South Australia v Totani [2010] HCA 39

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ

THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA  APPELLANT

AND

SANDRO PETER TOTANI & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

South Australia v Totani [2010] HCA 39
11 November 2010
A1/2010

ORDER

1.Grant of special leave expanded to include, within the orders appealed from, the order of Bleby J made on 28 September 2009.

2.Proposed further amended notice of appeal treated as filed in the appeal.

3.        Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia

Representation

M G Hinton QC, Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia with G J Parker for the appellant (instructed by Crown Solicitor (South Australia))

B W Walker SC with S J Doyle for the respondents (instructed by Caldicott and Co Barristers and Solicitors)

Interveners

S J Gageler SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with A M Dinelli intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

R J Meadows QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Western Australia and R M Mitchell SC intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia (instructed by State Solicitor (WA))

M G Sexton SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales with J G Renwick intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW)) at the hearing on 20 and 21 April 2010

J G Renwick intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW)) at the hearing on 17 June 2010

P M Tate SC, Solicitor-General for the State of Victoria with K L Walker intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)

W Sofronoff QC, Solicitor-General of the State of Queensland with G J D del Villar and A D Keyes intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the State of Queensland (instructed by Crown Solicitor (Qld)) at the hearing on 20 and 21 April 2010

P J Davis SC with G J D del Villar and A D Keyes intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the State of Queensland (instructed by Crown Solicitor (Qld)) at the hearing on 17 June 2010

M P Grant QC, Solicitor-General for the Northern Territory with S L Brownhill intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the Northern Territory (instructed by Solicitor for the Northern Territory)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. Courts and judges decide cases independently of the executive government. That is part of Australia's common law heritage, which is antecedent to the Constitution and supplies principles for its interpretation and operation[1]. Judicial independence is an assumption which underlies Ch III of the Constitution, concerning the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. It is an assumption which long predates Federation. Sir Francis Forbes, the first Chief Justice of New South Wales, stated the…

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Details
Case
[2010] HCA 39
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia concerning the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the *Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008* (SA). The dispute arose when the Attorney-General of South Australia declared the Finks Motorcycle Club a "declared organisation" under the Act. Subsequently, the Commissioner of Police applied to the Magistrates Court of South Australia for a "control order" against a member of the declared organisation, which the court was obliged to make if satisfied of the membership. The appeal involved the State of South Australia as the appellant and the respondents who were members of the declared organisation.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the *Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008* (SA), by requiring a State court exercising federal jurisdiction to make a control order based on an executive declaration and without a full judicial determination of the underlying facts, impermissibly infringed upon the institutional integrity of the court. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the task assigned to the Magistrates Court was repugnant to or incompatible with the exercise of judicial power, particularly in light of the fact that the Attorney-General's declaration, which was critical to the making of the control order, was made by a member of the executive government.

The High Court, in dismissing the appeal, reasoned that while the *Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008* (SA) did not introduce novel concepts in restricting freedom of association to prevent criminal conduct, the interaction between the executive declaration and the court's obligation to make a control order raised constitutional concerns. The Court affirmed that a court's institutional integrity is compromised when it no longer exhibits defining characteristics that distinguish it from other decision-making bodies, with perceptions of independence and impartiality being essential. Although the Act required the court to act on the Attorney-General's declaration, the Court found that the question of whether the court was being used as an instrument of the executive depended on the nature of the relationship established by the Act between the executive and judicial branches, rather than a comparison of the complexity of tasks undertaken by each. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Grant of special leave expanded to include, within the orders appealed from, the order of Bleby J made on 28 September 2009.

