Dickson v Mornington Shire Council

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QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:    

Dickson v Mornington Shire Council [2020] QIRC 106

PARTIES:      

Dickson, Bradley James
(Applicant)

v

Mornington Shire Council
(Respondent)

CASE NO:

GP/2020/5

PROCEEDING:

General Protections – application for extension of time

DELIVERED ON:

23 July 2020

HEARING DATES:

On the papers

MEMBER:

Industrial Commissioner Dwyer

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

ORDER:

1.   The application for extension of time is refused;

2.   Matter number GP/2020/5 is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 2016 – GENERAL PROTECTIONS APPLICATION RELATING TO DISMISSAL – Late filing – Eight days out of time - Application for extension of time – Reason for delay – Medical Conditions – Representative error – Merits

LEGISLATION:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 366, s 394

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s 285, s 297, s 306, s 310

CASES:

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500; 220 IR 445; [2012] HCA 32

Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC 089

Kornicki v Telstra-Network Technology Group (1997) 140 IR 1

Kyvelos v Champion Socks Pty Ltd, Print T2421 AIRC FB 10 November 2000

Long v Keolis Downer [2018] FWCFB 4109

Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 975

Periklis Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters [2018] FWCFB 901

Robinson v Interstate Transport Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 2728

Rose v BMD Constructions Pty Ltd [2011] FWA 673

Reasons for Decision

The Application

  1. On 6 January 2020 Mr Bradley Dickson was advised at a meeting with his employer that his employment with the Mornington Shire Council ('the respondent') was to be terminated, effective 12 January 2020 ('the termination date').

  2. On 11 February 2020 Mr Dickson filed an application with the Commission alleging contraventions of s 285 and s 297 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act') ('the adverse action complaint). Mr Dickson filed an affidavit supporting his application on 11 February 2020.

  1. The time limit prescribed by s 310 of the IR Act for filing such an application is 21 days after the date the dismissal took effect. It is not disputed that Mr Dickson's application was filed eight days outside the prescribed time limit.

  1. On 5 March 2020 Mr Dickson filed an application in existing proceedings and a further supporting affidavit seeking an extension to the time limit for filing.

  1. The Chief Executive Officer of the respondent, Mr Frank Mills, filed an affidavit on 19 March 2020.

  1. The parties agreed to have the application dealt with on the papers and filed written submissions on various dates between 7 and 16 April 2020. In addition to these submissions, I have had regard to the aforementioned affidavits filed by Mr Dickson[1] and Mr Mills[2] in my deliberations.

    [1] Filed on 11 February and 5 March 2020.

    [2] Filed on 19 March 2020.

  1. The question for determination is whether Mr Dickson ought to have the benefit of the discretion contained at s 310(2) of the IR Act to allow…

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Details
Case
[2020] QIRC 106
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dickson v Mornington Shire Council involved an application for an extension of time to file a general protections application relating to dismissal. The applicant, Mr. Dickson, sought to extend the filing deadline by eight days, citing medical conditions and representative error as reasons for the delay. The court was tasked with determining whether the circumstances were exceptional enough to warrant an extension under section 310(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016.

The legal issues centred around whether the delay was due to exceptional circumstances, and if so, whether this justified an extension of time. The court had to consider various factors including the reason for the delay, the merits of the application, and whether the delay caused prejudice to the employer. It was noted that while no single factor needed to be exceptional, the combination of factors needed to be examined collectively. The court found that Mr. Dickson's assertions of stress and anxiety did not sufficiently explain the delay, and the merits of the application were weak. The absence of an explanation for the delay and the poor merits were compelling reasons against granting the extension.

The court concluded that despite the short delay and the potential consequences for Mr. Dickson, the absence of an adequate explanation for the delay and the weak merits of the application meant that the exceptional circumstances were not met. The court refused the application for an extension of time and dismissed the matter. The orders included the refusal of the application for extension of time and the dismissal of the general protections application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for extension of time is refused;

