| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL |
| S EAPCI 2023 0009 |
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (ON BEHALF OF CALLAN BRUCE SEXTON) | Applicant |
| v | |
| ADAM CORMICK | Respondent |
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| JUDGES: | EMERTON P, T FORREST and OSBORN JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 15 June 2023 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 15 August 2023 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2023] VSCA 186 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2022] VSC 786 (Niall JA) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Application for leave to appeal – Crown appeal – Respondent subject to family violence intervention order – Condition that respondent not commit family violence – Contravention of family violence intervention order an offence under Family Violence Protection Act 2008 s 123(2) – Respondent made phone calls and sent texts to protected person – Director alleged that respondent committed family violence in form of emotional or psychological abuse by tormenting, intimidating, harassing or offending protected person – Magistrate dismissed charges – Magistrate not satisfied that respondent intended to be emotionally or psychologically abusive – Director appealed to Trial Division – Primary judge held that s 123(2) required prosecution to prove that respondent engaged in impugned conduct intending to emotionally or psychologically abuse protected person – Director seeks leave to appeal decision of primary judge – Whether judge erred in construing relationship between physical and fault elements of s 123(2) – Whether proof of specific intent to torment, intimidate, harass or offend is required to satisfy mens rea for s 123(2) – Leave to appeal granted – Appeal dismissed.
Family Violence Protection Act 2008 ss 5, 7, 57, 123, 123A, 125A; He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; Clubb v Edwards (2019) 267 CLR 171.
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| Counsel | |||
| Applicant: | Ms R Orr KC with Mr M N Keks and Ms L John | ||
| Respondent: | Ms S E Lacy with Ms C A Boston | ||
Solicitors | |||
| Applicants: | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions | ||
| Respondent: | Doogue & George Pty Ltd | ||
EMERTON P
OSBORN JA:
Introduction
On 12 May 2021, an interim family violence intervention order was made against the respondent, Adam Cormick, pursuant to s 53 of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (‘Act’) on the application of a member of Victoria Police (‘Interim Order’).
The affected family member identified in the Interim Order was the respondent’s former partner, MT, with whom he shared a daughter, AB.[1] The two conditions attached to the Interim Order prohibited the respondent from committing ‘family violence’ against MT and from intentionally damaging any property of MT or threatening to do so.
[1]To ensure that there is no possibility of identification, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of pseudonyms in place of names.
The Interim Order was served on the respondent on the same day.
On 16 July 2021, MT reported a series of breaches of the Interim Order to the police. The respondent was arrested and interviewed on 21 July 2021.
On 2 September 2021, the respondent was charged under s 125A of the Act with one count of persistently contravening a family violence intervention…
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- Case
- [2023] VSCA 186
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was the interpretation of the relationship between the physical and fault elements of section 123(2) of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008. The Trial Division held that the prosecution must prove that Cormick engaged in the impugned conduct intending to emotionally or psychologically abuse the protected person. The Director argued that the primary judge had erred in this interpretation, particularly in relation to the requirement of specific intent to torment, intimidate, harass or offend to satisfy the mens rea for section 123(2). The Director sought leave to appeal the decision of the primary judge, arguing that the interpretation of the statute was incorrect.
The court granted leave to appeal and subsequently dismissed the appeal. The court found that the primary judge had correctly interpreted the relevant statutory provisions, specifically that the prosecution must prove that Cormick intended to engage in conduct that would cause emotional or psychological abuse. The court held that the requirement for specific intent to torment, intimidate, harass or offend was not necessary to satisfy the mens rea for section 123(2). The court found that the primary judge's interpretation of the relationship between the physical and fault elements of section 123(2) was consistent with the purpose and object of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008. The court held that the appeal should be dismissed.
The final orders of the court were that leave to appeal was granted and the appeal was dismissed. The court held that the primary judge's interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions was correct and that the Director had not established that the primary judge had erred in law. The court found that the prosecution must prove that Cormick engaged in the impugned conduct intending to emotionally or psychological abuse the protected person, but that specific intent to torment, intimidate, harass or offend was not necessary to satisfy the mens rea for section 123(2).
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