Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 65  

Appeal from: Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] FCA 416
File number(s): NSD 373 of 2022
Judgment of: RANGIAH, GOODMAN AND MCELWAINE JJ
Date of judgment: 5 May 2023 
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – claim for unpaid wages and entitlements under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – where primary judge’s central findings based heavily upon findings as to credit – whether the primary judge erred by making findings contrary to incontrovertible facts on uncontradicted testimony, were glaringly improbable or were contrary to compelling inferences – whether the primary judge erred by failing to consider particular evidence

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for adjournment of appeal made at the commencement of the hearing – no sufficiently cogent explanation – whether the interests of justice required an adjournment – application refused   

Legislation:

Fair Work Act2009 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules)

Cases cited:

Alhalek v Quintiliani trading as Kells Lawyers [2021] FCAFC 139

Australian Red Cross Society v Queensland Nurses’ Union of Employees [2019] FCAFC 215

BHP Billiton Nickel West Pty Ltd v KN (Deceased) (TJIWARL and TJIWARD #2) [2018] FCAFC 8; (2018) 258 FCR 521

Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] FCA 416

Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 46; (2013) 250 CLR 303

Fox v Perry [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118

Frigger v Trenfield (No 3) [2023] FCAFC 49

Gabrielle v Abood (No 2) [2023] NSWCA 28

Jess v Cooloola Milk Pty Ltd [2022] FCAFC 75; (2022) 292 FCR 284 at 290

Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28; (2019) 266 CLR 129

Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75

Yousif v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2010] FCAFC 8; (2010) 193 IR 212

Division: Fair Work Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Number of paragraphs: 174
Date of hearing: 16 February 2023
Solicitor for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr M Seck with Mr M Whitbread
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Solve Legal

ORDERS

NSD 373 of 2022
BETWEEN:

JEAN DAHDAH

Appellant

AND:

PLATINUM DISTRIBUTORS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 151 351 059

First Respondent

JAMES DAHDAH

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RANGIAH, GOODMAN AND MCELWAINE JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

5 MAY 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.On or before 19 May 2023 the second respondent file and serve any evidence and written submissions (limited to 3 pages) on which he proposes to rely on the question of costs.

3.On or before 2 June 2023, the appellant file and serve any evidence and written submissions (limited to 3 pages) on which he proposes to rely on the question of costs.

4.On or before 16 June 2023, the second respondent file and serve any evidence and…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCAFC 65
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd was an appeal brought before the court concerning a dispute over unpaid wages and entitlements under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The appellant, a Lebanese citizen and cousin to the respondent, had entered into a written employment contract with Platinum in 2014, and subsequently worked for the company from February 2015 until June 2015. The appellant claimed that he was not paid his full entitlements, while the respondent argued that the appellant had abandoned his employment to purchase a truck and work for himself.

The primary issues the court had to decide were whether the primary judge had erred in making certain findings contrary to incontrovertible facts or uncontradicted testimony, whether those findings were improbable, and whether the primary judge had failed to consider particular evidence. Additionally, the court had to decide whether the interests of justice required an adjournment of the appeal, as requested by the respondent.

The court found that the primary judge had not erred in making the contested findings, as the evidence presented did not warrant a different conclusion. The court rejected the appellant's arguments that the primary judge's findings were contrary to the evidence presented and that the primary judge had failed to consider specific evidence. The court also found that the interests of justice did not require an adjournment of the appeal, as the respondent had not provided a sufficiently cogent explanation for the request.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed, and the court ordered the parties to file and serve evidence and written submissions on the question of costs. The court determined that the question of costs would be decided on the papers and without an oral hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. On or before 19 May 2023 the second respondent file and serve any evidence and written submissions (limited to 3 pages) on which he proposes to rely on the question of costs.

3. On or before 2 June 2023, the appellant file and serve any evidence and written submissions (limited to 3 pages) on which he proposes to rely on the question of costs.

4. On or before 16 June 2023, the second respondent file and serve any evidence and written submissions (limited to 2 pages) in reply on the question of costs.

