Seafolly Pty Ltd v Maddern (No 6)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Seafolly Pty Ltd v Madden (No 6) [2015] FCA 1369

Citation: Seafolly Pty Ltd v Madden (No 6) [2015] FCA 1369
Parties: SEAFOLLY PTY LTD v LEAH MADDEN
File number: VID 764 of 2010
Judge: TRACEY J
Date of judgment: 7 December 2015
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – costs – application for lump sum order – whether lump sum order would avoid expense, delay and aggravation involved in taxation – calculation of lump sum – calculation of discount to be applied
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.04(2), 40.02(b)
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) rr 62.04(2)(c), 62.36A
Cases cited: Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson No 2 (1995) 57 FCR 119 – cited
Ginos Engineers Pty Ltd v Autodesk Australia Pty Ltd (2008) 249 ALR 371 – cited
Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738 – cited
Nine Films and Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Limited [2006] FCA 1046 – cited
Seafolly Pty Ltd v Madden (No 5) [2014] FCA 1413 – cited
Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2007] FCA 2059 – cited
Sony Entertainment (Australia) Limited v Smith (2005) 215 ALR 788 – cited
Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 164 – cited
Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd (No 3) [2014] FCA 949 – cited
Date of hearing: 4 June 2015
Date of last submissions: 19 June 2015
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 42
Counsel for the Applicant/Cross-respondent: Mr C Golvan QC
Solicitor for the Applicant/Cross-respondent: K&L Gates
Counsel for the Respondent/Cross-claimant: Mr G Pauline
Solicitor for the Respondent/Cross-claimant: Ramsden Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 764 of 2010

BETWEEN:

SEAFOLLY PTY LTD
Applicant/Cross-respondent

AND:

LEAH MADDEN
Respondent/Cross-claimant

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 DECEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the respondent pay the applicant’s costs by way of a lump sum order fixed at $453,152.66.

2.If the respondent wishes to submit that the usual order for costs should not be made on the applicant’s application for a lump sum costs order, she file and serve written submissions (not exceeding three pages) within 14 days of the date of these orders and the applicant file and serve any answering submissions (of no more than three pages) within a further seven days.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 764 of 2010

BETWEEN:

SEAFOLLY PTY LTD
Applicant/Cross-respondent

AND:

LEAH MADDEN
Respondent/Cross-claimant

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE:

7 DECEMBER 2015

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This proceeding has a long history.  That history is summarised in Seafolly Pty Ltd v Madden (No 5) [2014] FCA 1413 at [1]-[14]. In that decision, which was handed down on 23 December 2014, I ordered that Ms…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1369
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Seafolly Pty Ltd v Maddern (No 6) involved a dispute over costs, specifically an application for a lump sum order by Seafolly against Maddern. The application was made pursuant to Rule 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), which allows a party who is entitled to costs to apply to the Court for an order that costs be awarded in a lump sum instead of, or in addition to, any taxed costs. The primary legal issue was whether the lump sum order would avoid the expense, delay, and aggravation involved in taxation, and if so, what the appropriate quantum of the lump sum order should be. The evidence presented by both parties included affidavits from costs consultants and solicitors, which provided varying estimates of the costs and potential savings of a lump sum order versus a contested taxation.

The court considered the evidence and submissions from both parties, acknowledging that a contested taxation would consume significant time and incur substantial costs. Ms Jennifer Young, a costs consultant for Seafolly, estimated the costs of a contested taxation at approximately $118,000, while Mr Graeme Arnold, a costs consultant for Maddern, suggested a lower figure of $68,900. Both consultants agreed, however, that a lump sum order would avoid the delay and expense of a contested taxation. The court also noted the substantial disagreement between the consultants regarding the quantum of the lump sum order itself. Ms Young estimated Seafolly's costs at $761,601.10, of which 85% or $476,461.95 was sought as a lump sum. In contrast, Mr Arnold estimated Seafolly's costs at $439,051.58, with a 20% discount applied to account for uncertainties, resulting in a proposed lump sum of $351,241.26.

