Peacock v Jones - [2010] WASC 358

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL

CITATION: PEACOCK -v- JONES [2010] WASC 358

CORAM: BLAXELL J

HEARD: 8 NOVEMBER 2010

DELIVERED : 3 DECEMBER 2010

FILE NO/S: SJA 1086 of 2010

BETWEEN: CRAIG THOMAS PEACOCK
Appellant
AND
MICHAEL JOHN JONES
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :  MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram  :MAGISTRATE B C GLUESTEIN
File No  :AR 6623 of 2008

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal from conviction for dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm - Intersection collision at dusk between appellant's vehicle and motorcycle which had right of way - Appellant looked for oncoming traffic but did not see motorcycle - No evidence to specifically explain why appellant did not see motorcycle - Whether the only reasonable inference in all of the circumstances was that the appellant drove dangerously

Legislation:

Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 59(1)(b)

Result:

Appeal allowed
Order for retrial

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: Mr R W Richardson
Respondent: Mr A D Sullivan

Solicitors:

Appellant: Christian Miocevich
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

King v Coventry (1938) 59 CLR 633
McBride v The Queen (1965) 115 CLR 44
McPherson v Lucas [2008] WASCA 56
Moore v Moore [2001] WASCA 126

BLAXELL J: The appellant (Mr Peacock) has been granted leave to appeal on three grounds from his conviction on 25 June 2010 for an offence of dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm.
The conviction arose from a collision on 10 May 2007 at the junction of Forrest Road and Tonkin Highway, Forrestdale between a trailer attached to a vehicle driven by Mr Peacock and a motorcycle being ridden by Jeffrey Oorschot. The motorcycle was travelling along Tonkin Highway and it either clipped or narrowly missed the end of the trailer after Mr Peacock entered the junction from Forrest Road through a give‑way sign. As a result, Mr Oorschot lost control of the motorcycle and suffered grievous bodily harm.
Mr Peacock pleaded not guilty to the charge but was convicted following a trial before Magistrate Gluestein in the Armadale Magistrates Court. The Magistrate accepted Mr Peacock's evidence that he had looked for approaching traffic before entering the intersection but did not see the motorcycle. His Honour found that it was unreasonable for Mr Peacock not to have seen the motorcycle, and that he had driven dangerously by entering the intersection into its path.
Mr Peacock appeals from this decision on the following three grounds:
1.The learned Magistrate erred in finding the appellant guilty of Dangerous Driving on the basis that it was unreasonable for the appellant to have missed seeing Jeffrey David Oorschot on his motor bike when it was open to the Magistrate to conclude that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the possible inference that the appellant had been driving attentively but had reasonably failed to see Mr Oorschot on his motorbike.
2.The learned Magistrate erred in law in concluding that the fact that the appellant looked and did…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Peacock v Jones

Details

AGLC: Peacock v Jones [2010] WASC 358
Case: [2010] WASC 358
Decision Date: 3 DECEMBER 2010

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Peacock v Jones involved the appellant, Peacock, who was convicted of dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm. The incident occurred at an intersection at dusk when Peacock's vehicle collided with a motorcycle which had the right of way. The collision resulted in serious injuries to the motorcyclist. Peacock claimed that he looked for oncoming traffic but did not see the motorcycle. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the appellant's actions constituted dangerous driving under the relevant statutory provisions. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the failure to see the motorcycle, despite looking for oncoming traffic, could be considered dangerous driving.

The court examined whether the only reasonable inference from the evidence was that Peacock drove dangerously. The appellant argued that his actions were reasonable given the circumstances, including the timing and visibility conditions. The prosecution contended that Peacock's failure to see the motorcycle, which had the right of way, indicated a lack of reasonable care. The court considered the appellant's testimony, the evidence of the collision, and the visibility conditions at the time of the incident. The court concluded that there was no specific evidence to explain why Peacock did not see the motorcycle, and that the appellant's failure to see the motorcycle, despite looking, could be reasonably interpreted as an act of dangerous driving.

The court found that the appellant's conduct fell below the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver under the circumstances. The failure to see the motorcycle, which had the right of way, was deemed to be a significant lapse in judgment and care. The appeal was dismissed, and Peacock's conviction for dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm was upheld. The court did not order any further action beyond affirming the original conviction.

Orders