Riverside Nursing Care Pty Ltd v Honourable Bronwyn Bishop

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Riverside Nursing Care Pty Ltd v Honourable Bronwyn Bishop FCA [2000] 434

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ‑ Decision revoking approval of nursing home to receive government subsidies under Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) ‑ Application for suspension of operation of decision pending outcome of application for judicial review ‑ Whether point of substance to be argued or serious question to be tried.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ‑ Decision revoking approval of nursing home to receive government subsidies under Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) ‑ Application for judicial review ‑ Provision in Aged Care Act for appeal to Administrative Appeals Tribunal from decision that has been confirmed after reconsideration ‑ Decision not confirmed at time of application for review ‑ Whether Act provides for adequate review of decision so as to enliven court’s discretion to refuse relief.

AGED CARE ‑ Decision revoking nursing home’s allocation of places ‑ Whether places thereby cease to exist or are available for re‑allocation.

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5, 10(2)(b)(ii)
Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) ss 14‑4, 65, 67‑1, 85‑2.
Accreditation Grant Principles 1999 pars 3.7, 4.2(2)(a)

Bragg v Department of Employment (1995) 59 FCR 31 applied
Feingold v Zammit (1984) 1 FCR 87 applied
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko‑Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 applied
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 applied
Reg v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commission; Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 cited
Mahon v Air New Zealand [1984] AC 808 cited
American Cyanamid v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 cited
Re Wardle; ex parte Widin v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1987) 70 ALR 633 considered
Minister for Immigration , Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Msilanga (1992) 34 FCR 169 cited

RIVERSIDE NURSING CARE PTY LTD (Administrator appointed) v THE HONOURABLE BRONWYN BISHOP (as the Commonwealth Minister of State for Aged Care) and ANDREW PODGER (as the Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care
V 147 of 2000

SUNDBERG J
7 APRIL 2000
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 147 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

RIVERSIDE NURSING CARE PTY LTD (ACN 005 377 453) (Administrator appointed)
APPLICANT

AND:

THE HONOURABLE BRONWYN BISHOP (as the Commonwealth Minister of State for Aged Care)
FIRST RESPONDENT

ANDREW PODGER (as the Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care)
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 APRIL 2000

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent’s motion notice of which was filed on 20 March 2000 be dismissed.

2.The applicant’s motion notice of which was filed on 16 March 2000 be dismissed.

3.The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the motion referred to in paragraph 1.

4.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the motion referred to in paragraph 2.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 147 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

RIVERSIDE…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 434
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Riverside Nursing Care Pty Ltd v Honourable Bronwyn Bishop, the applicant, a nursing home operator, sought to challenge the decisions of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Community Services to revoke its allocation of places and to suspend its approval as a provider of residential care services. The applicant argued that the decisions were flawed on various grounds, including that they were based on improper purposes, irrelevant considerations, and a failure to take into account relevant considerations. The applicant also sought a suspension of the orders pending the outcome of the review proceedings. The court considered the arguments advanced by the applicant and found them to be without merit.

The court held that the applicant had not demonstrated a point of substance or a serious question on any of the grounds of review relied upon. The court found that the decisions were based on proper purposes and relevant considerations, and that the applicant had not shown that the decisions were made for an improper purpose or that irrelevant considerations were taken into account. The court also held that the applicant had not established that the decisions failed to take into account relevant considerations, including the welfare of the residents.

The court further held that the applicant had not demonstrated that it would suffer substantial and irreparable harm if the orders were not suspended. The court found that the applicant's fear that its allocated places would be extinguished and the Secretary would be powerless to restore them if the applicant was successful on the review was unjustified. The court also held that the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of a suspension.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the applicant's motion for a suspension of the orders and the respondent's motion for an order that the applicant pay the respondents' costs of the motion. The court also ordered that the respondents pay the applicant's costs of the motion. The court held that the applicant had not established a point of substance or a serious question on any of the grounds of review relied upon, and that the decisions were lawfully made.

This case highlights the importance of ensuring that decisions are based on proper purposes and relevant considerations, and that irrelevant considerations are not taken into account. It also underscores the need for decision-makers to carefully consider the evidence before them and to ensure that their decisions are supported by the evidence. Finally, it emphasises the importance of considering the balance of convenience when deciding whether to grant a suspension of orders pending the outcome of review proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s motion notice of which was filed on 20 March 2000 be dismissed.

2. The applicant’s motion notice of which was filed on 16 March 2000 be dismissed.

3. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the motion referred to in paragraph 1.

4. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the motion referred to in paragraph 2.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant pointed to a comment made by one of the assessors who prepared the second serious risk report that “We would normally not word a survey so emotively, however, Canberra has to take notice”. As an example of this, the assessor said “Like dying lady bathed in kerosene”. It was said that this is evidence of an improper purpose. The particular purpose was not identified. The assessor’s comments do not in my view support the existence of any of the improper purposes. They are no more than an acknowledgment of the assessor’s concern about the state of affairs at the Home and her desire to bring that concern to the attention of the decision‑maker by the use of strong, perhaps over‑emphatic, language. Rather than supporting a case of improper purpose, this underlines the propriety of the assessor’s purpose, namely to advance the safety, health and wellbeing of the residents. But even if the assessor’s remarks could support a finding of improper purpose, they cannot be attributed to the Secretary so as to show that he made the second decision for an improper purpose. The remarks were not part of the report, and there is nothing to suggest that the Secretary or his delegate was aware of them. Further, as I have said in par 17, a reader of the relevant part of the report would discern that “bathed in kerosene” meant bathed in the solution of kerosene and water earlier described. The applicant has not shown a point of substance or a serious question under this head.No evidence It was submitted that there was no evidence upon which either decision could lawfully be made, and in particular that the serious risk reports were not evidence. The no evidence ground was not mounted under s 5(1)(h), but as an error of law under s 5(1)(f). See Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 358. The word “evidence” in this context does not mean evidence admissible in a court of law. It contemplates the existence of some material that tends to show the existence or non‑existence of facts relevant to the issue to be determined. In other words material which has some probative value. If it is capable of having any probative value, its weight is a matter for the decision‑maker. See, for example, Reg v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commission; Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 at 488 and Mahon v Air New Zealand [1984] AC 808 at 821. While the reports submitted to the Secretary may not have been admissible in a court of law, they were probative in the sense explained above. They tended to show that the applicant had not complied with its care obligations and that as a result there was an immediate and severe risk to the safety, health or wellbeing of residents. The applicant has not shown that there is a point of substance or a serious question under this head.OTHER MATTERSBalance of convenience In view of my conclusion that the applicant has not demonstrated a point of substance or a serious question, it is not strictly necessary for me to consider whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting or refusing a suspension of the orders. Cf American Cyanamid v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 at 408. However there is one aspect of the applicant’s claim that it will suffer substantial and irreparable harm unless a suspension is granted that requires comment. That is what is said to be the probability that its allocated places will be extinguished and the Secretary will be powerless to restore them if the applicant is successful on the review. In my view that fear is unjustified. There is nothing in the Act to support the view that the number of places available for allocation, as determined by the Minister for the relevant financial year, is reduced on the revocation of an allocation. Under s 18‑1 an allocation “ceases to have effect” if it is revoked under Part 4.4 (ss 64‑68). The implication is that the revoked places go back into the pool rather than that the pool shrinks or is not thereby deepened. In any event, s 14‑4(2) makes it clear that revoked places do not cease to exist, but are available for re‑allocation. Under s 14‑1(4) in order for an allocation to be made to an approved provider, the provider must have made a valid application and the allocation must comply with the terms of an invitation published under Division 13. Section 14‑4 empowers the Secretary to waive those requirements “if the places being allocated are places that have been relinquished under section 18‑2 or that were included in an allocation, or a part of an allocation, revoked under Part 4.4.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

