Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 157

Citation: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 157
Appeal from: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 265
Parties: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION and STEPHEN BYRNE v ANGLO COAL (DAWSON SERVICES) PTY LTD
File number: QUD 185 of 2015
Judges: JESSUP, BUCHANAN AND RANGIAH JJ
Date of judgment: 5 November 2015
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Adverse action – Dismissal of employee – Reasons for dismissal – Onus of disproof of existence of proscribed reasons cast upon employer – Whether discharged – Direct evidence of decision‑maker – Significance of employer’s failure to call some persons who conferred with decision‑maker – Whether this meant that onus had not been discharged – Finding at trial that onus had been discharged – Decision‑maker’s evidence as to his reasons accepted – Whether primary Judge’s findings glaringly improbable.

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Summary dismissal of employee for dishonestly claiming to be unwell during absence from work – Finding at trial that employee was unwell – Onus of proof to justify facts warranting summary dismissal – Whether facts to be assessed objectively or by reference to perception of employer at time of dismissal – Remedy for wrongful dismissal – Whether specific performance available – Whether exceptional circumstances present – Whether constituted by period of satisfactory post‑dismissal service under command of interlocutory order.

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Adverse action – Dismissal of employee – Reason for dismissal – Whether because employee exercised right under industrial instrument to be absent from work on account of illness – Employee had previously sought and was refused annual leave on days concerned – Employee announced intention to produce medical certificate – Employee did absent himself from work and later produced medical certificate – Employee was unwell on days concerned but employer believed otherwise and did not accept medical opinion – Employer regarded employee’s conduct as dishonest – Reason for employer’s decision to dismiss – Relevance of employer’s actual but erroneous belief that employee not unwell.

Legislation: Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth)
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 117, 340, 341, 346, 352, 360, 361, 394, 725, 727 and 729
Cases cited: Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 243
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Endeavour Coal Pty Ltd (2015) 231 FCR 150
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
General Motors-Holden’s Pty Ltd v Bowling (1976) 136 CLR 676
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Maritime Union of Australia v CSL Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 113 IR 326
Musgrove v Murrayland Fruit Juices Pty Ltd (1980) 47 FLR 156
State Rail Authority of New South Wales…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 157
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd was concerned with the dismissal of Mr. Byrne, a union member and employee of the respondent, Anglo Coal. Mr. Byrne was dismissed for allegedly dishonestly claiming to be unwell and absenting himself from work on two days for which he had previously requested annual leave that was denied. The union argued that the dismissal was wrongful as it was either for exercising his right to be absent from work due to illness or for other protected reasons under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The case was brought before the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issues the court had to address were whether Mr. Byrne's dismissal was due to exercising a workplace right or because of his temporary absence from work due to illness, and whether the employer had discharged the onus of proving that these were not the reasons for dismissal. Additionally, the court needed to determine the appropriate remedy for wrongful dismissal, considering whether specific performance was available and if exceptional circumstances existed, particularly in light of Mr. Byrne's post-dismissal satisfactory service under an interlocutory order.

The court found that the employer had successfully discharged the onus of proving that the dismissal was not for prohibited reasons under the Fair Work Act. The decision-maker's evidence, that the dismissal was based on Mr. Byrne's perceived dishonesty in claiming illness, was accepted by the court. The court also determined that the primary judge's findings were not glaringly improbable and affirmed the dismissal. The court rejected the union's argument that specific performance should be granted as a remedy and concluded that exceptional circumstances did not exist, as Mr. Byrne's post-dismissal service did not constitute such circumstances.

The final order of the court was to dismiss the appeal, affirming the earlier decision that the dismissal of Mr. Byrne was lawful.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

