Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council (No.2)

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QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council (No.2) [2024] QIRC 240

PARTIES:

Mutonhori, Simon
Applicant

v

Mount Isa City Council
Respondent

CASE NO:

GP/2024/20

PROCEEDING:

Application for extension of time

DELIVERED ON:

4 October 2024

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

Pratt IC

On the papers

ORDER:

1.     The application for an extension of time to file that part of the application that relates to dismissal is refused.

2.     That part of the application that relates to dismissal is dismissed.

3.     That part of the application that relates to suspension from duties may proceed to further directions.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – GENERAL PROTECTIONS – EXTENSION OF TIME – where applicant was a manager employed by the respondent – where applicant made bullying allegations – where applicant suspended by respondent – where respondent advised the applicant there were allegations of misconduct against him – where the respondent substantiated the allegations against the applicant – where respondent dismissed applicant – where applicant alleges the suspension and the dismissal were each a breach of general protections – where application relating to the dismissal was filed prima facie out-of-time – consideration of extension of time under section 310 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) – whether pursuing other remedies in different proceedings, filing incorrectly, a respondent defending its position or being unaware of the law are exceptional circumstances regarding whether to extend time – where applicant also alleges representative error – held, no representative error and no exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of time – application to extend time for the dismissal component of the claim refused.

LEGISLATION:

CASES:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 285(1)(a)(ii), s 310, pt 1 ch 8

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 366(2)

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541

Christine Smith v Express Excavation QLD Pty Ltd [2015] FWC 2436

Clark v Ringwood Private Hospital (1997) 74 IR 413

Davidson v Aboriginal and Islander Child Care Agency (1998) 105 IR 1

Dickson v Mornington Shire Council [2020] QIRC 106

Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC 89

Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 [2007] FCA 388

Long v Keolis Downer [2018] FWCFB 4109

Naidoo v Scenic Rim Regional Council [2024] QIRC 134

Nichols v State of Queensland (Department of Transport and Main Roads) [2023] QIRC 182

Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 975

Robinson v Interstate Transport Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 2728

Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd (t/as Richmond Oysters) [2018] FWCFB 901

Thornton v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2020] QIRC 393

Reasons for Decision

  1. This is an application for an extension of time for the filing of the substantive matter by Mr Mutonhori ('Applicant'), who was employed as Manager, Environment, Regulatory Services and Land Use with the Mount Isa City Council ('Respondent'). The Applicant was suspended and was then dismissed from that position. He subsequently filed proceedings alleging various breaches of the general protections provisions contained…

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Details
Case
[2024] QIRC 240
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council (No.2) involved a dispute between an employee, Mutonhori, and his employer, Mount Isa City Council, over allegations of bullying and subsequent suspension and dismissal. Mutonhori argued that his suspension and dismissal were retaliatory actions in response to his complaints about being bullied, which he claimed were protected activities under the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld). The application to the court was filed 134 days outside the prescribed 21-day time limit for such applications, raising the issue of whether an extension of time should be granted under section 310 of the IR Act.

The court had to determine whether the delay in filing was due to exceptional circumstances that warranted an extension. Mutonhori argued that there was no representative error and that he had pursued other remedies in different proceedings, which caused the delay. The Council opposed the application for an extension, arguing that these circumstances did not constitute exceptional reasons under the statute.

The court considered the statutory limitation periods and previous cases where similar applications for extensions were denied. It held that filing in the wrong jurisdiction, pursuing remedies elsewhere, or misunderstanding the limitation period did not constitute exceptional circumstances. The court also rejected Mutonhori's claim of representative error, finding that his solicitor was not acting as his representative in these proceedings at the time of the dismissal. The court concluded that Mutonhori was not blameless for the delay and that extending time in this case would be unfair to other applicants who had similar delays but were denied extensions.

Accordingly, the application for an extension of time was refused. The dismissal component of Mutonhori's claim was dismissed, while the part of the claim relating to the suspension could proceed. The court's decision underscored the importance of adhering to statutory time limits and the need for fairness in applying the discretion to extend time.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time to file that part of the application that relates to dismissal is refused.