SUNDBERG J
It is apparent from the above discussion that the consequences of a review audit report and of a serious risk report are quite different. A recommendation for sanctions following a review audit report occurs after a sequence of events that may last over a month. The provider is given the opportunity for input into the appropriate ways of redressing non‑compliance with standards, and a timetable for improvement is created. Sanctions that follow a serious risk report may be imposed immediately, and no provision is made under the Act or the Principles for a response by the provider. The applicant has not shown a point of substance or a serious question on this point.Decisions not authorised by ActAbrogation of delegate’s duty The complaint here is that the delegate accepted the serious risk reports without question, and that the findings as to non‑compliance and immediate and severe risk were therefore not made by the Secretary. Paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 of the Principles contemplate that the Secretary will receive the report of an accreditation body and consider the information and recommendations it contains. The first and second decisions show that in reaching her decision the delegate had regard to, amongst other things, the accreditation body’s reports. But they also show that the delegate applied her own mind to whether the matters contained in the reports justified a finding of non‑compliance and a finding of serious risk to the health, safety or wellbeing of those receiving care. The evidence does not support the abrogation complaint, and the applicant has not made out a point of substance or a serious question.Irrelevant considerations It was submitted that the Secretary took into account assertions contained in the Agency’s reports that were exaggerated and inflammatory and unsupported by probative evidence. The only instance given is the “outrageous and entirely unsupported” charge in the first report that “A dying resident was bathed in kerosene, a process that must have been extremely distressing and frightening”. A reading of the report as a whole shows that “bathed in kerosene” means bathed in a solution of 30 millilitres of kerosene to a bathtub full of water. The relevant part of the report ‑ “Infection Control” ‑ twice refers to such a solution, once to a “solution of water and kerosene”, and twice to a “solution of kerosene”. Then comes the offending passage, which read in isolation suggests a bath in neat kerosene. However, in the light of the Infection Control discussion as a whole, the reader would be in no doubt that the resident was bathed in a solution of 30 millilitres of kerosene to a bathtub of water. There is no point of substance or serious question here.Failure to take relevant considerations into accountInterests of residents This ground is applicable to the first and second decisions. Both reflect a concern for the welfare of residents. The Secretary was satisfied that there was an immediate and severe risk to the safety, health or wellbeing of the care recipients. It is difficult in these circumstances to understand an argument that a relevant consideration, namely their welfare, was not taken into account. This ground is presumably directed to the residents’ welfare incident upon their possible relocation. However, the second decision records·that the delegate had regard to the desirability of an approach that does not involve residents moving from the Home, but did not think that approach feasible given that there was no developed proposal from a provider or potential provider to do this, and·that the delegate had regard to a file note of Jenny Hefford, a Departmental officer who attended a meeting of residents and their representatives, where participants expressed concerns about the possibility of moving family members to another facility because of the difficulty of finding places and the stress associated with moving frail older persons.Doubtless because it was assumed that the first decision would be suspended by the applicant’s agreement to appoint an administrator, the consequences of the removal of the residents was not addressed in that decision. But it was the subject of distinct consideration when it became a live issue. What the applicant really seeks to do under this head is to complain that the interests of residents were not taken into account so as to produce the result it would have preferred, namely to keep the Home operating so the residents would not have to be moved. That is review on the merits, and is not open to the Court. The applicant has not established a point of substance or a serious question under this head.Illawong

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SUNDBERG J

It was submitted that the Secretary took into account assertions contained in the Agency’s reports that were exaggerated and inflammatory and unsupported by probative evidence. The only instance given is the “outrageous and entirely unsupported” charge in the first report that “A dying resident was bathed in kerosene, a process that must have been extremely distressing and frightening”. A reading of the report as a whole shows that “bathed in kerosene” means bathed in a solution of 30 millilitres of kerosene to a bathtub full of water. The relevant part of the report ‑ “Infection Control” ‑ twice refers to such a solution, once to a “solution of water and kerosene”, and twice to a “solution of kerosene”. Then comes the offending passage, which read in isolation suggests a bath in neat kerosene. However, in the light of the Infection Control discussion as a whole, the reader would be in no doubt that the resident was bathed in a solution of 30 millilitres of kerosene to a bathtub of water. There is no point of substance or serious question here.Failure to take relevant considerations into accountInterests of residents This ground is applicable to the first and second decisions. Both reflect a concern for the welfare of residents. The Secretary was satisfied that there was an immediate and severe risk to the safety, health or wellbeing of the care recipients. It is difficult in these circumstances to understand an argument that a relevant consideration, namely their welfare, was not taken into account. This ground is presumably directed to the residents’ welfare incident upon their possible relocation. However, the second decision records·that the delegate had regard to the desirability of an approach that does not involve residents moving from the Home, but did not think that approach feasible given that there was no developed proposal from a provider or potential provider to do this, and·that the delegate had regard to a file note of Jenny Hefford, a Departmental officer who attended a meeting of residents and their representatives, where participants expressed concerns about the possibility of moving family members to another facility because of the difficulty of finding places and the stress associated with moving frail older persons.Doubtless because it was assumed that the first decision would be suspended by the applicant’s agreement to appoint an administrator, the consequences of the removal of the residents was not addressed in that decision. But it was the subject of distinct consideration when it became a live issue. What the applicant really seeks to do under this head is to complain that the interests of residents were not taken into account so as to produce the result it would have preferred, namely to keep the Home operating so the residents would not have to be moved. That is review on the merits, and is not open to the Court. The applicant has not established a point of substance or a serious question under this head.Illawong