Criminal Law—Dangerous driving occasioning death through impact with motor vehicle—Ingredients of offence—Driver asleep in period immediately preceding impact—Whether "driving"—Relevant period of driving—Crimes Act 1900, s. 52A.
Decisions
MASON C.J., BRENNAN, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY AND GAUDRON JJ. The applicant, Michael Jiminez, seeks special leave to appeal against his conviction of culpable driving for which he was sentenced to six months' imprisonment to be served by way of periodic detention.
2. At about 11.00 p.m. on 13 June 1988, the applicant set out to travel south in his BMW sedan from the Gold Coast in Queensland to Sydney in New South Wales. He was accompanied by three female companions, one of whom was Janelle May Stephanoni. Before setting out the applicant slept for four hours from about five o'clock in the afternoon. Stephanoni first drove the car for about 400 kilometres during which time the applicant slept. At about 3.30 a.m. on 14 June 1988, the applicant took over the driving of the car. At about 6.00 a.m. at Eungai Creek on the Pacific Highway approximately 30 kilometres north of Kempsey, the car failed to take a moderate right-hand curve in the highway. It travelled on to the eastern gravel shoulder, continued on and collided with a tree and then with two other trees. Stephanoni, who was sitting in the front passenger seat and not wearing a seat-belt, was killed. The other two passengers were in the rear seat.
3. At the scene of the accident there were four wheel marks commencing on the eastern gravel shoulder and extending south for some thirty-seven metres. The marks ended at the base of the first tree. About ten metres south of this tree were the two other trees against which the car had come to rest. There were patches of fog in the low-lying areas along the highway.
4. The applicant was taken to a local hospital where he was treated. Subsequently he was taken to the home of a Salvation Army minister who had attended the scene of the accident and he slept for some three to four hours.
5. A police constable, who also attended the scene of the accident, asked the applicant what had happened. He replied: "I went to sleep." Subsequently a record of interview with the applicant was made which contained the following questions and answers: "Q. How did the collision occur? A. I really don't know. Before the accident there was a lot of fogs in the road, I lost control of the car. Everybody was asleep, the three girls and then it happened. I was just for a second. I lost control when I fell asleep. I'm not sure what happened. Q. What is the last thing you remember before losing control? A. I was in the road the last thing I remember. Before the accident I was going…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Jiminez v the Queen [1992] HCA 14
Case
[1992] HCA 14
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of Jiminez against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of a confession made by Jiminez to police, which he argued was involuntary and therefore improperly admitted into evidence at his trial.
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the confession was obtained in circumstances that rendered it involuntary, thereby breaching the rule against admitting involuntary confessions. This required the Court to examine the voluntariness of Jiminez's statement, considering the conduct of the police officers and the effect of that conduct on Jiminez's state of mind at the time the confession was made.
The Court applied the established legal principle that a confession is inadmissible if it is involuntary, meaning it was not the product of the free will of the accused. This can occur if the confession was induced by threats, promises, or other forms of coercion that overcame the will of the accused. The High Court analysed the evidence relating to the interview process, including the length of questioning, the demeanour of the police, and any inducements offered or threats made. The Court ultimately determined that the confession was not involuntary and therefore admissible.