Tajjour v New South Wales

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ

Matter No S36/2014

SLEIMAN SIMON TAJJOUR  PLAINTIFF

AND

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES  DEFENDANT

Matter No S37/2014

JUSTIN HAWTHORNE  PLAINTIFF

AND

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES  DEFENDANT

Matter No S38/2014

CHARLIE MAXWELL FORSTER  PLAINTIFF

AND

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES  DEFENDANT

Tajjour v New South Wales
Hawthorne v New South Wales
Forster v New South Wales

[2014] HCA 35

8 October 2014

S36/2014, S37/2014 & S38/2014

ORDER

Matter No S36/2014

The questions asked in the Special Case dated 5 March 2014 be answered as follows:

1.Is s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) invalid because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution?

Answer:Section 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) is not invalid.

2.Is there implied into the Commonwealth Constitution a freedom of association independent of the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters?

Answer:No.

3.Does s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) contravene any implied freedom of association referred to in question 2?

Answer:Unnecessary to answer.

4.Is s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) invalid because it is inconsistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as ratified by the Commonwealth of Australia?

Answer:No.

5.Who should pay the costs of the special case?

Answer:The plaintiff.

Matter No S37/2014

The questions asked in the Special Case dated 5 March 2014 be answered as follows:

1.Is s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) invalid because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on

governmental and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution?

Answer:Section 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) is not invalid.

2.Is there implied into the Commonwealth Constitution a freedom of association independent of the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters?

Answer:No.

3.Does s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) contravene any implied freedom of association referred to in question 2?

Answer:Unnecessary to answer.

4.Is s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) invalid because it is inconsistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as ratified by the Commonwealth of Australia?

Answer:No.

5.Who should pay the costs of the special case?

Answer:The plaintiff.

Matter No S38/2014

The questions asked in the Special Case dated 5 March 2014 be answered as follows:

1.Is s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) invalid because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution?

Answer:Section 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) is not invalid.

2.Who should pay the costs of the special case?

Answer:The plaintiff.

Representation

G R James QC and P D Lange with E M M James and A Ahmad for the plaintiff in S36/2014 (instructed by Matouk Joyner Solicitors)

G O'L Reynolds SC with…

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Details
Case
[2014] HCA 35
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered whether section 93X of the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW), which criminalises habitually consorting with convicted offenders after receiving an official warning, impermissibly burdened the implied freedom of political communication guaranteed by the Commonwealth Constitution. The plaintiffs, charged under this section, sought declarations that the law was invalid. The matter was heard on Special Case.

The Court was required to determine whether section 93X of the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW) was invalid for impermissibly burdening the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters. Additionally, the Court considered whether the Constitution implied a freedom of association independent of the freedom of political communication, and if so, whether section 93X contravened such a freedom. The Court also addressed whether the section was invalid due to inconsistency with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The Court reasoned that the implied freedom of political communication is an indispensable incident of representative and responsible government under the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by legislative power unless the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate purpose. Applying this test, the Court found that section 93X, by its broad prohibition on consorting with convicted offenders, imposed a burden on the implied freedom that was not justified. The Court noted that the section could be read in various ways to avoid invalidity, but no single construction was dictated by the text and context of the provision, leading to its invalidity under the principle established in *Pidoto v Victoria*. The Court also determined that there is no implied freedom of association in the Constitution independent of the implied freedom of political communication.

The High Court answered the questions in the Special Cases by declaring that section 93X of the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW) is invalid because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters. The Court also answered that there is no implied freedom of association independent of the implied freedom of communication. The plaintiffs were ordered to pay the costs of the Special Case.

Orders

Orders of the court

Matter No S36/2014

The questions asked in the Special Case dated 5 March 2014 be answered as follows:

1. Is s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) invalid because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution?

Answer: Section 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) is not invalid.

2. Is there implied into the Commonwealth Constitution a freedom of association independent of the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters?

Answer: No.

3. Does s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) contravene any implied freedom of association referred to in question 2?

Answer: Unnecessary to answer.

4. Is s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) invalid because it is inconsistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as ratified by the Commonwealth of Australia?

Answer: No.

5. Who should pay the costs of the special case?

Answer: The plaintiff.

Matter No S37/2014

The questions asked in the Special Case dated 5 March 2014 be answered as follows:

1. Is s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) invalid because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on

governmental and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution?

Answer: Section 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) is not invalid.

2. Is there implied into the Commonwealth Constitution a freedom of association independent of the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters?

Answer: No.

3. Does s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) contravene any implied freedom of association referred to in question 2?

Answer: Unnecessary to answer.

4. Is s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) invalid because it is inconsistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as ratified by the Commonwealth of Australia?

Answer: No.

5. Who should pay the costs of the special case?

Answer: The plaintiff.

Matter No S38/2014

The questions asked in the Special Case dated 5 March 2014 be answered as follows:

1. Is s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) invalid because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution?

