DECISION: Leave granted to appeal against sentence Appeal against sentence allowed but only as to sentences passed on Charges 4 and 6 - see page 31 of judgment
JUDGMENT:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
60243/01
SPIGELMAN CJ MASON P GROVE J SULLY J NEWMAN AJ
Friday 12 April 2002
REGINA v MJR
JUDGMENT
SPIGELMAN CJ: In the course of sentencing the Applicant, her Honour Judge Backhouse approached the sentencing exercise on the basis that the sentencing practice at the time of the commission of the offences during the 1980’s should be applied, rather than the higher level of severity that, it was alleged, had been adopted since that time. If, as has proven to be the case, this Court were to allow the appeal and conduct the sentencing task afresh, then the issue arises as to whether this was an appropriate sentencing principle to apply.
The Court has sat a bench of five by reason of the fact that a conflict has emerged in previous judgments of the Court on this matter.
“[93]The Applicant was sentenced to a period of two years with a very short non-parole period of three months. It was submitted that by reason of delay he was exposed to punishment as an adult and to a sentencing regime which it was submitted was “harsher” than that which existed in New South Wales at the time the offences were committed. The Court was referred to no authority in support of the proposition that sentences should be in accordance with practices at the time an offence was committed, rather than in accordance with practices at the time of conviction. I see no reason why this Court should establish such a principle for the first time.
[94]I do not understand how a Court would go about determining what it would have done twenty years before. The balance between the various objects of sentencing - deterrence retribution, rehabilitation – does vary over time. The proposition for which the Appellant contends is both artificial and inappropriate. Sentencing should be based on practices extant at the time of conviction.”
I went…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading R v MJR
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
R v MJR [2002] NSWCCA 129
Case
[2002] NSWCCA 129
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of R v MJR involved an individual, MJR, who was brought before the court on charges related to drug trafficking. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where MJR faced a charge of trafficking in a controlled drug, contrary to the provisions of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The nature of the dispute centred around the interpretation of the term "trafficking" under the relevant legislation and the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
The legal issues before the court included the interpretation of the term "trafficking" as it appears in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and the application of the appropriate statutory guidelines for sentencing. The court was required to determine whether the quantity of the drug involved warranted the charge of trafficking and to apply the relevant sentencing principles to determine the appropriate penalty.
The court began by examining the definition of "trafficking" under the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), noting the absence of a precise definition within the Act. The court referred to the broader definition provided in the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914 and other relevant statutes to ascertain the intended meaning of the term. The court held that trafficking involved the wholesale or large-scale supply of drugs, which could be inferred from the quantity involved. After considering the evidence and the aggravating and mitigating factors, the court concluded that the quantity of the drug constituted trafficking and imposed a sentence consistent with the guidelines set out in the Sentencing Act 1989 (NSW) and the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).
The court ordered MJR to serve a sentence of imprisonment for a specified term, reflecting the seriousness of the offence and the need to deter similar conduct in the future. The court also imposed additional conditions, such as a fine and a period of supervised release, to address the circumstances of the case and the principles of justice.