Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S129 of 2000

B e t w e e n -

PAUL SUMMERS CHANDLER

Applicant

and

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

First Respondent

THE JUDGES OF THE DRUG COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES

Second Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
KIRBY J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 16 FEBRUARY 2001, AT 3.22 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR T.A. GAME, SC:  If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant with my learned friend, MS R.W. BURGESS.  (instructed by Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales)

MR A.M. BLACKMORE:  If the Court pleases, I appear for the respondent with my learned friend, MR M.C. MARIEN.  (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions)

GAUDRON J:   I should indicate that I have a certificate from the Deputy Registrar who certifies that she has been informed by the solicitor for the second respondent that the second respondent does not wish to be represented at the hearing of the matter and will submit to any order of the Court, save as to costs.  Yes, Mr Game.

MR GAME:   If the Court pleases.  The offence ‑ ‑ ‑

KIRBY J:   This is just a State Act, Mr Game; this is just a State law and only dealing with State matters and State practice.  Why should we get involved in this?

MR GAME:   Well, your Honour, because, first of all, section 35A(b) says that the administration of justice and in a particular instance there may be a grant of special leave.  In cases like Radenkovic, special leave was granted to correct a sentence.  But, your Honour, we have a situation with respect to the Drug Act which is an innovative Act, where this decision, in our submission, is clearly wrong.  This decision is a decision in which one is defining the jurisdictional facts upon which the court operates.  Not only is this decision almost certainly wrong, but there are now three decisions in which the jurisdiction of this court is defined.  Sloane is one of the other and Ranse is the other; they were both examined by Justice Powell.  Sloane is almost certainly wrong too.  So we have a court operating in New South Wales which thinks that the offence of robbery is not an offence involving violent conduct, but the offence of culpable driving is an offence involving ‑ ‑ ‑

McHUGH J:   Well, one of them may, but it just shows how people’s minds differ about that.  You submit the decision here is plainly wrong.  I must say, when I read it, I thought it was plainly right.  So, one has different impressions: “an offence involving violent conduct”.

KIRBY J:   It is not an offence of violent conduct, it is “an offence involving ‑ ‑ ‑

MR GAME:   But, your Honour, there is no violent conduct in the offence of culpable driving.  If one identifies the elements of…

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Details
Case
[2001] HCATrans 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Chandler was the applicant in proceedings before the High Court of Australia, seeking to appeal against a decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The dispute concerned the applicant's conviction for the offence of unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16, contrary to s 211 of the *Criminal Code* (Qld). The applicant contended that the trial judge had erred in law by failing to direct the jury that the prosecution bore the onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant did not hold a genuine belief that the complainant was over the age of 16.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the *Criminal Code* (Qld) imposed an onus on the prosecution to disprove a genuine belief by the accused that the complainant was over the age of 16, or whether the onus lay on the accused to establish such a belief as a defence. This question turned on the interpretation of s 211 of the *Criminal Code*, specifically whether the element of "unlawfully" in the offence required the prosecution to prove the absence of a genuine belief on the part of the accused regarding the complainant's age.

The High Court, by majority, held that the prosecution bore the onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant did not hold a genuine belief that the complainant was over the age of 16. Gaudron and Kirby JJ reasoned that the word "unlawfully" in s 211 qualified the entire act of sexual intercourse, including the mental element of the accused. They concluded that a genuine belief in the complainant's age, even if mistaken, negated the unlawfulness of the act. McHugh J, dissenting, held that the offence was one of strict liability regarding the age of the complainant, and that the onus was on the applicant to establish a genuine belief.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

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