the FW Act to award costs in favour of a party to a proceeding is enlivened only in accordance with s 570(2), s 569 or s 569A: s 570(1). In the present case, ss 569 and 569A are not relevant but s 570(2) is. The effect of s 570(2) is to provide that the s 570(1) discretion is enlivened if the party against whom the costs order is sought:(1)instituted the proceeding vexatiously (s 570(2)(a));(2)instituted the proceeding without reasonable cause (s 570(2)(a));(3)unreasonably performed an act or made an omission that caused the other party to incur the costs sought (s 570(2)(b)); or(4)unreasonably refused to participate in a matter before the Fair Work Commission where that matter arose from the same facts as the proceeding (s 570(2)(c)).Relevant principles

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant contends that: (1) the discretion under s 570 of the FW Act to award costs is enlivened only if the Court considers that his appeal was vexatious; (2) the respondent has not established that the appeal was vexatious; and (3) thus, the discretion to award costs does not arise and no costs order should be made. He did not otherwise address the respondent’s submissions.Consideration As is apparent from the text of s 570, and contrary to the appellant’s submissions, it is not necessary for the Court to be satisfied that the appellant instituted the appeal vexatiously in order to enliven the discretion in s 570(1) of the FW Act. As noted at [5] above, other means of enlivening the discretion include, relevantly, the Court being satisfied that the appeal was instituted without reasonable cause (s 570(2)(a)) or the Court being satisfied that an unreasonable act or omission of the appellant caused the respondent to incur the costs in respect of which an order is sought (s 570(2)(b)). These two criteria have a considerable factual overlap in the present case and it is convenient to consider them together. The starting point is to consider what facts were apparent to the appellant (objectively) at the time that the appeal was instituted. At that time the appellant had: (1) the primary judge’s detailed reasons in the primary judgment; (2) the primary judge’s reasoning in the primary costs judgment; and (3) the notice of appeal. In our view, taking these matters into account, the appeal had no reasonable prospects of success, for the following reasons. The findings in the primary judgment that were challenged on appeal related to three issues. These are described in a summary form in the appeal judgment at [5] to [14]. The first issue and the primary judge’s findings concerning that issue were described in the appeal judgment as follows:5. The first and central issue was whether the appellant’s employment by Platinum ended on 26 June 2015 as a result of a conversation of that date between the appellant and the respondent (26 June 2015 conversation) as the respondent contended, or continued past that date and until October 2017 (as the appellant contended).6. The primary judge found that the appellant’s employment ended as a result of the 26 June 2015 conversation. He reached that finding by: accepting the evidence of two other participants in that conversation as to what was said; relying upon minutes of a meeting between the respondent and his accountant on 30 June 2015 (30 June 2015 minutes) which record the respondent’s statement that the appellant had resigned; accepting the evidence of John (the appellant’s uncle and the respondent’s father), that during a conversation with the appellant on 5 July 2015 (5 July 2015 conversation) the appellant asked John for employment with John’s company Veejay Pty Ltd and that the appellant thereafter worked for Veejay; and finding that group certificates for the 2016 and 2017 financial years (2016 and 2017 group certificates) – which suggested that the appellant was in the employ of Platinum during those financial years – were false documents which the respondent caused to be prepared because of a request of the appellant, his sister (Jousephine) and niece (Jouliana) made during a family meeting on 13 September 2017 (13 September 2017 family meeting) so as to assist the appellant to satisfy a condition of his visa and thereby assist in his application for permanent residency in Australia.7. These key findings were squarely based upon the primary judge’s views as to the credit of the appellant, the respondent and various witnesses. The primary judge was not prepared to accept the evidence of the appellant or the respondent without corroboration. He did not rely upon their uncorroborated evidence and made his findings: (1) as to the 26 June 2015 conversation upon his acceptance of the evidence of two other witnesses, Mr Boustany and Mr Atie; (2) as to the 5 July 2015 conversation on his acceptance of John’s evidence; and (3) as to the 2016 and 2017 group certificates upon the evidence of Jousephine and Jouliana.(emphasis in original)