Criminal Law—Vagrancy—Habitually consorting with reputed thieves—Offence unless good account given of consorting—Whether establishing that consorting was for an innocent purpose a "good account"—Vagrancy Act 1966 (Vict.), s. 6 (1).

Decisions

1979, May 30.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment prepared in this application for special leave by my brother Mason. I agree entirely with those reasons and with the conclusion that the application for special leave be refused. I find no need to add anything on my own behalf. (at p379)

STEPHEN J. I have read and am in agreement with all that is said in the reasons for judgment of Mason J. and of Aickin J. concerning this application for special leave. (at p379)

2. I would refuse special leave accordingly. (at p379)

MASON J. The applicant was convicted at the Fitzroy Magistrates' Court on 21st April 1976 on two counts of habitually consorting with reputed thieves contrary to s. 6 (1) (c) of the Vagrancy Act 1966 (Vict.) and sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to be served concurrently. Section 6 (1) (b) and (c) provide:
Any person who-
. . . (b) is found in a house or place in company with reputed thieves or persons having no visible lawful means of support who, on being thereto required by the court, does not give to the satisfaction of the court a good account of his lawful means of support and also of his being in such house or place upon some lawful occasion; (c) habitually consorts with reputed thieves or known prostitutes or persons who have been convicted of having no visible lawful means of support unless such person, on being thereto required by the court, gives to the satisfaction of the court a good account of his lawful means of support and also of his so consorting; . . . shall be guilty of an offence. Penalty: For a first offence - imprisonment for one year; For a second or subsequent offence against this section (whether under the same paragraph or not) - imprisonment for two years." Paragraphs (b) and (c) of s. 6 (1) were subsequently amended by s. 3 of Act No. 9047 of 1977, the relevant effect of which was to delete from par. (c) the reference to persons who have been convicted of having no visible lawful means of support and that part of the proviso that related to a good account of the defendant's lawful means of support. But it was the section in the form in which it stood before this amendment that governed the present case. (at p379)

2. An appeal by the applicant against the convictions was dismissed by Judge Hewitt in the County Court of Victoria on 17th June 1976. His Honour refused the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Johanson v Dixon

Details

AGLC: Johanson v Dixon [1979] HCA 23
Case: [1979] HCA 23
Decision Date: 30 May 1979

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the appeal in *Johanson v Dixon*. The dispute concerned the validity of a notice of termination of a lease, which the tenant, Mr. Johanson, argued was invalid. The landlord, Mr. Dixon, had issued the notice under section 80(1)(b) of the *Landlord and Tenant (Control of Rents) Act 1942* (SA).

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the notice of termination was validly served on the tenant. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the notice, which was posted by registered mail to the tenant's last known place of abode, constituted proper service in accordance with the requirements of the relevant legislation and general principles of service.

The Court held that service by registered post to the tenant's last known place of abode was not sufficient to effect valid service of the notice. The majority reasoned that while service by post could be effective in some circumstances, the legislation required actual notice to be brought to the attention of the tenant. Merely posting the notice, without proof that it came to the tenant's knowledge, did not satisfy this requirement. The Court applied the principle that statutory requirements for service must be strictly adhered to, and in the absence of express provision for substituted service, personal service or service that demonstrably brings the notice to the recipient's attention is generally required.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, finding the notice of termination to be invalid.

Orders