Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 8)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 8) [2006] FCA 1537

COSTS – application for costs against presently self-represented litigant – circumstances in which costs will be awarded on an indemnity basis – where litigant’s unreasonable conduct has needlessly prolonged the proceeding

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43

Alpine Hardwoods (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hardys Pty Ltd(No 2) (2002) 190 ALR 121 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 201 ALR 618 cited
Australian Transport Insurance Pty Ltd v Graeme Phillips Road Transport Insurance Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 177 cited
Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] FCAFC 51 cited
Bhagat v Royal & Sun Alliance Life Assurance Australia Ltd [2000] NSWSC 159 referred to
Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333 discussed
Colgate-Palmolive Companyv Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225 discussed
Cook v Pasminco Ltd (No 2) (2000) 107 FCR 44 cited
Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 cited
Hamod v New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659 cited
Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd (No 3) [1996] FCA 184 cited
Huntsman Chemical Company Australia Ltd v International Pools Australia Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242 discussed
Ogawa v The University of Melbourne (No 2) [2004] FCA 1275 cited
Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Braverus Maritime Inc (No 2) (2004) 212 ALR 281 cited
Ruddock v Vadarlis(No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229 cited
Spalla v St George Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 416 referred to
Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 7) [2006] FCA 1177 referred to
Smallacombe v Lockyer Investment Co Pty Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 97 cited
Vasram v AMP Life Limited [2002] FCA 1286 referred to

ANTHONY PATRICK SPALLA v ST GEORGE MOTOR FINANCE LTD (ACN 007 656 555), ST GEORGE WHOLESALE FINANCE PTY LTD (ACN 001 834 886), ANDREW WILLIAM BECK, ANDREW STEWART HOME, DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, SIMON ALEXANDER WALLACE SMITH, ST GEORGE MOTOR WHOLESALE PTY LTD (ACN 007 664 217), GUISEPPE MICHELE RAMBALDI AND IRLMOND PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 066 314 870)
VID 631 OF 2005

KENNY J
20 NOVEMBER 2006
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 631 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

ANTHONY PATRICK SPALLA
Applicant

AND:

ST GEORGE MOTOR FINANCE LTD (ACN 007 656 555)
First Respondent

ST GEORGE WHOLESALE FINANCE PTY LTD (ACN 001 834 886)
Second Respondent

ANDREW WILLIAM BECK
Third Respondent

ANDREW STEWART HOME
Fourth Respondent

DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU
Fifth Respondent

SIMON ALEXANDER WALLACE SMITH
Sixth Respondent

ST GEORGE MOTOR WHOLESALE PTY LTD (ACN 007 664 217)
Seventh Respondent

GUISEPPE MICHELE RAMBALDI
Eighth Respondent

IRLMOND PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 066 314 870)
Ninth Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 NOVEMBER 2006

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Subject to Order 2 hereof, the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 1537
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 8) involved the applicant, Mr Spalla, and multiple respondents, including Deloitte and St George Motor Finance Ltd. The dispute primarily centred around the applicant's conduct during the trial, which the respondents argued was unreasonable and led to significant delays and wasted court time. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining the appropriate costs order in light of this conduct.

The legal issues before the court included whether indemnity costs could be awarded based on the applicant's conduct that occurred while he was represented by counsel and whether the prolongation of the proceeding due to the applicant's unreasonable actions warranted such costs. The court examined the principle that indemnity costs are intended to compensate the innocent party for unreasonable conduct that led to unnecessary costs, rather than to punish the losing party or deter future litigation.

The court found that the applicant's conduct, particularly his threat to call Mr Hayes QC and his insistence on tendering Mr Hayes QC's opinions, as well as the abrupt termination of his counsel's and solicitor's services, significantly prolonged the trial and wasted court time. These actions were deemed unreasonable, and the court held that indemnity costs were appropriate for the first four days of the trial against the applicant. The court further ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the remaining trial days and the costs of a subsequent bias application on a party and party basis.

The final orders of the court required the applicant to pay the respondents' costs on a party and party basis, with specific indemnity costs for the first four days of the trial to certain respondents. This decision underscored the court's power to order indemnity costs where a party's unreasonable conduct has unjustly burdened the opposing party with unnecessary costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Subject to Order 2 hereof, the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the proceeding, including reserved costs of the application made by facsimile dated 28 March 2006, on a party and party basis.

2. The applicant pay the third to sixth and eighth respondents’ costs of the first four days of the trial (being 14, 15, 16 and 17 March 2006) on an indemnity basis, such indemnity costs to include all costs incurred by them except in so far as they are of an unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably incurred, so that subject to these exceptions, the third to sixth and eighth respondents are completely indemnified by the applicant.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case revolves around the proceedings between Mr Spalla and St George Motor Finance Ltd, with additional involvement from Deloitte and Mr Hayes QC. Mr Spalla initiated legal action against St George Motor Finance Ltd, and during the trial, his conduct, including threats to call Mr Hayes QC and the withdrawal of his counsel and solicitor, caused significant delays. These actions led to a substantial portion of the fourth day of the trial being wasted and an adjournment of the trial from 17 March 2006 to 26 April 2006. The Deloitte parties sought indemnity costs based on the argument that Mr Spalla's conduct prolonged the proceedings unreasonably.

