Criminal Law—Dangerous driving occasioning death or grievous bodily harm through impact with motor vehicle—Ingredients of offence—"in a manner &hich is dangerous to the public"—Direction to jury—Indictment—Form—Crimes Act, 1900 (N.S.W.), s. 52A*.
Decisions
On 27th April the following written reasons for judgment were delivered:- BARWICK C.J. The applicant was convicted at Quarter Sessions in Sydney, of two offences against the provisions of s. 52A of the Crimes Act, 1900 (N.S.W.). Each conviction was in the same terms except as to the identity of the person with whom the motor vehicle was said to have come into contact and as to the extent of the result. In one case that person, a child, was killed; in the other, the person, an adult, was occasioned grievous bodily harm. (at p45)
2. He now moves for special leave to appeal against the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal dismissing his appeal to that Court against these convictions. (at p46)
3. The charges against the applicant were as follows:
"For that he on 14th May 1964 at West Ryde in the State of New South Wales did drive a motor vehicle to wit a motor lorry in a manner which was dangerous to the public and through impact with the said motor vehicle, the death of Kevin Patrick Daly was then occasioned." "For that he on the day in the year and at the place last aforesaid did drive a motor vehicle to wit a motor lorry in a manner which was dangerous to the public and through impact with the said motor vehicle, grievous bodily harm was then occasioned to Doreen Mavis Daly." (at p46)
4. Section 52A of the Crimes Act, 1900 is in the following terms-
"(1) Where the death of any person is occasioned through impact with a motor vehicle or through the impact of a motor vehicle with any vehicle or other object in, on or near which the person was at the time of impact and in either case the motor vehicle was at the time of impact being driven by a person - (a) under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug; or
(b) at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public,
the person last-mentioned shall be guilty of the misdemeanour of culpable driving and shall be liable to imprisonment for five years. (2) Where grievous bodily harm to any person is occasioned through impact with a motor vehicle or through the impact of a motor vehicle with any vehicle or other object in, on or near which the person was at the time of impact and in either case the motor vehicle was at the time of impact being driven by a person - (a) under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug; or
(b)…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
McBride v the Queen [1966] HCA 22
Case
[1966] HCA 22
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by McBride against a conviction for murder. The appellant had been found guilty of the murder of his wife and sentenced to death. The central dispute revolved around the admissibility of certain evidence obtained from the appellant and the proper application of the law relating to self-defence.
The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence obtained from the appellant under circumstances that the defence argued amounted to an unlawful search and seizure. Furthermore, the Court had to consider whether the jury directions on the issue of self-defence were adequate and correctly reflected the relevant legal principles, particularly concerning the appellant's belief as to the necessity of using force.
The Court held that the evidence in question had been unlawfully obtained and should not have been admitted at trial. Barwick C.J., with whom McTiernan and Taylor JJ agreed, reasoned that the common law of Australia did not permit the admission of evidence obtained in contravention of fundamental rights, even if it was relevant. The Court also found that the directions on self-defence were insufficient, failing to adequately explain that the jury must acquit if they found the appellant genuinely believed he was acting in self-defence, even if that belief was mistaken.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.