HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJTHE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA APPELLANT
AND
SANDRO PETER TOTANI & ANOR RESPONDENTS
South Australia v Totani [2010] HCA 39
11 November 2010
A1/2010ORDER
1.Grant of special leave expanded to include, within the orders appealed from, the order of Bleby J made on 28 September 2009.
2.Proposed further amended notice of appeal treated as filed in the appeal.
3. Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia
Representation
M G Hinton QC, Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia with G J Parker for the appellant (instructed by Crown Solicitor (South Australia))
B W Walker SC with S J Doyle for the respondents (instructed by Caldicott and Co Barristers and Solicitors)
Interveners
S J Gageler SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with A M Dinelli intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
R J Meadows QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Western Australia and R M Mitchell SC intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia (instructed by State Solicitor (WA))
M G Sexton SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales with J G Renwick intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW)) at the hearing on 20 and 21 April 2010
J G Renwick intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW)) at the hearing on 17 June 2010
P M Tate SC, Solicitor-General for the State of Victoria with K L Walker intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)
W Sofronoff QC, Solicitor-General of the State of Queensland with G J D del Villar and A D Keyes intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the State of Queensland (instructed by Crown Solicitor (Qld)) at the hearing on 20 and 21 April 2010
P J Davis SC with G J D del Villar and A D Keyes intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the State of Queensland (instructed by Crown Solicitor (Qld)) at the hearing on 17 June 2010
M P Grant QC, Solicitor-General for the Northern Territory with S L Brownhill intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the Northern Territory (instructed by Solicitor for the Northern Territory)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
Courts and judges decide cases independently of the executive government. That is part of Australia's common law heritage, which is antecedent to the Constitution and supplies principles for its interpretation and operation[1]. Judicial independence is an assumption which underlies Ch III of the Constitution, concerning the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. It is an assumption which long predates Federation. Sir Francis Forbes, the first Chief Justice of New South Wales, stated the…
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- Case
- [2010] HCA 39
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the *Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008* (SA), by requiring a State court exercising federal jurisdiction to make a control order based on an executive declaration and without a full judicial determination of the underlying facts, impermissibly infringed upon the institutional integrity of the court. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the task assigned to the Magistrates Court was repugnant to or incompatible with the exercise of judicial power, particularly in light of the fact that the Attorney-General's declaration, which was critical to the making of the control order, was made by a member of the executive government.
The High Court, in dismissing the appeal, reasoned that while the *Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008* (SA) did not introduce novel concepts in restricting freedom of association to prevent criminal conduct, the interaction between the executive declaration and the court's obligation to make a control order raised constitutional concerns. The Court affirmed that a court's institutional integrity is compromised when it no longer exhibits defining characteristics that distinguish it from other decision-making bodies, with perceptions of independence and impartiality being essential. Although the Act required the court to act on the Attorney-General's declaration, the Court found that the question of whether the court was being used as an instrument of the executive depended on the nature of the relationship established by the Act between the executive and judicial branches, rather than a comparison of the complexity of tasks undertaken by each. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Grant of special leave expanded to include, within the orders appealed from, the order of Bleby J made on 28 September 2009.
2. Proposed further amended notice of appeal treated as filed in the appeal.
3. Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
Full text does not contain this section.