ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL Criminal Law-Motor vehicle-Driving in manner dangerous to public-Death
caused thereby-Objective test of liability Manner" of driving-Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (S.A.) (No. 2252), sec. 14.
Sec. 14 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (S.A.) provides " Any person who-(a) drives a motor vehicle in a culpably negligent manner, or recklessly, or at a speed, or in a manner, which is dangerous to the public and (b) by such negligence, recklessness, or other conduct, causes the death of any person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour."
Held that upon a prosecution under that section for driving in a manner dangerous to the public the test of liability was objective and impersonal and did not depend on the state of mind of the accused at the time of the alleged offence.
Per Latham C.J., Rich, Dixon and McTiernan JJ. :-The expression " driving at a speed, or in a manner, which is dangerous to the public describes the actual behaviour of the driver and, in general, does not require any given state of mind as an essential element of the offence; but the section does not exclude a defence of mistake of fact on reasonable grounds or involuntariness or other exceptional excuse to which a state of mind may be material. "Manner' of driving includes all matters connected with the management and control of a car by a driver when it is being driven. It includes starting and stopping, signalling or failing to signal, and sounding a warning or failing to sound a warning, as well as other matters affecting the speed at which, and the course in which, the car is driven. Casual behaviour on the roads and momentary lapses of attention, if they result in danger to the public, are not outside the prohibition of sec. 14 merely because they are casual or momentary.
Per Starke J. -The offence of driving in a manner which is dangerous to the public is established if it be proved that the acts of the driver create a
danger, real or potential, to the public. Advertence to the danger on the part of the driver is not essential; but whether such danger exists depends upon all the circumstances of the case, e.g., the character and condition of the roadway, the amount and nature of the traffic that might be expected, the speed of the motor vehicle, the observance of traffic signals and the condition
Special leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of
APPLICATION for special leave to appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal of South Australia.
Robert Victor Coventry was convicted in the Criminal Court at Adelaide, on an information under sec. 14 of the Criminal Law Con- solidation Act 1935 (S.A.), for driving a motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public and thereby causing the death of a boy named Ronald Arthur Howlett.
The Court of Criminal Appeal…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
R v Coventry [1938] HCA 31
Case
[1938] HCA 31
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This case concerned an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of South Australia. The applicant, the Crown, sought to appeal against the quashing of a conviction of Robert Victor Coventry. Coventry had been convicted in the Criminal Court at Adelaide under section 14 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (S.A.) for driving a motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public, which conduct caused the death of a boy. The Court of Criminal Appeal had quashed the conviction, finding the trial judge's summing up inadequate regarding the mental element of the offence, despite believing there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
The central legal issue before the High Court was the interpretation of section 14 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (S.A.), specifically whether the offence of driving a motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public required proof of a particular state of mind on the part of the driver, or if liability was determined by an objective assessment of the driver's conduct. The Crown argued that the offence was one of absolute liability, focusing solely on the driver's conduct and its objective dangerousness, while the Court of Criminal Appeal had suggested an element of "fairly high degree of indifference to the safety of the public" was involved.
The High Court, in refusing special leave to appeal, clarified that the test for liability under section 14 for driving in a manner dangerous to the public is objective and impersonal. The focus is on the actual behaviour of the driver and whether it created a real or potential danger to the public, irrespective of the driver's subjective state of mind. While acknowledging that certain defences such as mistake of fact on reasonable grounds or involuntariness might involve a consideration of the driver's state of mind, the general rule is that the offence is complete upon proof of conduct that is objectively dangerous. The Court further elaborated that "manner of driving" encompasses all aspects of the management and control of a vehicle, including actions like signalling or failing to signal, and that casual behaviour or momentary lapses of attention, if they result in public danger, are not excluded from the prohibition.
Special leave to appeal was refused because the High Court considered the primary reasons for the Court of Criminal Appeal's decision to be based on the specific facts and the perceived impact of the trial judge's summing up on the jury, rather than a significant point of law of general importance. However, the High Court took the opportunity to express its disagreement with certain aspects of the Court of Criminal Appeal's reasoning, particularly the suggestion that a "manner of driving" must involve more than a casual or transitory act or omission, and that failures to signal or warn could not constitute a "manner of driving."