5. The question of costs be determined on the papers and without an oral hearing.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

A. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

[1]

The first issue

[5]

The second issue

[11]

The third issue

[14]

B. THE SALIENT FACTS AS FOUND BY THE PRIMARY JUDGE

[16]

C. AN OVERVIEW OF THE REASONING OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE

[32]

The appellant’s claim

[32]

The essential reasoning

[34]

The primary judge’s ultimate conclusion and some troubling matters

[40]

The role of credit in the primary judge’s findings

[45]

D. THE FIRST AND SECOND ISSUES – GROUNDS OF APPEAL 1 TO 5 AND 7 TO 8

[50]

Ground 1: Resignation – 26 June 2015 conversation

[51]

Ground 1 – first error

[55]

Ground 1 – second error

[57]

Ground 2: Resignation – Permanent residency

[60]

Ground 2 – first error

[63]

Ground 2 – second error

[73]

Ground 3: Secondment

[76]

Ground 3 – first error

[79]

Ground 3 – second error

[92]

Ground 4: Secondment

[116]

Ground 5: Group certificates

[129]

Ground 7: Payment of wages during secondment period

[131]

Ground 7 – first error

[136]

Ground 7 – second and third errors

[139]

Ground 8: Secondment and payment of wages

[142]

E. THIRD ISSUE – CASE FOR UNPAID WAGES IN THE PERIOD FROM FEBRUARY 2015 UNTIL 26 JUNE 2015 – GROUND 6

[149]

The appellant’s case and the primary judge’s findings

[149]

The sixth ground of appeal

[151]

Consideration

[152]

F. NOTICE OF CONTENTION

[164]

G. APPLICATION TO ADJOURN THE HEARING OF THE APPEAL

[165]

H. CONCLUSION

[174]

Background

Background to the litigation

Thus the appeal must fail and it is unnecessary to consider the respondent’s notice of contention.B. THE SALIENT FACTS AS FOUND BY THE PRIMARY JUDGE The salient facts found by the primary judge are set out below. The appellant is a citizen of Lebanon and a first cousin of the respondent. The respondent was the sole shareholder and director of Platinum, until its deregistration on 23 January 2019. Platinum operated a business of importing and exporting goods, from premises in Yennora in Sydney. On 2 February 2014, the appellant and Platinum entered into a written employment contract pursuant to which the appellant was to be employed by Platinum in Australia as an “export co‑ordinator” for an annual wage of $97,500. On 14 October 2014, the Department of Home Affairs sent the appellant a letter stating that visa applications for the appellant and his family had been approved. The letter provided that if the appellant were to stop working for his sponsor (Platinum) then he would be required to find another employer willing to nominate him, apply for another type of substantive visa, or leave Australia. On 14 January 2015, the appellant arrived in Australia and on 17 February 2015, he commenced work with Platinum at its Yennora premises. On 26 June 2015, and during the 26 June 2015 conversation, the appellant resigned from or abandoned his employment with Platinum in order to purchase a truck and to work for himself. The primary judge found that the conversation occurred in the manner recounted by the respondent, namely that:(1)in the days prior to 26 June 2015, the appellant approached the respondent and said that he had a friend who had a truck that he wanted to sell and that the friend had work for him to do. They had a conversation to the following effect:Appellant:… a friend of mine has a truck he wants to sell, and I want to buy it.Respondent: What do you mean?Appellant:I have a friend who is selling his truck and he has work for me.Respondent: … you can’t buy a truck. You are working for me. Appellant:OK, we will talk. (2)there was a conversation on 26 June 2015 in which the appellant, the respondent and Mr Boustany (a friend of the respondent) participated, and which included the following exchange: The primary judge also accepted the evidence of Mr Boustany and Mr Atie, a motor mechanic who leased part of his premises at Yennora to Platinum, concerning the 26 June 2015 conversation. Mr Boustany gave evidence that:(1)in January 2015, the respondent introduced him to the appellant and he subsequently saw the appellant regularly at Platinum’s premises and conversed with him;(2)on about 26 June 2015, Mr Boustany visited Platinum’s premises to see the respondent and had a brief conversation with the appellant who informed him that he wished to buy a truck in order to work for himself. Mr Boustany replied that the appellant’s visa required the appellant to work for Platinum and that the appellant could not raise the money to pay for the truck. The conversation continued:

