Clubb v Edwards & Anor; Preston v Avery & Anor

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[2018] HCATrans 210

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M46 of 2018

B e t w e e n -

KATHLEEN CLUBB

Appellant

and

ALYCE EDWARDS

First Respondent

ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR VICTORIA

Second Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Hobart  No H2 of 2018

B e t w e e n -

JOHN GRAHAM PRESTON

Appellant

and

ELIZABETH AVERY

First Respondent

SCOTT WILKIE

Second Respondent

KIEFEL CJ
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 11 OCTOBER 2018, AT 10.00 AM

(Continued from 10/10/18)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

____________________

KIEFEL CJ:   Yes, Mr Solicitor.

MR DONAGHUE:   Thank you, your Honour.  Your Honours, if I could turn immediately to the second of the five categories identified in our oral outline, which we have called the threshold question, the premise for the submissions that I am about to make is that Ms Clubb wishes to challenge the law under which she was convicted on the basis that it unduly burdens political communication, even though she did not herself engage in political communication of the constitutionally protected kind.

If I could emphasise at the outset this is not a submission that when assessing burden, applying Lange and McCloy, the burden should be assessed on the facts of the specific case.  We accept, as the Court has regularly held, including in Brown, that when assessing burden the appropriate approach is to assess the burden arising from the law generally and nothing I am about to say disputes that proposition.

Our point is a different point. It is about the circumstances in which a person is entitled to raise or perhaps, more accurately, where the Court should agree to decide the constitutional question which would then involve the assessment of the general burden that the law imposes.  So if a person is entitled to raise, and the Court agrees to decide that question, undoubtedly the Court then decides the validity of the law generally.  The question is when you get to that step.

Now, given the exchanges in argument yesterday, in order to develop this submission I propose to take the Court to four cases.  But before I do so, can I make the point that in our submission it is helpful in assessing the submissions I am going to make about those four cases to keep at the front of mind a distinction between two different kinds of judicial activity, the first being the construction of a statute and the second being the reading down of the statute.

As to construction, obviously the principles are well settled.  The Court looks at the terms, context, purpose of the Act and, equally obviously, having applied that ordinary approach, there will sometimes be constructional choices that need to be made in the interpretation of the Act.

If, in that kind of situation, one construction of the law would result in an invalid operation of the Act and the…

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Details
Case
[2018] HCATrans 210
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Clubb v Edwards & Anor; Preston v Avery & Anor*, the High Court of Australia considered appeals arising from defamation proceedings. The primary dispute concerned the publication of allegedly defamatory material on social media platforms, specifically Facebook. The appellants, Mr Clubb and Mr Preston, were the individuals who had published the material, while the respondents, Ms Edwards and Ms Avery, were the subjects of the publications. The High Court was tasked with determining the appropriate application of the defence of qualified privilege in the context of online publications and the extent to which the common law principles of defamation should adapt to the digital age.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the defence of qualified privilege was available to the appellants for their Facebook posts, and if so, under what conditions. This involved an examination of the elements of qualified privilege, particularly the requirement of a legal, social, or moral duty to publish and an interest in receiving the information. The Court also had to consider whether the nature of social media platforms, with their broad and often indiscriminate audience, was compatible with the established requirements for qualified privilege, which traditionally contemplated a more targeted dissemination of information.

The High Court ultimately held that the defence of qualified privilege was not available to the appellants in these circumstances. The Court reasoned that the nature of Facebook, as a platform where posts are accessible to a wide and undefined audience, did not align with the requirement for a duty to publish to a specific recipient or group with a corresponding interest in receiving the information. Their Honours emphasised that the common law principles of qualified privilege were developed in a pre-digital era and that while the law must adapt to new technologies, it should not do so in a way that fundamentally alters the established legal principles. The Court found that the publications were made to a general audience without the necessary reciprocal duty and interest required for qualified privilege to apply.

The appeals were dismissed.

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