Answer: Section 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) is not invalid.

2. Who should pay the costs of the special case?

Answer: The plaintiff.

Background

Background to the litigation

Neither the Parliament of the Commonwealth nor the Parliament of any State has power to make a law inconsistent with that freedom of communication on matters of government and politics which is an indispensable incident of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government of the Commonwealth. Section 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) makes it an offence, punishable by imprisonment, fine, or both imprisonment and fine, habitually to consort with convicted offenders after having been given an "official warning"[112] in relation to each of those offenders. Is that law beyond the legislative power of the Parliament of New South Wales?[112]Defined by s 93X(3) as a warning given by a police officer (orally or in writing) that a convicted offender is a convicted offender and that consorting with a convicted offender is an offence.The facts and proceedings The plaintiff in each of these proceedings stands charged with an offence against s 93X. Each has brought proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales seeking a declaration that s 93X is invalid. On the application of the Attorney‑General for New South Wales, the whole of each proceeding has been removed[113] into this Court. The parties in each proceeding have agreed in stating questions of law in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Full Court. [113]Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 40(1). None of the special cases records any agreed fact about what is said to constitute the alleged habitual consorting beyond the names of the persons with whom it is alleged the plaintiff was consorting and the fact that each was a convicted offender. None of the special cases says anything to suggest that any of the alleged occasions of consorting was for a purpose of, or attended by, any communication about any government or political matter. Each plaintiff alleges that s 93X is invalid because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication concerning government and political matters. Mr Tajjour and Mr Hawthorne further allege that s 93X is invalid because it infringes a freedom of association which they assert should be found to be implied in the Constitution and because s 93X is inconsistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[114] ("the ICCPR"). The questions stated in the form of special cases ask, in effect, whether the allegations the plaintiffs make should be accepted. They should not.[114]Done at New York on 16 December 1966; [1980] ATS 23.Freedom of political communication – principles Because freedom of communication on matters of government and politics is an indispensable incident of that system of representative and responsible government which the Constitution creates and requires, that freedom cannot be curtailed[115] by the exercise of legislative or executive power and the common law cannot be inconsistent with it. But the freedom is not absolute and it follows that the limit on legislative power is not absolute. [115]Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 560; [1997] HCA 25; Monis v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92 at 141 [103]; [2013] HCA 4; Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 88 ALJR 227 at 235 [31]; 304 ALR 266 at 275; [2013] HCA 58.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ HAYNE J
The general words of s 93X present a variety of ways in which the excess of power might be removed. Section 93X and its associated provisions might be reframed so as not to impose a burden on the implied freedom at all, or so as to impose a lesser or conditional burden which would satisfy the proportionality criterion. There is no unique construction which would bring the section within the legislative power of the Parliament. As Latham CJ said in Pidoto v Victoria[110]:"if a law can be reduced to validity by adopting any one or more of a number of several possible limitations, and no reason based upon the law itself can be stated for selecting one limitation rather than another, the law should be held to be invalid."That passage was referred to in Victoria v The Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case)[111]. Further, a construction of s 93X to confine its operation by reference to the implied freedom would involve a reading of its text and that of s 93Y, which sets out six express innocent purpose defences, in a way that would be inconsistent with the statutory text and context. It would be inconsistent with the scope of the term "consorting", which the Parliament has chosen to use according to its received meaning, and inconsistent with the qualifications on that received meaning reflected in s 93Y. Section 31 does not apply in this case to save s 93X from invalidity.[110](1943) 68 CLR 87 at 111; [1943] HCA 37.[111](1996) 187 CLR 416 at 502 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ; [1996] HCA 56.Conclusion The questions in the Special Cases relating to Tajjour and Hawthorne should be answered as follows:Q1.Is s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) invalid because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution?A1. Yes.Q2.Is there implied into the Commonwealth Constitution a freedom of association independent of the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters?A2. Not necessary to answer.Q3.Does s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) contravene any implied freedom of association referred to in question 2?A3. Not necessary to answer.Q4.Is s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) invalid because it is inconsistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as ratified by the Commonwealth of Australia?A4. No.Q5.Who should pay the costs of the Special Case? A5.The defendant. In the Special Case relating to Forster, only the first and last questions were referred. The answer to the first question should be "Yes" and the answer to the last question should be "The defendant". Neither the Parliament of the Commonwealth nor the Parliament of any State has power to make a law inconsistent with that freedom of communication on matters of government and politics which is an indispensable incident of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government of the Commonwealth. Section 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) makes it an offence, punishable by imprisonment, fine, or both imprisonment and fine, habitually to consort with convicted offenders after having been given an "official warning"[112] in relation to each of those offenders. Is that law beyond the legislative power of the Parliament of New South Wales?[112]Defined by s 93X(3) as a warning given by a police officer (orally or in writing) that a convicted offender is a convicted offender and that consorting with a convicted offender is an offence.The facts and proceedings

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, HAYNE J

Full text does not contain this section.