FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ives v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 1033
Review of: Ives and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2025] ARTA 42 (16 January 2025) File number(s): NSD 1691 of 2024 Judgment of: OWENS J Date of judgment: 1 September 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of decision of Administrative Review Tribunal not to revoke cancellation of visa under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – applicant contended that Tribunal did not comply with Ministerial Direction No. 110 – whether conviction for dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm was a “violent crime” within the meaning of the Direction – violence includes the unlawful use, or threatened use, of physical force – no jurisdictional error established - application dismissed Legislation: Constitution, s 75(v)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 476A(1)(b), 476A(2), 499(1), 499(2A), 501(3A), s 501(6), 501(7), 501CA
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 52A(3)(c)
Drug Court Act 1998 (NSW)
Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), s 176(3)(b)(i)
Cases cited: BNY23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2025) 307 FCR 150; [2025] FCAFC 14
Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions (2000) 49 NSWLR 1; [2000] NSWCA 125
Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290
Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; [1985] HCA 29
R v Butcher [1986] VR 4
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 53 Date of last submission/s: 20 May 2025 Date of hearing: 13 May 2025 Counsel for Applicant: Mr D Godwin Solicitor for the Applicant: Nikjoo Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Francois Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1691 of 2024 BETWEEN: BENJAMIN WILLIAM IVES
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
OWENS J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 SEPTEMBER 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The amended originating application for review of a migration decision filed on 20 February 2025 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
OWENS J:
The applicant arrived in Australia from New Zealand in 1984, as an 18-month-old child. He has lived here ever since without becoming a citizen.
On 25 July 2022, the visa pursuant to which he resided in Australia was cancelled in accordance with the requirements of s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). That followed from the applicant’s conviction in 2019 for various offences, and for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 18 months (thus causing him to fail the character test set out…
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 1033
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The amended originating application for review of a migration decision filed on 20 February 2025 be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In other words, the Tribunal appeared to reason directly from the physical impact of the applicant’s conduct on the victim to the conclusion of a violent crime. It did not rely on any subjective mental state of the applicant, any particular quality or feature of the applicant’s conduct, or any other matter, in reaching that conclusion.CONSIDERATION There was one question of construction upon which both parties were agreed. The term “violent crimes” might be used to describe the particular circumstances of an individual’s criminal offending, or it may designate an inherent quality of certain offences. Here, it was common ground that the term was used in Direction No. 110 in the former, and not the latter, sense. In my view the parties were correct to proceed on that basis, having regard to the purpose of the inquiry in respect of which the Direction has been issued. That is to say, the determination of whether there is “another reason” to revoke the mandatory cancellation of a non-citizen’s visa will necessarily proceed by reference to the “specific circumstances of the case” (cl. 5.1(3)), and any consideration of “the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen’s conduct to date” (cl. 8.1(2)(a)) is naturally directed to the person’s actual conduct, as opposed to the particular offence with which they happen, for whatever reason, to be charged. In the context of Direction No. 110, for example, a person who physically assaults another and steals their wallet has committed a violent crime, even if they are charged and convicted only of theft (and not robbery). The parties were also agreed that contested questions of construction should be resolved by reference to the text and context of the Direction itself. Again, they were correct to do so. Indeed, it is important to keep that anchoring principle in mind, given that the question whether a particular crime is “violent” (or involves “violent conduct”, or similar inquiries) has the potential to arise in a variety of different contexts. The parties referred to several cases in which questions of that kind had been considered, and sought to rely upon or distinguish them, as required, for their arguments. Some care, though, needs to be taken in identifying the assistance that may be obtained from considerations of similar issues in other settings. Whether or not a crime is properly regarded as a “violent crime” is capable of varying depending on the context in which, and the reason for which, the classification is demanded. It is important, in other words, to bear in mind that the question to be addressed is the meaning of the phrase “violent crime” as it is used in Direction No. 110, and not some broader quest to identify a unifying principle in accordance with which all crimes (let alone conduct) may be designated either violent or non-violent for all purposes. In any event, as I have recorded, at the core of both parties’ submissions was a focus on the text and context of Direction No. 110. In particular, both parties relied heavily on what they contended were the ordinary meaning of the disputed words. (It is perhaps a testament to the subtlety and flexibility of the English language that both submitted that the ordinary meaning of the words “violent crime” favoured their own case).