Eicens v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services)

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QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION: Eicens v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2024] QIRC 256
PARTIES:

Eicens, Jayhden Jon
(Applicant)

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services)
(Respondent)

CASE NO: GP/2024/12
PROCEEDING: Application in existing proceedings
DELIVERED ON: 1 November 2024
MEMBER: Gazenbeek IC
HEARD AT: On the papers
ORDERS: The matter GP/2024/12 is dismissed for want of jurisdiction
CATCHWORDS: INDUSTRIAL LAW – GENERAL PROTECTIONS APPLICATION RELATING TO DISMISSAL – where the Applicant filed a general protections application 7 days out of time – whether, having regard to s 310(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the Applicant should be allowed a further period of time to make application to the Commission – whether Commission satisfied exceptional circumstances exist within the meaning of s 310(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) to enliven the Commission’s discretion to allow a further period of time to make application to the Commission – Commission not satisfied exceptional circumstances exist – matter dismissed for want of jurisdiction
LEGISLATION AND INSTRUMENTS:

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 38

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 366

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 282, 284, 285, 306, 309, 310, 316, 317, 451

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 91(1)(b)

Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) rr 8, 13, 14, 15, 16

CASES:

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541

Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1996) 67 IR 298

Charles v Anglican Care [2016] FWC 4664

Dickson v Mornington Shire Council [2020] QIRC 106

Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC 089

Ermel v Duluxgroup (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 17

Khiani v Australian Bureau of Statistics [2011] FCAFC 109

Long v Keolis Downer T/A Yarra Trams [2018] FWCFB 4109

Naidoo v Scenic Rim Regional Council [2024] QIRC 134

Nichols v State of Queensland (Department of Transport and Main Roads) [2023] QIRC 182

Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 975

Singh v Gemini Logistics Pty Ltd [2024] FWC 2787

Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd (t/as Richmond Oysters) [2018] FWCFB 901

Thornton v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2020] QIRC 393

Reasons for Decision

  1. Mr Jayhden Jon Eicens (‘the Applicant’) commenced employment with Queensland Corrective Services (‘the Respondent’) as a Custodial Corrections Officer on


    12 October 2020.

  2. On 28 July 2023, the Applicant was invited to show cause why disciplinary findings should not be made against him in relation to the following allegation:[1]

    That between 1 March 2022 and 10 October 2022, you engaged in inappropriate workplace conduct in your verbal communications with your colleagues at Lotus Glen Correctional Centre.

    [1] Letter of Mr G. McCahon (Deputy Commissioner, Custodial Operations) to Applicant, dated 28 July 2023, 2.

  3. After receiving the Applicant’s response to the first show cause notice, the Applicant was advised on 12 December 2023 that the allegation was substantiated, and that it had been determined he was guilty of misconduct pursuant to s 91(1)(b) of the Public…

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Details
Case
[2024] QIRC 256
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Mr Eicens, filed a general protections application seven days late, challenging his dismissal by Queensland Corrective Services. The Queensland Industrial Relations Commission considered whether exceptional circumstances existed under s 310(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) to justify an extension of time to file the application. The Commission assessed the case against the criteria in s 310(2) of the IR Act, which includes the absence of a reasonable explanation for the delay, the lack of merit in the application, and other relevant factors.

The Commission examined the applicant's delay in filing, the absence of a reasonable explanation for this delay, and the difficulties the applicant would face in proving the merits of the application. While the delay was relatively short, the Commission found that the lack of a reasonable explanation and the lack of merit in the application were significant factors. The Commission concluded that these factors, considered as a whole, did not constitute exceptional circumstances under s 310(2) of the IR Act. The Commission also noted that the absence of exceptional circumstances meant that the applicant would not obtain any forensic advantage over other employees who had also been dismissed.

As the application was made outside the 21-day limitation period stipulated in s 310(1)(a) of the IR Act, the Commission determined it did not have jurisdiction to deal with the application. Consequently, the matter was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Commission's decision was influenced by the lack of exceptional circumstances and the need to ensure fairness in comparison to other employees who had also been dismissed and filed their applications within the statutory limit.

