Ives v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ives v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 1033   

Review of:  Ives and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2025] ARTA 42 (16 January 2025)
File number(s): NSD 1691 of 2024
Judgment of: OWENS J
Date of judgment: 1 September 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of decision of Administrative Review Tribunal not to revoke cancellation of visa under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – applicant contended that Tribunal did not comply with Ministerial Direction No. 110 – whether conviction for dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm was a “violent crime” within the meaning of the Direction – violence includes the unlawful use, or threatened use, of physical force – no jurisdictional error established - application dismissed
Legislation:

Constitution, s 75(v)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 476A(1)(b), 476A(2), 499(1), 499(2A), 501(3A), s 501(6), 501(7), 501CA

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 52A(3)(c)

Drug Court Act 1998 (NSW)

Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), s 176(3)(b)(i)

Cases cited:

BNY23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2025) 307 FCR 150; [2025] FCAFC 14

Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions (2000) 49 NSWLR 1; [2000] NSWCA 125

Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290

Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; [1985] HCA 29

R v Butcher [1986] VR 4

R v BXY [2023] QSC 42

R v YTZ; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2023] QCA 87

Swan v R [2016] NSWCCA 79

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 53
Date of last submission/s: 20 May 2025
Date of hearing: 13 May 2025
Counsel for Applicant:  Mr D Godwin
Solicitor for the Applicant:  Nikjoo Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent:  Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the First Respondent:  Mills Oakley
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1691 of 2024
BETWEEN:

BENJAMIN WILLIAM IVES

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

OWENS J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 SEPTEMBER 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The amended originating application for review of a migration decision filed on 20 February 2025 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

OWENS J:

  1. The applicant arrived in Australia from New Zealand in 1984, as an 18-month-old child. He has lived here ever since without becoming a citizen.

  2. On 25 July 2022, the visa pursuant to which he resided in Australia was cancelled in accordance with the requirements of s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). That followed from the applicant’s conviction in 2019 for various offences, and for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 18 months (thus causing him to fail the character test set out…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 1033
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Ives sought judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal not to revoke the cancellation of his visa under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had correctly applied Ministerial Direction No. 110 in determining whether Ives’ conviction for dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm constituted a “violent crime”. The court considered whether the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of the term “violent crime” within the context of Direction No. 110. The court found that the Tribunal had not made a jurisdictional error in its reasoning. The Tribunal had reasoned from the physical impact of Ives’ conduct on the victim to conclude that the offence was violent. The court held that the term “violent crimes” in Direction No. 110 referred to the particular circumstances of an individual’s criminal offending, rather than an inherent quality of certain offences. The court rejected the contention that the Tribunal had failed to consider all relevant matters in reaching its conclusion, noting that the focus should be on the specific circumstances of the case and the actual conduct of the individual, rather than the particular offence with which they were charged. The application for judicial review was dismissed, and Ives was ordered to pay the Minister’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended originating application for review of a migration decision filed on 20 February 2025 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