2. Proposed further amended notice of appeal treated as filed in the appeal.

3. Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The State of South Australia appeals, by special leave, from the orders containing the answers and seeks special leave to appeal from the final orders made. In my view, that leave should be granted and the initial grant expanded. The appeal should be dismissed with costs, for the reasons which follow.The facts It was not in dispute in the proceedings before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, by way of questions reserved, that the respondents were members of the Finks Motorcycle Club. The Club had been made the subject of a declaration by the Attorney-General for South Australia, on the application of the Commissioner of Police, and was therefore a "declared organisation" for the purpose of the Act. The declaration was made under s 10(1) of the Act. The Commissioner subsequently applied for and obtained a control order against the second respondent from the Court[599].[599]The application for an order against the first respondent was adjourned. The control order was made under s 14(1) of the Act, which requires that:"The Court must, on application by the Commissioner, make a control order against a person (the defendant) if the Court is satisfied that the defendant is a member of a declared organisation."The order prohibited the second respondent from associating with other persons who are members of declared organisations. Such a prohibition is required by s 14(5)(b)(i) of the Act. The order contained one exception to that prohibition, namely an association occurring between members of a registered political party in particular circumstances and subject to certain conditions as to notification. The making of the order had the further consequence, by reason of s 35(1)(b) of the Act, that it would be an offence for any other person to associate with the second respondent on six or more occasions in a 12 month period, subject to the exceptions listed in s 35(6).A court's institutional integrity In Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission[600], Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ explained that a court may be said to lack institutional integrity when it no longer exhibits, in some relevant respect, those defining characteristics which set courts apart from other decision-making bodies. Their Honours acknowledged that it is not possible to make some all-encompassing statement of the minimum defining characteristics of a court[601]. Nevertheless, consideration might be given, in the first place, to what is usually involved in a judicial process. Although it is equally difficult to state all the respects in which the institutional integrity of a court may be seen to be compromised, perceptions of a court as independent and impartial must be taken as essential to its integrity[602].[600](2006) 228 CLR 45 at 76 [63]; [2006] HCA 44.[601]Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45 at 76 [64]; see also North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146 at 163 [30]; [2004] HCA 31; Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532 at 552-553 [10] per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ; [2008] HCA 4.[602]Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45 at 67-68 [41] per Gleeson CJ, 76 [64] per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ; Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532 at 552‑553 [10] per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ (dissent) KIEFEL J (dissent)
As appears from the preceding, the SOCC Act does not introduce novel or unique concepts into the law in so far as it is directed to the prevention of criminal conduct by providing for restrictions on the freedom of association of persons connected with organisations which are or have been engaged in serious criminal activity. The area of constitutional scrutiny in this appeal is the interaction between the Attorney-General's executive declaration of an organisation and the conditional obligation imposed upon the Magistrates Court to make a control order on the application of the Commissioner. It was the constitutional propriety of that interaction which concerned the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia.The decision of the Full Court In the Full Court, Bleby J, with whom Kelly J agreed[96], summed up his opinion of the operation of s 14(1) of the SOCC Act as follows[97]:"Thus it can be seen that the process of depriving a person of their right to and freedom of association on pain of imprisonment for up to five years, although formally performed by a State court which exercises federal jurisdiction, is in fact performed to a large extent by a member of the Executive Government in a manner which gives the appearance of being done by the court. But the process is devoid of the fundamental protections which the law affords in the making of such an order, namely, the right to have significant and possibly disputed factual issues determined by an independent and impartial judicial officer and the right to be informed of and to answer the case put against the person."His Honour characterised s 14(1) of the SOCC Act as requiring the Magistrates Court to "act without question on a declaration which represents the finding of the Attorney-General on matters critical to the making of the control order, and without the right to a fair hearing"[98]. He held that the "unacceptable grafting of non-judicial powers onto the judicial process in such a way that the outcome is controlled, to a significant and unacceptable extent, by an arm of the Executive Government … destroys the court's integrity as a repository of federal jurisdiction"[99].[96](2009) 105 SASR 244 at 305 [277].[97](2009) 105 SASR 244 at 283 [166].[98](2009) 105 SASR 244 at 283 [167].[99](2009) 105 SASR 244 at 281 [157]. Bleby J attached weight to the requirement of the SOCC Act that the most complex factual matters to be established before a control order could be made were to be determined by the Attorney-General[100]. I agree with Hayne J that the question whether the Magistrates Court is required by s 14(1), in appearance or reality, to act as an instrument of the executive is not determined by a comparison of the respective size or complexity of the tasks undertaken by the executive and the judicial branches of government. Rather it depends upon the nature of the relationship that the SOCC Act establishes between those two branches[101]. The proposition embodied in the second ground of appeal raised by the State of South Australia and set out below is correct but does not lead to a determination of the appeal in favour of the State.[100](2009) 105 SASR 244 at 280 [154]-[155].[101]Judgment of Hayne J at [199]-[200].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

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