Rukavina v FNQH Pathology Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Rukavina v FNQH Pathology Pty Ltd [2025] FedCFamC2G 69

File number: ADG 188 of 2024
Judgment of: JUDGE BROWN
Date of judgment: 28 January 2025
Catchwords: FAIR WORK – Application for costs – Respondent seeks indemnity costs – Whether Application was filed without reasonable cause – Consideration of conduct of the Applicant – Whether indemnity costs as sought is appropriate – Applicant to pay costs in a fixed sum
Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Pts 3 – 1, 6 – 4B, ss 3, 340, 341, 342, 351, 361, 539, 570, 789FD, 789FC

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 5, 143, 190, 191, 192

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 Div 13.1 rr 1.04, 4.04, 22.02, 22.06, 30.04

Cases cited:

Australian & International Pilots Association v Qantas Airlines Limited (No 3) [2007] FCA 879

Australian Workers Union v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCAFC 23

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technology and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500

Bywater v Appco Group Australia Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 799

Celand v Skycity Adelaide Pty Ltd (2017) 256 FCR 306

Colgate Palmolive v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 157

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (2015) 230 FCR 298

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clarke (2008) 170 FCR 574

Ermel v Duluxgroup (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 17

Henry v Leighton Admin Services Pty Ltd [2015] FCCA 1923

Johnson v Monti-Haitsma Enterprises (No 2) [2014] FCA 1020

Jones v Queensland Tertiary Admissions Centre Limited (No 2) [2010] FCA 399

Kanan v Australian Postal & Telecommunications Union [1992] FCA 539

Khiani v Australian Bureau of Statistics [2011] FCAFC 109

PIA Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v King [2020] FCAFC 15

Ragata Developments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation & Anor [1993] FCA 115

Ryan v Primesafe [2015] FCA 8

Saxena v PPF Asset Management Ltd [2011] FCA 395

Shea v TRUenergy Services Pty Ltd (No 6) (2014) 314 ALR 346

Spotless Services Australia Ltd v Deputy President March [2004] FCAFC 155

State of Victoria (Office of Public Prosecutions) v Grant [2014] FCAFC 184

Tomvald v Toll Transport [2017] FCA 1208

Wong v National Australia Bank [2021] FCA 671

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 148
Date of hearing: 12 December 2024
Place: Adelaide
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr Irvine, Websters Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Dr Fallah
Solicitor for the Respondent: LawBase Pty Ltd

ORDERS

ADG 188 of 2024

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

SAMANTHA RUKAVINA

Applicant

AND:

FNQH PATHOLOGY PTY LTD

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE BROWN

DATE OF ORDER:

28 JANUARY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Within 28 days of the date of these orders, the Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 69
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Rukavina v FNQH Pathology Pty Ltd revolves around a dispute filed in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, where Ms Rukavina alleged that she was dismissed in contravention of general protections under the Fair Work Act. FNQH Pathology Pty Ltd sought indemnity costs from Ms Rukavina, arguing that the application was filed without reasonable cause. The court was required to determine whether Ms Rukavina's decision to withdraw her claim should result in her being prejudiced by a costs order and whether the application was made without reasonable cause.

The court analysed the conduct of Ms Rukavina and her advisors, noting that her initial application and supporting claim did not adequately specify the workplace right on which she relied. Instead, she assumed that her assertion of an inchoate workplace right, coupled with the fact of her dismissal, was sufficient. Furthermore, the court found that Ms Rukavina had not provided the necessary objective facts to establish a sufficient evidentiary basis that she had been subject to adverse action because of a prohibited attribute. The court held that the institution of proceedings in this manner was inconsistent with the overarching principle of efficient and effective delivery of justice and did not encourage ill-defined claims.

The court concluded that FNQH was entitled to seek particulars of the alleged workplace right, which it did on multiple occasions. Despite ample time and multiple requests, Ms Rukavina did not provide the necessary particulars or amend her application. The court found that the proceedings were likely instituted without reasonable cause, and as a result, FNQH was entitled to indemnity costs. However, the court also noted that Ms Rukavina had withdrawn her claim, and the proceedings had not progressed to the point where the parties were required to substantiate their positions. Therefore, the court ordered that Ms Rukavina would pay costs in a fixed sum.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