At the time of the accident the offender was tired (having just completed a night-shift at work), but he had not started to fall asleep. He was not using his phone. The sentencing judge found that the impact was as a result of a “significant level of inattention”.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The critical reasoning of the Tribunal on this issue was brief. It held (at [31]):On balance, acknowledging the violence done to the victim and the victim’s immediately resulting injuries …, the Tribunal considers that this crime can be considered to be violent and consequently that this offending should be viewed very seriously. In other words, the Tribunal appeared to reason directly from the physical impact of the applicant’s conduct on the victim to the conclusion of a violent crime. It did not rely on any subjective mental state of the applicant, any particular quality or feature of the applicant’s conduct, or any other matter, in reaching that conclusion.CONSIDERATION There was one question of construction upon which both parties were agreed. The term “violent crimes” might be used to describe the particular circumstances of an individual’s criminal offending, or it may designate an inherent quality of certain offences. Here, it was common ground that the term was used in Direction No. 110 in the former, and not the latter, sense. In my view the parties were correct to proceed on that basis, having regard to the purpose of the inquiry in respect of which the Direction has been issued. That is to say, the determination of whether there is “another reason” to revoke the mandatory cancellation of a non-citizen’s visa will necessarily proceed by reference to the “specific circumstances of the case” (cl. 5.1(3)), and any consideration of “the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen’s conduct to date” (cl. 8.1(2)(a)) is naturally directed to the person’s actual conduct, as opposed to the particular offence with which they happen, for whatever reason, to be charged. In the context of Direction No. 110, for example, a person who physically assaults another and steals their wallet has committed a violent crime, even if they are charged and convicted only of theft (and not robbery). The parties were also agreed that contested questions of construction should be resolved by reference to the text and context of the Direction itself. Again, they were correct to do so. Indeed, it is important to keep that anchoring principle in mind, given that the question whether a particular crime is “violent” (or involves “violent conduct”, or similar inquiries) has the potential to arise in a variety of different contexts. The parties referred to several cases in which questions of that kind had been considered, and sought to rely upon or distinguish them, as required, for their arguments. Some care, though, needs to be taken in identifying the assistance that may be obtained from considerations of similar issues in other settings. Whether or not a crime is properly regarded as a “violent crime” is capable of varying depending on the context in which, and the reason for which, the classification is demanded. It is important, in other words, to bear in mind that the question to be addressed is the meaning of the phrase “violent crime” as it is used in Direction No. 110, and not some broader quest to identify a unifying principle in accordance with which all crimes (let alone conduct) may be designated either violent or non-violent for all purposes.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In other words, the Tribunal appeared to reason directly from the physical impact of the applicant’s conduct on the victim to the conclusion of a violent crime. It did not rely on any subjective mental state of the applicant, any particular quality or feature of the applicant’s conduct, or any other matter, in reaching that conclusion.CONSIDERATION There was one question of construction upon which both parties were agreed. The term “violent crimes” might be used to describe the particular circumstances of an individual’s criminal offending, or it may designate an inherent quality of certain offences. Here, it was common ground that the term was used in Direction No. 110 in the former, and not the latter, sense. In my view the parties were correct to proceed on that basis, having regard to the purpose of the inquiry in respect of which the Direction has been issued. That is to say, the determination of whether there is “another reason” to revoke the mandatory cancellation of a non-citizen’s visa will necessarily proceed by reference to the “specific circumstances of the case” (cl. 5.1(3)), and any consideration of “the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen’s conduct to date” (cl. 8.1(2)(a)) is naturally directed to the person’s actual conduct, as opposed to the particular offence with which they happen, for whatever reason, to be charged. In the context of Direction No. 110, for example, a person who physically assaults another and steals their wallet has committed a violent crime, even if they are charged and convicted only of theft (and not robbery). The parties were also agreed that contested questions of construction should be resolved by reference to the text and context of the Direction itself. Again, they were correct to do so. Indeed, it is important to keep that anchoring principle in mind, given that the question whether a particular crime is “violent” (or involves “violent conduct”, or similar inquiries) has the potential to arise in a variety of different contexts. The parties referred to several cases in which questions of that kind had been considered, and sought to rely upon or distinguish them, as required, for their arguments. Some care, though, needs to be taken in identifying the assistance that may be obtained from considerations of similar issues in other settings. Whether or not a crime is properly regarded as a “violent crime” is capable of varying depending on the context in which, and the reason for which, the classification is demanded. It is important, in other words, to bear in mind that the question to be addressed is the meaning of the phrase “violent crime” as it is used in Direction No. 110, and not some broader quest to identify a unifying principle in accordance with which all crimes (let alone conduct) may be designated either violent or non-violent for all purposes. In any event, as I have recorded, at the core of both parties’ submissions was a focus on the text and context of Direction No. 110. In particular, both parties relied heavily on what they contended were the ordinary meaning of the disputed words. (It is perhaps a testament to the subtlety and flexibility of the English language that both submitted that the ordinary meaning of the words “violent crime” favoured their own case).