Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm) [2020] FCAFC 62

Appeal from: Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm) (No 4) [2018] FCA 968
File number: TAD 28 of 2018
Judges: BROMWICH, O’CALLAGHAN AND WHEELAHAN JJ
Date of judgment: 9 April 2020
Catchwords:

NEGLIGENCE – appeal by way of rehearing – where the primary judge dismissed the appellant’s applications against the respondent solicitors seeking damages for alleged professional negligence – duty of care owed by the first to fourth respondent solicitors and counsel in providing legal advice to the appellant nursing home operator – where the appellant, in respect of its Derwent Court nursing home in Hobart, faced Commonwealth government sanctions and the revocation of its approval as a Commonwealth funded nursing home operator under the National Health Act 1953 (Cth), and sought advice from the first to fourth respondent solicitors and counsel – errors by primary judge – Full Court to decide for itself – whether the first to third respondents and counsel were negligent in failing to advise the appellant that it had grounds to challenge a decision of a delegate of the Minister to impose financial sanctions pursuant to s 45E of the National Health Act – whether the appellant would have acted on such advice – whether the first to fourth respondents and counsel were negligent in failing to advise the appellant of the enactment of the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) and the transitional provisions in the Aged Care (Consequential Provisions) Act 1997 (Cth) – whether the first to fourth respondents and counsel were negligent in failing to advise the appellant of the significance of that legislation to a proposed decision by a delegate of the Minister to revoke its nursing home approval pursuant to s 44(2) of the National Health Act – what advice did the exercise of reasonable care require – first to fourth respondents and counsel negligent in failing to identify new legislation – whether, if reasonable and prudent advice given, the appellant would have become an approved provider of aged care services upon the commencement of the Aged Care Act – characterisation of the appellant’s claim as one for its lost opportunity to become an approved provider under the new legislation and to conduct its nursing home business at new premises, or alternatively, to sell its Commonwealth approvals to another approved provider – formulation of the content of reasonable and prudent advice – causation involving proof of a past hypothetical in which circumstantial evidence was the dominant consideration, assessed prospectively and without the benefit of hindsight, on the balance on probabilities – finding that even if the appellant had been given reasonable and prudent advice by its solicitors and counsel, the appellant had not established that it would have become an approved provider of aged care services upon the commencement of the Aged Care Act and thereby have avoided the damage which it claimed – appeal dismissed.

APPEAL – nature of appellate review…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 62
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jadwan Pty Ltd, the appellant, brought an action against Rae & Partners (A Firm), the first respondent, and three other solicitors and counsel, the second to fourth respondents, seeking damages for alleged professional negligence. The appellant, a nursing home operator, faced Commonwealth government sanctions and the revocation of its approval as a Commonwealth funded nursing home operator under the National Health Act 1953 (Cth). The appellant sought legal advice from the respondents in respect of its Derwent Court nursing home in Hobart. The primary judge dismissed the appellant’s applications against the respondents, finding that the appellant had failed to establish that it would have become an approved provider of aged care services upon the commencement of the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) and thereby have avoided the damage it claimed.

The legal issues for the court to decide were whether the first to third respondents and counsel were negligent in failing to advise the appellant that it had grounds to challenge a decision of a delegate of the Minister to impose financial sanctions pursuant to s 45E of the National Health Act. The court was also required to determine whether the appellant would have acted on such advice. The court considered whether the first to fourth respondents and counsel were negligent in failing to advise the appellant of the enactment of the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) and the transitional provisions in the Aged Care (Consequential Provisions) Act 1997 (Cth), and whether the first to fourth respondents and counsel were negligent in failing to advise the appellant of the significance of that legislation to a proposed decision by a delegate of the Minister to revoke its nursing home approval pursuant to s 44(2) of the National Health Act. The court also considered what advice the exercise of reasonable care required and whether, if reasonable and prudent advice had been given, the appellant would have become an approved provider of aged care services upon the commencement of the Aged Care Act.

The Full Court concluded that the primary judge had erred in finding that even if the appellant had been given reasonable and prudent advice by its solicitors and counsel, the appellant had not established that it would have become an approved provider of aged care services upon the commencement of the Aged Care Act and thereby have avoided the damage which it claimed. However, the Full Court found that the appellant had failed to establish that it would have become an approved provider of aged care services upon the commencement of the Aged Care Act and thereby have avoided the damage it claimed. The appeal was dismissed.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The parties file and exchange any submissions as to costs or other consequential orders, not to exceed three pages, by 4.00pm 4 May 2020.
3. If so advised, the parties file and exchange any submissions in reply, not to exceed three pages, by 4.00pm 11 May 2020.
4. The question of costs, and any consequential orders, shall be considered on the papers.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The parties file and exchange any submissions as to costs or other consequential orders, not to exceed three pages, by 4.00pm 4 May 2020.

3. If so advised, the parties file and exchange any submissions in reply, not to exceed three pages, by 4.00pm 11 May 2020.

4. The question of costs, and any consequential orders, shall be considered on the papers.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Schedule 1 of the Consequential Provisions Act effected extensive amendments to the National Health Act so as to give effect to the transition to the Aged Care Act in relation to the Commonwealth subsidy of proprietors of private nursing homes, in respect of approved places, for approved patients.Background The evidence at trial The principal lay witnesses called at trial were Mrs Joan Alexander and Ms Julie Alexander (who were called by Jadwan), and Mr Wicks (who was called by the first to third respondents). As we have mentioned, Mr Hogan was deceased. Mr Porter was not called by any party. There was a great deal of documentary evidence. During the course of his work for Jadwan, Mr Wicks had taken detailed notes of events, and of his thoughts, and his file notes were admitted as an exhibit. Mrs Joan Alexander had maintained a work diary in which she recorded notes of discussions, meetings, events, and her thoughts relevant to Jadwan’s affairs. Extracts from Mrs Alexander’s diary were admitted into evidence. In relation to the principal lay witnesses, the primary judge made some general findings in relation to the credit of Mr Wicks and Mrs Joan Alexander. As to Mr Wicks, his Honour was satisfied that, unless good reason was established to the contrary in a particular instance, the Court was entitled to rely on Mr Wicks’s file notes as highly probative of what they recorded. However, his Honour stated that without the benefit of his notes and his file, Mr Wicks’s memory proved to be susceptible of error. His Honour also stated that under robust cross-examination, Mr Wicks showed some signs of discomfort, but these observations reinforced rather than undermined the judge’s confidence in Mr Wicks’s honesty. His Honour considered that Mr Wicks asserted a certainty about his recollection beyond that which his Honour found plausible, but found that when Mr Wicks gave such evidence he genuinely believed that his memory should be preferred. His Honour also found that in relation to some aspects of his evidence under cross-examination, Mr Wicks was too prone to make concessions, which his Honour characterised as a self-destructive willingness to make what appeared to be unnecessary concessions. His Honour thought that Mr Wicks’s over-confidence and willingness to make concessions were manifestations of a lack of insight and judgment, and not dishonesty. His Honour was satisfied that, without impugning Mr Wicks’s credibility, in respect of those occasions when Mr Wicks’s oral evidence diverged from his contemporaneous written notes, in the absence of a clear contextual reason or evidence to corroborate his evidence, the Court was entitled to proceed on the basis that what was recorded in his notes should be accepted as being more reliable. As to Mrs Joan Alexander, his Honour found at [146] that she gave evidence of the truth as she recalled it, and noted at [141] that her credit was not put in issue. However, his Honour did not accept all of Mrs Alexander’s evidence where it was based upon her recollection. There were some instances where his Honour preferred contemporaneous notes to the evidence of Mrs Alexander’s recollection.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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