The case before the court was an application for indemnity costs brought by the Deloitte parties against Mr Spalla. The application arose from the conduct of Mr Spalla during the trial, where he allegedly wasted court time by threatening to call Mr Hayes QC and by withdrawing his counsel and solicitor. These actions caused the entire fourth day of the trial to be wasted and led to a five and a half weeks adjournment of the trial. The application was heard in the context of ongoing litigation between Mr Spalla and St George Motor Finance Ltd, with Deloitte and Mr Hayes QC also being involved in the proceedings.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KENNY J
Issues
1. Whether indemnity costs can be awarded for the unreasonable conduct of a litigant that prolongs the proceeding.
2. Whether the conduct of Mr Spalla, including the withdrawal of his counsel and solicitor, justifies the award of indemnity costs to the Deloitte parties for the first four days of the trial.
3. Whether the conduct of Mr Spalla warrants an indemnity costs order for the wasted time on the fourth day of the trial and the subsequent adjournment.

Held
1. The court concluded that indemnity costs can be awarded for the unreasonable conduct of a litigant that prolongs the proceeding.
2. The conduct of Mr Spalla, including the withdrawal of his counsel and solicitor, justified the award of indemnity costs to the Deloitte parties for the first four days of the trial.
3. The conduct of Mr Spalla warranted an indemnity costs order for the wasted time on the fourth day of the trial and the subsequent adjournment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KENNY J

The Deloitte parties stated that the conduct relied upon in support of their application for indemnity costs largely occurred while Mr Spalla was represented by counsel. They submitted that indemnity costs might be awarded not only where the proceeding was hopeless or misconceived, but also where a litigant’s unreasonable conduct prolonged the proceeding. In support of their indemnity costs application, the Deloitte parties submitted that: (a)much time was wasted as a result of Mr Spalla’s continuing threat to call Mr Hayes QC and his insistence on tendering the opinions of Mr Hayes QC; and(b)the withdrawal by Mr Spalla of instructions to, or the termination by him of the retainer of, his counsel and his solicitor on the third day of the trial, which led to the whole of the fourth day being wasted and to an adjournment of the trial for approximately five and a half weeks (between 17 March 2006 and 26 April 2006).CONSIDERATION For the reasons that follow, I would order that Mr Spalla pay Mr Rambaldi’s and the Deloitte parties’ costs of the first four days of the trial on an indemnity basis and, thereafter, on a party and party basis. I would order that he pay the St George parties’ costs on a party and party basis. Mr Spalla should also pay the respondents’ costs of his bias application on a party and party basis. The power of the Court to make an order for costs derives from s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Costs ordinarily follow the event (that is, the successful party receives costs) and are awarded on a party and party basis, unless there are particular or special circumstances that warrant the Court departing from this practice and making some other order: see Colgate-Palmolive Companyv Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225 (“Colgate-Palmolive”) at 232-233 per Sheppard J and Ruddock v Vadarlis(No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229 at 234 per Black CJ and French J. The rationale for an indemnity costs order can be variously stated. In Hamod v New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659 at [20], Gray J, with whom Carr and Goldberg JJ agreed, said:“Indemnity costs are not designed to punish a party for persisting with a case that turns out to fail. They are not awarded as a means of deterring litigants from putting forward arguments that might be attended by uncertainty. Rather, they serve the purpose of compensating a party fully for costs incurred, as a normal costs order could not be expected to do, when the court takes the view that it was unreasonable for the party against whom the order is made to have subjected the innocent party to the expenditure of costs.” In Colgate-Palmolive, Sheppard J set out some relevant principles (at 232-235) concerning indemnity costs and referred to some of the circumstances in which courts have ordered that costs be paid on an indemnity basis. These circumstances included “the making of allegations of fraud knowing them to be false and the making of irrelevant allegations of fraud”, “evidence of particular misconduct that causes loss of time to the Court and to other parties”, “the fact that the proceedings were commenced … in wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law”, and “the making of allegations which ought never to have been made or the undue prolongation of a case by groundless contentions”: see also Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 at 400-401 per Woodward J and Australian Transport Insurance Pty Ltd v Graeme Phillips Road Transport Insurance Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 177 at 178 per Woodward J. In Cook v Pasminco Ltd (No 2) (2000) 107 FCR 44, the Court made an order for indemnity costs against the applicants’ solicitors in a representative action upon the ground that the proceeding was not only untenable but “brought irresponsibly without any, or any proper, consideration of the question whether it had any prospect of success”: see [66] per Lindgren J.