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At J[242] to [243], the primary judge expressed his conclusions on that alternative case:242. I am not persuaded, on the basis of the evidence available, that the 2015 tax return does not represent the true position, namely that the [appellant] was paid wages by Platinum prior to 26 June 2015. There is no suggestion that the tax return is not a genuine document, or that the ATO did not provide a refund in the amount specified in the return. It is inherently improbable that Platinum or the respondent would have manufactured a state of affairs where tax would be paid in respect of wages for the [appellant] in circumstances where he was not paid at all. Indeed, such a proposition was not put to the respondent even though the submissions advanced by the [appellant] suggest (without making the allegation directly) that this is what must have taken place. 243. In the circumstances, in my view the [appellant] has not established that he was not paid wages for the period 17 February 2015 to 26 June 2015.(emphasis added)The sixth ground of appeal The sixth ground of appeal is expressed in the notice of appeal as: The learned judge erred in finding at [242] that he was not “persuaded that on the basis of the evidence available that the 2015 tax return does not represent the true position, namely that the [appellant] was paid wages by Platinum prior to 26 June 2015”.Consideration The appellant contends that the primary judge’s finding at J[242] that he was not persuaded that the 2015 tax return does not represent the true position is erroneous, for the following reasons. First, the appellant submitted, the reasoning to that conclusion is flawed in that:(1)the appellant denies having received such wages;(2)at its highest, the 2015 tax return and 2015 notice of assessment prove that the respondent paid withholding tax to the Australian Taxation Office, but do not prove that wages were in fact paid by Platinum to the appellant; and(3)the primary judge’s reasoning does not allow for the possibility that the respondent could have caused a state of affairs in which Platinum paid withholding taxes to the Australian Taxation Office but did not pay the appellant. We discern no flaw in the reasoning of the primary judge. He was required to determine whether Platinum had failed to pay wages to the appellant between February 2015 and 26 June 2015. He had determined that neither the appellant’s nor the respondent’s evidence could be accepted absent corroboration. He had before him the 2015 tax return and the 2015 notice of assessment which on their face suggested that such wages had been paid. On that basis, he was unpersuaded that there had been an underpayment by Platinum to the appellant. To have found otherwise, the primary judge would have had to conclude that the 2015 tax return was a false document and, as the primary judge found at J[242], there was no suggestion made that the 2015 tax return was not a genuine document. In these circumstances, a finding that the appellant had not discharged the onus of proving that he had not been paid wages between February 2015 and 26 June 2015 was not only open, but also clearly correct.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge also found that from about 5 July 2015, the appellant was engaged to work for Veejay and not for Platinum because:(1)of the 5 July 2015 conversation which the primary judge found occurred in the terms recounted by John (and denied by the appellant);(2)he found that John paid the appellant directly and in cash for that work; and(3)various documents relied upon by the appellant to demonstrate that the appellant continued to be employed by Platinum lacked sufficient cogency to allow the primary judge to draw the conclusion sought by the appellant. The primary judge’s ultimate conclusion and some troubling matters The primary judge’s ultimate conclusion was expressed at J[227]:In the result, the conclusion that I reach is that the [appellant] has not made out his case that he worked for Platinum for the period from 27 June 2015 until 1 October 2017. I accept that he left the employment of Platinum on about 26 June 2015. Prior to reaching that conclusion, the primary judge addressed three aspects of the case that he described as “particularly troubling”. The first aspect was described by the primary judge as the inherent improbability that a person in the position of the appellant would leave his life in Lebanon and come to Australia to work at Platinum, only to abandon that employment a few months later. His Honour addressed that concern as follows:223. …On one level it does not seem like rational behaviour. The [appellant] as a recent arrival to Australia was naïve as to local laws and to a large extent in the hands of the respondent. It would be a rash thing for one in his position to take such a course. 