QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
CITATION: | Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council (No.2) [2024] QIRC 240 |
PARTIES: | Mutonhori, Simon v Mount Isa City Council |
CASE NO: | GP/2024/20 |
PROCEEDING: | Application for extension of time |
DELIVERED ON: | 4 October 2024 |
MEMBER: HEARD AT: | Pratt IC On the papers |
ORDER: | 1. The application for an extension of time to file that part of the application that relates to dismissal is refused. 2. That part of the application that relates to dismissal is dismissed. 3. That part of the application that relates to suspension from duties may proceed to further directions. |
| CATCHWORDS: | INDUSTRIAL LAW – GENERAL PROTECTIONS – EXTENSION OF TIME – where applicant was a manager employed by the respondent – where applicant made bullying allegations – where applicant suspended by respondent – where respondent advised the applicant there were allegations of misconduct against him – where the respondent substantiated the allegations against the applicant – where respondent dismissed applicant – where applicant alleges the suspension and the dismissal were each a breach of general protections – where application relating to the dismissal was filed prima facie out-of-time – consideration of extension of time under section 310 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) – whether pursuing other remedies in different proceedings, filing incorrectly, a respondent defending its position or being unaware of the law are exceptional circumstances regarding whether to extend time – where applicant also alleges representative error – held, no representative error and no exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of time – application to extend time for the dismissal component of the claim refused. |
LEGISLATION: CASES: | Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 285(1)(a)(ii), s 310, pt 1 ch 8 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 366(2) Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 Christine Smith v Express Excavation QLD Pty Ltd [2015] FWC 2436 Clark v Ringwood Private Hospital (1997) 74 IR 413 Davidson v Aboriginal and Islander Child Care Agency (1998) 105 IR 1 Dickson v Mornington Shire Council [2020] QIRC 106 Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC 89 Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 [2007] FCA 388 Long v Keolis Downer [2018] FWCFB 4109 Naidoo v Scenic Rim Regional Council [2024] QIRC 134 Nichols v State of Queensland (Department of Transport and Main Roads) [2023] QIRC 182 Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 975 Robinson v Interstate Transport Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 2728 Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd (t/as Richmond Oysters) [2018] FWCFB 901 Thornton v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2020] QIRC 393 |
Reasons for Decision
This is an application for an extension of time for the filing of the substantive matter by Mr Mutonhori ('Applicant'), who was employed as Manager, Environment, Regulatory Services and Land Use with the Mount Isa City Council ('Respondent'). The Applicant was suspended and was then dismissed from that position. He subsequently filed proceedings alleging various breaches of the general protections provisions contained…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council (No.2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2024] QIRC 240
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the delay in filing was due to exceptional circumstances that warranted an extension. Mutonhori argued that there was no representative error and that he had pursued other remedies in different proceedings, which caused the delay. The Council opposed the application for an extension, arguing that these circumstances did not constitute exceptional reasons under the statute.
The court considered the statutory limitation periods and previous cases where similar applications for extensions were denied. It held that filing in the wrong jurisdiction, pursuing remedies elsewhere, or misunderstanding the limitation period did not constitute exceptional circumstances. The court also rejected Mutonhori's claim of representative error, finding that his solicitor was not acting as his representative in these proceedings at the time of the dismissal. The court concluded that Mutonhori was not blameless for the delay and that extending time in this case would be unfair to other applicants who had similar delays but were denied extensions.
Accordingly, the application for an extension of time was refused. The dismissal component of Mutonhori's claim was dismissed, while the part of the claim relating to the suspension could proceed. The court's decision underscored the importance of adhering to statutory time limits and the need for fairness in applying the discretion to extend time.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time to file that part of the application that relates to dismissal is refused.
2. That part of the application that relates to dismissal is dismissed.
3. That part of the application that relates to suspension from duties may proceed to further directions.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to fairness between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position, the Applicant argues that a holistic approach needs to be taken in determining fairness. He argues that granting an extension would not create a precedent or unfairness to employers in a similar position, that he gained no forensic advantage from the delay and that it was not deliberate or negligent on his part. The Respondent argues that there are no matters of fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position. As I understand this submission, the Respondent is arguing that this is a neutral consideration rather than one which swings the scales in favour of, or against, exercising the discretion.Consideration There are two distinct acts that the Applicant alleges constitute adverse action: his suspension on 16 November 2023, and his dismissal on 20 December 2023. As is plainly laid out in section 310(3) of the IR Act, the limitation period is 6 years for an application relating to adverse action taken in contravention of section 285 where that adverse action is not a dismissal. The Applicant had 6 years from 16 November 2023 to file an application alleging that the Respondent took adverse action in contravention of section 285 by suspending him. The application is therefore plainly within time insofar as it relates to whether the Respondent took adverse action in contravention of section 285 by suspending the Applicant. However, as noted above, a general protections application relating to dismissal must be filed within 21 days of the dismissal taking effect. I accept that filing in the wrong jurisdiction or pursuing remedies elsewhere, misunderstanding the nature of the remedies available to the Applicant when filing the above-mentioned matters, or not knowing there is a limitation period, do not constitute "exceptional circumstances" that would warrant the exercise of the discretion in this case. I have had regard to the authorities referred to by the Respondent and I follow the same approach set out in those cases I have mentioned above on this issue. The pursuit of alternative proceedings by the Applicant, to the extent that doing so caused the Applicant to delay filing these proceedings, does not constitute an exceptional circumstance. Nor does the Respondent exercising its right to take up a defence. That is did so in those other proceedings is irrelevant to this issue in my view. As to the representative error argument, I have had regard to the solicitor's cost agreement that the Applicant has attached to his materials. I note that the date of that cost agreement is 16 November 2023. The dismissal was issued on 20 December 2023. I note also that the solicitor's cost agreement defines the scope of work as "advise and assist you in relation to your workplace investigation, with a view to preparing correspondence to be sent to Mount Isa City Council." On the evidence, it is clear to me that the solicitor engaged by the Applicant, was engaged for the sole purpose of giving one 15-minute advice session as the Applicant described it. That was confined to advising on correspondence relating to the above-mentioned investigation, not these proceedings or the dismissal that inspired them. Indeed, the brief engagement predates the dismissal. I therefore find that the services provided by the solicitor were not such that the solicitor could be described as the Applicant's "representative" in these proceedings. By the time of the dismissal, the very brief engagement of the solicitor had ended and the solicitor was no longer acting for the Applicant. On the Applicant's own evidence, I find that there was no representative acting for the Applicant at the time of his dismissal or during the period of time that the limitation period ran its course. That finding is fatal to the argument of representative error. It cannot be accepted that the Applicant was entirely blameless for the delay. This is a long way from being one of those cases where the applicant put their matter in the hands of a solicitor or other representative who, whilst holding those instructions, failed to advise on or file the proceedings within the relevant time limit. The Applicant's submission regarding representative error must be rejected.