Orders

Orders of the court

The matter GP/2024/12 is dismissed for want of jurisdiction

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I am unable to identify any particular unfairness to Mr Eicens in all of the circumstances of this matter if an extension of time for filing is not granted, and have decided to treat this factor as being neutral. Conclusion Having filed his general protections application in the Industrial Registry 7 days out of time, Mr Eicens needed to satisfy the Commission that there are exceptional circumstances that warrant the granting of an extension of time. However, having taken into account the matters listed in s 310(2)(a)-(e) of the IR Act, I am not satisfied that Mr Eicens has established that such exceptional circumstances exist. I acknowledge that the delay in filing in this matter is a relatively short period, and that a refusal to grant the extension of time will extinguish Mr Eicens’ opportunity to seek a remedy for his termination.[56] However, Mr Eicens has not identified any one factor which is exceptional, nor can the combination of all circumstances be reasonably regarded as exceptional. Further, I have ultimately determined that the absence of a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing, and the significant difficulties Mr Eicens will face in demonstrating that his application has any merit, overwhelmingly outweigh the other factors when considered as a whole. [56] Dickson [90]. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that Mr Eicens has established that there are exceptional circumstances that enliven the discretion provided for in s 310(2) of the IR Act to allow a further period for the filing of his application. As Mr Eicens’ application was made outside of the 21-day limitation period stipulated in s 310(1)(a) of the IR Act, the Commission therefore does not have jurisdiction to deal with it, and I order accordingly. Order I make the following order: The matter GP/2024/12 is dismissed for want of jurisdiction

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Dickson, Industrial Commissioner Dwyer observed the following in relation to s 310(2)(e) of the IR Act:[53] [53] [2020] QIRC 106, citing Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC 089. [83] In Doorley, Commissioner Black observed:This consideration invites a comparison between the applicant and another employee in the position of the applicant. The purpose of this consideration is to ensure that the applicant does not obtain any forensic advantage from the delay in commencement of the proceedings. In Ballarat Truck Centre v Kerr, the Fair Work Commission Full Bench stated:[26]It appears to be clear that s.366(2)(e) should be limited to a comparison of persons who have also had their employment terminated and are thus capable of lodging a s.365 application. A time limit for the lodgement of an application under Part 3-1 of the Act is only provided for with respect to s.365 applications. The Act imposes no time constraints on other applications available under Part 3-1. It follows that the consideration stipulated in s.366(2)(e) of the Act requires a comparison between people who are capable of bringing a s.365 application. Further, as Mr Follett submitted, if s.366(2)(e) allowed for a comparison to a person who had not been dismissed, then, as the Act imposes no time constraints on other applications under Part 3-1, that comparison would always produce comparative unfairness and it could hardly be seen to be indicative of whether there are exceptional circumstances for which a further period of time could be granted.[84] In this case the proper comparison ought to be with Mr Dickson and another employee, dismissed from their employment at the conclusion of their probationary period, who has filed outside the statutory limit. [85] Considered in isolation, in a matter like this the facts will always reveal unfairness where a person is denied an opportunity to pursue such an application. However, the considerations identified in s 310(2) require an holistic approach .[86] In this matter, the absence of evidence to support the reasons for delay, and the lack of merit weighs heavily against Mr Dickson in my view. The question of fairness ought to be considered in that context. (emphasis added) Neither party has pointed to a case “where a person in a similar position to [the applicant] had or had not been given a further period to make a general protections application” to aid in my consideration of this criterion.[54] However, I find Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon’s decision in Naidoo to be of some relevance; the applicant in Naidoo similarly did not provide a satisfactory explanation for their delay in filing, and “failed to identify the basis for his general protections application” such that it was found the merits of the application did not favour an extension of time.[55] The applicant’s application in Naidoo for a further period to make a general protections application relating to dismissal was ultimately dismissed. [54] Nichols v State of Queensland (Department of Transport and Main Roads) [2023] QIRC 182 [108]. [55] Naidoo v Scenic Rim Regional Council [2024] QIRC 134 [101]-[104].