In these circumstances, it is the contention of Ms Rukavina, and those advising her, that she should not be prejudiced, in terms of a costs order, because of her decision to withdraw her claim when each of the parties has not as yet been required to put flesh on the bones of their competing positions. BACKGROUND These proceedings are to be determined within the context of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)[6] and the rules made under it, particularly the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021.[7][6] Hereinafter referred to as “the FCFCOA Act”. [7] Hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”. The Rules provide the mechanisms by which proceedings are to be commenced, in the court, including in respect of general protection proceedings. Whilst provisions of the FCFCOA Act provide the general ethos of the court itself and how it is directed to conduct any litigation coming before it. Section 190 of the FCFCOA Act provides a directive to the court to, in the application of its practice and procedure, to facilitate the just resolution of disputes, according to law, as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. This reflects the objects of the FCFCOA Act as contained in section 5 and is referred to as the court’s overarching purpose. Rule 1.04 of the Rules delineates the obligation of parties to assist the court to achieve its objectives as delineated by the overarching purpose parties are required to avoid undue delay, expense and technicality. They are also directed to consider options for primary dispute resolution as early as possible. Rule 30.04 stipulates the manner in which an application in respect of a general protection matter is to be commenced. It is to be made with the approved form and be accompanied by a claim in accordance with the approved form together with a certificate issued by the Fair Work Commission which indicates that the Commission is satisfied that all reasonable attempts have been made to resolve the relevant dispute or that such attempts are unlikely to be successful. Rule 4.04 of the Rules provides that it is not necessary for an applicant, in general protection proceedings, to file any affidavit evidence in support of the application [see rule 4.04(2)(c)]. In addition, it should be noted that is always open to an applicant to commence proceedings by the filing of a statement of claim. In this particular matter, Ms Rukavina elected to commence the proceedings by filing an application supported by a claim detailed in the prescribed form to which was attached a certificate from a Fair Work Commissioner, which indicated that a conference had been convened between the parties to the dispute on 3 May 2024, following which the Fair Work Commission was satisfied that all reasonable attempts to resolve the rising dispute had been undertaken and were likely to be unsuccessful. In keeping with the ethos of the overarching purpose, the relevant claim form is not a complex document. The most significant section of the claim form is Part G, which poses the following issues, which are to be addressed, under the heading Contravention(s) alleged. The proforma aspect of Part G are as follows:•What are the grounds for the claim that the employee was dismissed in contravention of a general protection? (Set out in numbered paragraphs the facts relied on and the provisions of the Fair Work Act relevant to the claim). •If relying on s.340 specify the ‘workplace right’ claimed.•If relying on s.351 specify the attribute in s.351(1). •Attach an extra sheet if required.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

It is a process involving the balance and reconciliation of competing principles, which must be undertaken cautiously, from a careful analysis of both facts and law. The interests of access to justice, in the industrial setting, must be balanced against the risk of awarding a potential free kick to a person, who is accessing the court for ulterior or improper purposes or has conducted proceedings in an unreasonable manner. The discretion must be exercised judicially.CONCLUSIONS In my view, Ms Rukavina’s case was not clearly articulated at the time of its commencement. She did not adequately specify the workplace right on which she relied. Rather, her application and its supporting claim proceeded on the assumption that the assertion of an inchoate workplace right, when coupled with the fact that she had been subject to adverse action, was sufficient. In addition, by necessary implication, she relied on the application of the reverse onus provisions contained in section 361 as requiring FNQH as having to negate her assertion to establish her cause of action. In my view, on the basis of what was said particularly in Jones v Queensland Tertiary Admissions Centre Limited (No 2), Ms Rukavina and those advising her needed to do more. What was needed was the provision by her, to both the court and FNQH, of objective facts to establish a sufficient evidentiary basis that she had been subject to adverse action because of a prohibited attribute pertaining to her. It is not sufficient to merely assert the existence of a workplace right. No such objective facts have been provided. I do not consider that the institution of proceedings, in this way, is consistent with the overarching principle which underpins all litigation in this court. It is not calculated to assist with the efficient and effective delivery of justice. The court should not encourage ill-defined and ambit claims, even in a cost protected jurisdiction such as the fair work one. In these circumstances, in my view, FNQH was entitled to seek particulars of the alleged workplace right relied upon, which it did on four discrete occasions prior to the first listing of the matter, for its first mention, in September 2024. In addition, it invited the applicant to amend its application to provide these particulars. The fact that no such particulars were ever provided, and no amendment made, in the approximately six months the matter was before the court, lends weight to the respondent’s submission that Ms Rukavina, and more importantly those advising her, had not given any thought to whether there was a proper legal basis for the application other than Ms Rukavina had been dismissed and was aggrieved by it. Accordingly, in my view, although it cannot be found definitively that the proceedings were commenced vexatiously, the assertion that they had been instituted without reasonable cause could have been negated by the making of amendment; the provision of particulars; or the filing of further evidence; none of which occurred, notwithstanding the fact that requests were made to this effect and there was ample time available to do so.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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