In reaching its decision, the court determined that a lump sum order was appropriate in this case, finding that it would indeed avoid the expense, delay, and aggravation involved in taxation. The court also considered the range of discounts applied in previous cases, ultimately deciding on a lump sum order of $453,152.66. This amount was calculated based on the evidence presented, with the court acknowledging the need for a reasonable compromise between the figures proposed by the respective costs consultants. The court also noted that if Maddern wished to contest the usual order for costs on the basis of the lump sum order application, she could file written submissions within 14 days of the date of the orders, with Seafolly having a further seven days to respond.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the respondent pay the applicant’s costs by way of a lump sum order fixed at $453,152.66.

2. If the respondent wishes to submit that the usual order for costs should not be made on the applicant’s application for a lump sum costs order, she file and serve written submissions (not exceeding three pages) within 14 days of the date of these orders and the applicant file and serve any answering submissions (of no more than three pages) within a further seven days.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Rule 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (“the Rules”) provides that a party who is entitled to costs may apply to the Court for an order that costs “be awarded in a lump sum, instead of, or in addition to, any taxed costs …”. Prior to the commencement of the Rules, Order 62.04(2)(c) provided for the Court to order that costs be paid in a ‘gross sum’. EVIDENCE Seafolly relied on three affidavits, sworn by a costs consultant, Ms Jennifer Young, and on two affidavits sworn by a partner in the firm of solicitors which had acted for it – Mr Anthony Watson. Ms Madden relied on evidence from another costs consultant, Mr Graeme Arnold. The evidence disclosed a measure of agreement. It was accepted on all sides that, were the matter to proceed to a contested taxation, a good deal of time would be consumed and expense incurred. Furthermore the process would take many months. Ms Young estimated that it would cost both parties about $118,000 if taxation was required. That amount would be made up of professional charges to prepare the bill, preparing the file for taxation, appearances before a Registrar over about six days and dealing with any list of objections. Mr Arnold contested Ms Young’s estimate. He suggested a figure of $68,900. The major difference between the two estimates was that Mr Arnold based his estimates on a taxation hearing taking only three days. He accepted that the cost of preparing a bill in taxable form would be “considerable” but he did not consider that this necessarily provided a reason for the making of a lump sum costs order. His view was that, in the circumstances of the present case, the making of such an order was not the “only realistic way” to proceed. There was substantial disagreement between the deponents as to the quantum of any lump sum order which the Court might be minded to make. Ms Young provided a series of reports. Her most recent report, dated 1 February 2015, took account of Seafolly’s costs and disbursements up to December 2014. Ms Young estimated Seafolly’s actual costs and disbursements at $761,601.10. On a party/party basis its costs and disbursements totalled $560,543.48. Eighty-five percent of this sum was the $476,461.95 sought by Seafolly by way of a lump sum costs order. Seafolly calculated that this amount represented 73.6% of the actual costs and disbursements incurred by it. This, it submitted, was “well within the scope of lump sum costs awards granted by the Court for party/party costs in other proceedings.” Mr Arnold had provided a report in March 2013. In that report he had estimated Seafolly’s party/party costs and disbursements, up to March 2013, to be $439,051.58. This figure was about 67% of the actual costs incurred by Seafolly up until that time. To this figure Mr Arnold applied a discount of 20%. He sought to justify this discount on the basis that it would “allow for uncertainties associated with the process”. He noted that Ms Young’s estimates had not incorporated any discount for “uncertainties”. He referred to a number of decisions of the Court in which, he said, that discounts had been applied. They were:·Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 164 (15%);·Nine Films & Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Limited [2006] FCA 1046 (23%); ·Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119 (39%); and ·Sony Entertainment v Smith (2005) 215 ALR 788 (60% on actual; 32% on party/party).His proposed discount of 20% was, therefore, towards the lower end of the range established by these cases. Once the 20% discount was applied the resultant figure of $351,241.26 represented 53% of the actual costs incurred by Seafolly up until March 2013.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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