224. However, after observing the [appellant] in the witness box and considering his evidence closely, in my view he was capable of making impulsive and irrational decisions if he considered that they would be to his benefit. The fact that he behaved in a way that may appear objectively to be irrational does not persuade me that he was being truthful in denying, in the face of the other evidence to which I have referred, the 26 June 2015 conversation or in presenting the alternative version of events that he has advanced in relation to his work at Veejay, or the events that happened thereafter. The second aspect of the case that troubled the primary judge was that within ten days of the 26 June 2015 conversation concerning the appellant’s intention to buy a truck and to work for himself, the appellant (on 5 July 2015) asked John for work at Veejay. His Honour addressed that concern as follows:225.… On one view that might indicate that he never had an intention to acquire a truck and that the version offered by the respondent is false. However, I prefer to rely on the objective factors to which I have referred. It is entirely possible that the [appellant] changed his mind after the respondent refused to provide his support (including financial support) for buying the truck and instead decided to chance his arm working for John.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The sixth ground of appeal is expressed in the notice of appeal as: The learned judge erred in finding at [242] that he was not “persuaded that on the basis of the evidence available that the 2015 tax return does not represent the true position, namely that the [appellant] was paid wages by Platinum prior to 26 June 2015”.Consideration The appellant contends that the primary judge’s finding at J[242] that he was not persuaded that the 2015 tax return does not represent the true position is erroneous, for the following reasons. First, the appellant submitted, the reasoning to that conclusion is flawed in that:(1)the appellant denies having received such wages;(2)at its highest, the 2015 tax return and 2015 notice of assessment prove that the respondent paid withholding tax to the Australian Taxation Office, but do not prove that wages were in fact paid by Platinum to the appellant; and(3)the primary judge’s reasoning does not allow for the possibility that the respondent could have caused a state of affairs in which Platinum paid withholding taxes to the Australian Taxation Office but did not pay the appellant. We discern no flaw in the reasoning of the primary judge. He was required to determine whether Platinum had failed to pay wages to the appellant between February 2015 and 26 June 2015. He had determined that neither the appellant’s nor the respondent’s evidence could be accepted absent corroboration. He had before him the 2015 tax return and the 2015 notice of assessment which on their face suggested that such wages had been paid. On that basis, he was unpersuaded that there had been an underpayment by Platinum to the appellant. To have found otherwise, the primary judge would have had to conclude that the 2015 tax return was a false document and, as the primary judge found at J[242], there was no suggestion made that the 2015 tax return was not a genuine document. In these circumstances, a finding that the appellant had not discharged the onus of proving that he had not been paid wages between February 2015 and 26 June 2015 was not only open, but also clearly correct. Thus, the appellant’s submissions are rejected. More particularly, and addressing the matters set out at sub‑paragraphs [153(1) to (3) above]:(1)the appellant’s denial of having received wages was of no weight given his Honour’s credit findings concerning the appellant, the absence of corroborative evidence and the presence of contradictory evidence;(2)whilst the 2015 tax return and 2015 notice of assessment do not conclusively prove that wages were in fact paid by Platinum to the appellant, they are significant evidence of that fact. Further, the primary judge’s finding was not that wages were in fact paid by Platinum to the appellant but that the appellant had not proved that such payments had not been made; and(3)whilst as a matter of logic it was possible that the respondent could have caused a state of affairs in which Platinum paid withholding taxes to the Australian Taxation Office but did not pay wages to the appellant, no reason has been put forward as to why the primary judge should have made such a finding when: (1) it is difficult to reconcile with the 2015 tax return and 2015 notice of assessment; (2) it would require proof that the 2015 tax return contained false representations and that the respondent engaged in serious misconduct when an evidentiary foundation for the basis of such serious allegations had not been established. In circumstances where, as the primary judge noted at J[242], such a position was not put to the respondent, a submission based on the premise of such serious misconduct should not have been made to the primary judge. Nor should it have been made on appeal.