My conclusion that Mr Byrne was dismissed because he exercised a workplace right and because he was temporarily absent from work because of illness is based upon the factual findings of the primary Judge, but I differ from her Honour about the legal significance of those factual findings. The facts as found A statement of the factual position may be found in the judgment of the primary Judge (Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 265) and in the reasons for judgment of Jessup J. What appears below is a summary or skeleton of those findings as an introduction to the discussion of the legal issues later in this judgment. Mr Byrne, as I said earlier, was employed by the respondent from 1 August 2011. He was employed as a Mine Employee Level 2. He was a member of the first appellant and, in November 2012, was elected to the position of Lodge President at the mine operated by the respondent – the Dawson Mine at Moura in Central Queensland. On 21 April 2014, Mr Byrne applied for two days annual leave for Thursday 24 and Friday 25 April 2014. The respondent normally required at least 28 days notice of an annual leave request. Mr Byrne’s request was declined shortly after it was made. Evidence was given by the mining superintendent, which the primary Judge accepted, that Mr Byrne was put out by the decision and announced that he was “going to be sick anyway” and would obtain a medical certificate. Mr Byrne was then advised that if he did not attend for work the discipline policy would be invoked. Mr Byrne did not attend for work on his rostered shifts on 24 and 25 April 2014. He did produce a non-specific and unilluminating medical certificate. The discipline process was commenced. On 30 April 2014, Mr Byrne attended a meeting with the mining superintendent and a human resources officer. He was challenged about his earlier remarks and his desire to take annual leave. The mining superintendent did not accept his explanation (that it would assist the respondent to have lower absenteeism figures) and also concluded that Mr Byrne had dishonestly claimed to be sick on 24 and 25 April 2014. On 1 May 2014 Mr Byrne attended a meeting at which the respondent gave him a letter providing him the opportunity to show cause why he should not be dealt with for serious misconduct. The letter said (in part): Serious Misconduct – Show CauseAs you are aware, we have been investigating: (a)Your conduct on 22 April 2014 (DS), at which time you requested annual leave and advised the Company that if your annual leave request was not approved for 24 and 25 April 2014 (NS) you would take sick leave; and (b)Your subsequent absence from work on 24 and 25 April 2014 (NS) – you notified your supervisor that you were taking sick leave. As part of our investigation, we have spoken to both you and other persons involved in the incident. The Company has now finalised its investigation of the matter and based on the information available to the Company, the Company has determined that you have engaged in serious misconduct by wilfully absenting yourself from your work on 24 and 25 April 2014 (NS). This conduct occurred in circumstances where you had requested annual leave to be absent on those dates and had been advised on 22 April 2014 that: Ÿyour annual leave was not approved; and Ÿif you absented yourself on those dates, you would likely be subject to disciplinary action. …

Decision

Reasons for decision

The conclusions of the primary Judge, upon this part of the case before her Honour, are stated in the following paragraphs: Claims under the FW Act – conclusion… 138In conclusion, while the evidence before me supports a finding that Mr Byrne actually did have or was developing a medical condition on 22 April 2014, and that he was ill on 24 and 25 April 2014, I am satisfied that the respondent has discharged its onus under s 361 of the FW Act. I accept the evidence of Mr Power, and am satisfied that the real reasons of Mr Power in deciding to terminate Mr Byrne’s employment did not include as a substantial or operative factor any of the proscribed reasons identified in ss 340, 346 or 352 of the FW Act. More precisely, I am satisfied that, for the reasons I have set out, adverse action was taken by the respondent against Mr Byrne, for the reason that Mr Power believed that Mr Byrne had conducted himself in a dishonest manner by: Ÿplanning to take sick leave when he was not sick; Ÿthreatening to use a medical certificate as a justification for taking annual leave which had been refused him; Ÿobtaining that medical certificate to circumvent the respondent’s refusal of his annual leave request, by persuading Dr Farahmand to issue a medical certificate in reliance on description of symptoms; and Ÿdisingenuously claiming that his original application for annual leave had been to assist the respondent in relation to maintenance of low absentee statistics and/or had been pursuant to a practice in respect of taking annual leave when sick rather than sick leave. 139These reasons are not prohibited under the FW Act, and termination of employment in reliance on that belief is similarly not prohibited (cf Barclay and CFMEU v BHP, as well as comments of Burchardt FM (as he then was) in Anderson at [101]). Mr Power did not terminate Mr Byrne’s employment for any reason associated with his temporary absence from work because of illness or injury, Mr Byrne’s exercise or proposed exercise of the workplace right of taking sick leave, Mr Byrne’s engagement in industrial activity, or Mr Byrne’s position in the union. In my respectful view, the summary offered at [138] is not a complete one because it does not include the earlier findings that Mr Power was significantly, indeed critically, influenced in his decision by his conclusion that the absences on 24 and 25 April 2014 were not on account of illness and, it must follow, his view that Mr Byrne was not entitled to be absent under the relevant enterprise agreement. The enterprise agreement (the Dawson Mines Collective Enterprise Agreement 2014) provided, by cl 3.2, as follows: 3.2Personal/Carer’s Leave… 3.2.3Employees may take personal/carer’s leave if the leave is taken: (a)because the employee is not fit for work because of a personal illness or injury affecting the employee; or … 3.2.4Employees will be paid their Normal Annual Salary rate for the period of personal/carer’s leave. 3.2.5Employees must notify Dawson of their inability to attend for a reason outlined in clause 3.2.3 prior to the commencement of work or otherwise as soon as is practicable. When notifying Dawson, the employee must also inform Dawson of the estimated length of the absence.