2. Matter number GP/2020/5 is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In all of the circumstances of this matter I am unable to identify any particular unfairness to Mr Dickson. Conclusion In Periklis Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission set out the approach to be adopted when considering s 366(2) of the FW Act:[49][38]As we have mentioned, the assessment of whether exceptional circumstances exist requires a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. No one factor (such as the reason for the delay) need be found to be exceptional in order to enliven the discretion to extend time. This is so because even though no one factor may be exceptional, in combination with other factors the circumstances may be such as to be regarded as exceptional.[39]So much is clear from the structure of s.366(2), each of the matters needs to be taken into account in assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances. The individual matters might not, viewed in isolation, be particularly significant, so it is necessary to consider the matters collectively and to ask whether collectively the matters disclose exceptional circumstances. The absence of any explanation for any part of the delay, will usually weigh against an applicant in such an assessment. Similarly a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay, will usually weigh in the applicant's favour, though, as we mention later, it is a question of degree and insight. However the ultimate conclusion as to the existence of exceptional circumstances will turn on a consideration of all of the relevant matters and the assignment of appropriate weight to each.(Underlining and emphasis added)[49] Ibid. I consider that this approach is equally apposite to s 310(2) of the IR Act. I am mindful that the delay in this matter is a relatively short period. I am also conscious that a refusal to grant the extension sought will extinguish Mr Dickson's opportunity to seek a remedy for his termination. If these were the only considerations, I might be inclined to a more favourable approach to his application. However, the absence of explanation for the delay and the obvious difficulties with merit are stark and compelling features of this matter that overwhelm the other factors when considered as a whole. Even when considering that the true failing with respect to the explanations for the delay could simply be a result of inadequate evidence put before me, I consider that the poor merits are, of themselves, a compelling reason to refuse the application. In all of these circumstances I refuse the application to extend the time for filing and dismiss matter GP/2020/5 in its entirety. I make the following Orders:1.The application for extension of time is refused;2.Matter number GP/2020/5 is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 310(2) provides that consideration of 'exceptional circumstances' requires the Commission to take into account a number of prescribed factors, namely: (a) the reason for the delay; and(b) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and(c) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and(d) the merits of the application; and(e) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.Consideration of s 310(2) Factors (a)Reason for delay Mr Dickson filed two affidavits (on 11 February and 5 March 2020) that set out his evidence dealing with inter alia the reasons for his delay in filing his application. The reasons for delay offered by Mr Dickson are: Mr Dickson states that he experienced 'stress and anxiety' from approximately 18 December 2019[6]. Mr Dickson attended for medical treatment on 7 January 2020 i.e. the day after he was advised his employment was terminated though it is apparent that he formulated a plan to seek medical attention from about 4 January 2020[7] .[6] Affidavit of Bradley Dickson filed 11 February 2020, paragraph 34 and 43.[7] Affidavit of Bradley Dickson filed 11 February 2020, paragraph 44. Mr Dickson's affidavit filed 11 February 2020 attaches two medical certificates certifying (cumulatively) that Mr Dickson is 'unfit for work' due to a 'medical condition' between 6 January to 3 May 2020. Neither Mr Dickson, nor any medical expert provide any evidence in these proceedings as to the precise nature of Mr Dickson's medical condition or any expert opinion on what (if any) impact such condition had on e.g. his cognitive capacity. Significantly, apart from a broad assertion, Mr Dickson in his affidavits provides no insight into how his asserted 'stress and anxiety' impeded his capacity to file proceedings within the prescribed time limit. In his affidavit evidence he makes the following statements: Notwithstanding his assertion in his affidavit filed on 11 February 2020 that his 'current health situation caused an inability to obtain legal advice' Mr Dickson then immediately goes on, in glaring contradiction, to attest to no fewer than two or three separate instances of contact with his (then) lawyer Mr Lang. I note that all of these contacts were within the prescribed time limit. Further, in his affidavit filed on 5 March 2020, Mr Dickson recites, with some particularity, his understanding (as at 16 January 2020) of the advice he says he had from Mr Lang[16].[16] Affidavit of Bradley Dickson filed 5 March 2020, paragraph 52. I accept Mr Dickson's assertions that he felt anxious and stressed from approximately 18 December 2019 and beyond. I further accept that he was unfit for work as stated in the medical certificates. But these findings do not assist Mr Dickson in establishing that he lacked sufficient capacity to commence proceedings within the stipulated time frame. It is trite to note that both the lead up to and the aftermath of a dismissal will likely cause an employee in Mr Dickson's situation to feel distressed and anxious[17]. But Mr Dickson's assertion go much further. He asserts that he was so affected by his medical condition that he was robbed of the capacity to obtain legal advice[18]. [17] See for example Rose v BMD Constructions Pty Ltd [2011] FWA 673 at [9] – [10].[18] Affidavit of Bradley Dickson filed 11 February 2020, paragraph 64.