Johnson v Monti-Haitsma Enterprises Pty Limited (in external administration) (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Johnson v Monti-Haitsma Enterprises Pty Limited (in external administration) (No 2) [2014] FCA 1020

Citation: Johnson v Monti-Haitsma Enterprises Pty Limited (in external administration) (No 2) [2014] FCA 1020
Parties: DEBRA JOHNSON  v MONTI-HAITSMA ENTERPRISES PTY LIMITED (IN EXTERNAL ADMINISTRATION)
File number: NSD 713 of 2014
Judge: EDMONDS J
Date of judgment: 19 September 2014
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 570
Cases cited: Cavar v Nursing Australia [2012] FCA 338 applied
Johnson v Monti-Haitsma Enterprises Pty Ltd [2014] FCCA 259 referred to
Kanan v Australian Postal and Telecommunications Union (1992) 43 IR 257 cited
Kerr v Jaroma Pty Ltd t/a Treasury Motor Lodge (1996) 70 IR 469 cited
Khiani v Australian Bureau of Statistics [2011] FCAFC 109 cited
R v Moore; Ex parte Federated Miscellaneous Workers’ Union of Australia (1978) 140 CLR 470 cited
Date of hearing: Done on the papers
Date of last submissions: 1 and 8 September 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 19
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R De Meyrick
Solicitor for the Applicant: CBD Law
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Cross
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Business Lawyers & Advisors

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 713 of 2014

BETWEEN:

DEBRA JOHNSON
Applicant

AND:

MONTI-HAITSMA ENTERPRISES PTY LIMITED (IN EXTERNAL ADMINISTRATION)
Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE:

19 SEPTEMBER 2014

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 26 August 2014, I dismissed the applicant’s application for an extension of time under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 to file a notice of appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

  2. I did so because, in my view, the applicant had no reasonable prospect of succeeding on any of the ten grounds in the draft notice of appeal.

  3. At the time of handing down judgment, I ordered the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

  4. At that time, counsel for the applicant asked me to hear the parties on the question of costs and in response I gave the parties leave to file written submission on whether or not I should vacate the costs order.

  5. Both parties filed written submission and it was agreed that I should deal with the matter on the papers.

    Applicant’s Submissions

  6. The applicant submitted that there should be no order as to costs in respect of the application to extend time to file a notice of appeal, notwithstanding that the application was unsuccessful.

  7. The application and the proposed appeal were in the Court’s fair work jurisdiction; s 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) provides:

    Costs only if proceedings instituted vexatiously etc.

    (1)A party to proceedings (including an appeal) in a court (including a court of a State or Territory) in relation to a matter arising under this Act may be ordered by the court to pay costs incurred by another party to the proceedings only in accordance with subsection (2) or section 569…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1020
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Johnson v Monti-Haitsma Enterprises Pty Limited (in external administration) (No 2), the applicant, Johnson, sought an extension of time to appeal a decision made by the Federal Court. The respondent, Monti-Haitsma Enterprises Pty Limited, opposed the application, arguing that it was without reasonable cause and thus liable for costs. The case involved the interpretation of section 570 of the Federal Court of Australia Act and whether it provided a "free kick" to applicants without consequences.

The legal issue before the court was whether section 570 of the Federal Court of Australia Act provides a "free kick" to applicants, without consequences, when seeking an extension of time to appeal a decision. The court needed to determine whether the applicant's pursuit of the appeal was without reasonable cause and thus liable for costs. The court considered the distinction between whether a "first instance" application is without reasonable cause, as opposed to whether appeal applications are without reasonable cause.

The court held that section 570 does not provide a "free kick" to applicants without consequences. It concluded that the applicant's appeal had "no merit" and "would inevitably fail." The applicant's pursuit of the appeal was therefore "without reasonable cause," and the applicant should pay the respondent's costs. The court declined to vacate the order made on 26 August 2014, and the applicant was liable for costs.

The court's reasoning was based on the fundamental deficiencies in the applicant's case that precluded any reasonable prospects of success. The applicant was aware of these deficiencies from the time of the receipt of the decision of Judge Driver, yet still pursued the application for extension of time to appeal. The court concluded that the applicant's further pursuit of the claims before the court was "without reasonable cause." The court held that the applicant should pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

While s 570 provides some cost protection to an applicant, it does not provide a “free kick”, without consequences. From the time of the receipt of the decision of Judge Driver, the applicant was aware of the fundamental deficiencies in her case that precluded any reasonable prospects of success. The agitation of the application for extension of time to appeal was therefore pursued without reasonable cause, and the applicant should pay the respondent ‘s costs.Conclusion I agree with the respondent’s submission. The consideration of costs in relation to the application to extend time to appeal draws into consideration the important distinction between whether a “first instance” application is without reasonable cause, as opposed to whether appeal applications are without reasonable cause. As Flick J observed in Cavar v Nursing Australia (at [23]), when awarding costs:Irrespective of whether or not the proceeding before the Federal Magistrate could be characterised as one being “without reasonable cause”, it is concluded that the present Application for Leave to Appeal can accurately be so characterised. By the time the present Application was filed, Ms Cavar had the benefit of the reasons for decision of the Federal Magistrate. Those reasons carefully set forth the deficiencies in her claims for relief. Having had those deficiencies identified, it remained a matter for Ms Cavar to determine whether or not she wished to seek to appeal to this Court. Having decided to do so, however, her further pursuit of the claims before this Court is “without reasonable cause”. The deficiencies identified by the Federal Magistrate were so fundamental to the claim sought to be advanced by Ms Cavar that any further pursuit of those claims was “without reasonable cause”. In the face of my finding in Johnson v Monti-Haitsma Enterprises Pty Limited (in External Administration) [2014] FCA 906) at [15] that the applicant’s appeal had “no merit” and “would inevitably fail”, the pursuit of the application for an extension of time was “without reasonable cause”. For the foregoing reasons, I decline to vacate order 2 made on 26 August 2014.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established