2. That part of the application that relates to dismissal is dismissed.

3. That part of the application that relates to suspension from duties may proceed to further directions.

Background

Background to the litigation

The application was filed on 24 May 2024. The dismissal took effect on 20 December 2023. Section 310(1)(a) of the IR Act relevantly provides that applications of this nature must be filed within 21 days after the dismissal took effect. Not counting the day of the dismissal itself,[1] the application needed to be filed on or before 10 January 2024 if it was to be filed within the prescribed time limit. The application was filed on 24 May 2024, which is 134 days outside of the prescribed time limit. The Respondent opposes the granting of extra time.[1] Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s 38(1).Relevant background The essence of the Applicant's claim is that his suspension and dismissal were each carried out because of complaints that he made about being bullied. I surmise the Applicant alleges that those complaints were the exercise of workplace rights pursuant to the IR Act, and that his suspension and dismissal therefore contravened section 285(1)(a)(ii) of the IR Act. The Applicant commenced working for the Respondent after signing a contract on 7 July 2023. On or around 8 November 2023, the Applicant complained that he had been bullied in the workplace. The complaints, broadly speaking, can be summarised as challenging the policy concerning the recruitment of staff, questioning management enquiries of staff working with the Applicant about the Applicant's conduct, alleging unreasonable demands to produce a comprehensive report in a short timeframe despite having a heavy workload, alleging mishandling by the Respondent of a disciplinary process initiated by the Applicant against another employee and alleging that management was not supporting the Applicant's work. On 15 November 2023, the Respondent instructed the Applicant to undertake alternative work while it investigated his complaints. At that stage, the Applicant was advised that there were some allegations made against him, which would be elaborated on in the coming days. The Applicant declined to undertake alternative work and, on 16 November 2023, the Respondent advised the Applicant by letter that he would be stood down until the completion of an investigation into his complaints because he declined to undertake the alternative work. On 17 November 2023, the Respondent wrote to the Applicant inviting him to show cause in relation to allegations which can be broadly summarised as:a.Allegation One – directing staff to disregard practices that they are required to follow by legislation, personally disregarding duties and responsibilities of the Applicant's position and engaging in bullying behaviour. Examples of such instances included directing staff to abandon the use of a particular form for certifying compliant asbestos management, several times directing an employee to euthanise animals with a firearm knowing that the employee was not licenced to do so and that doing so was in contravention of legislation and a Workplace Health and Safety Queensland Prohibition Notice regarding the same, incorrectly dealing with the execution of a lease and being dismissive of concerns regarding same and stating in a discussion about limits to his authority that he had authority to do what he liked;b.Allegation Two – engaging in bullying, the particulars of which were, in summary, pressuring staff to not impound cats and dogs, but rather, to classify them as "feral" animals so they could be euthanised immediately, instructing employees to shoot impounded animals and becoming agitated when they refused on the basis of stating that it was unlawful to do so unlicensed, making snide remarks about an employee's age and yelling aggressively at an employee causing significant distress;c.Allegation Three – refusing to follow reasonable directions from management, the particulars of which can be summarised as responding to a request to report on an animal management facility by saying that doing so was a waste of time, that the Applicant was not there to pander to the person requesting the report and refusing to provide another report regarding local laws;d.Allegation Four – attempting to procure a firearm to unlawfully euthanise impounded animals, the particulars of which can be summarised as texting an employee seeking that he provide his firearm to another council employee in order for that other employee to euthanise animals where that other employee was not appropriately licensed, had not been trained appropriately and no risk assessment had been carried out;e.Allegation Five – soliciting unlicensed individuals to euthanise impounded animals, the particulars of which can be summarised as directing an employee to euthanise animals on 13 October 2023 and expressing disappointment with that employee when he refused and, on 14 October 2023, directing another employee to euthanise dogs and cats where that employee was not licensed to do so and in circumstances where the Applicant was alleged to have described it as a "covert operation" and requested that employee not tell senior management;f.Allegation Six – euthanising animals in breach of the relevant procedures and legislation, the particulars of which can be summarised as having euthanised animals over the weekend of 14 and 15 October 2023 in breach of the Biosecurity Act 2014;g.Allegation Seven – unreasonable management action taken by the Applicant against a particular employee, the particulars of which can be summarised as reprimanding in a threatening and aggressive manner an employee for statements that the employee made at a team meeting regarding the correct procedure for dealing with impounded animals.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I cannot accept the Applicant's submissions as to taking a holistic view of the fairness as between the Applicant and others in similar cases. The test to be applied is whether it would be unfair to persons in a similar position to the Applicant who have had their applications for extension of time refused. As the Respondent has pointed out, there are many instances where applicants have misunderstood which jurisdiction to file in, or not appreciated the time limitation period, or the nuances of the law around what they should allege and where they should file their claim. Those applicants had their applications for extra time refused in similar circumstances to the Applicant. It would be unfair to those applicants to allow extra time in this case where their applications were refused in similar circumstances. Accordingly, this part of the Applicant's submissions must be rejected.Conclusion The application as it relates to the suspension is within time. However, as it relates to the dismissal, the blame for this application being filed outside of the statutory time limit lies entirely with the Applicant. There was no representative error. Pursuing alternative avenues for remedy is not an exceptional circumstance that warrants extending time. Nor is not knowing of the limitation period itself. Nor is a respondent taking up its right to a defence in proceedings pursued by an applicant other than the proceeding that is the subject of an application for an extension of time. The Applicant has failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances exist in this case. There is obvious prejudice to the Applicant in refusing an extension of time. Against that needs to be weighed the clear intention of Parliament to impose the limitation period, upon which potential respondents are entitled to rely and manage their affairs accordingly. Whilst I cannot form a view as to merit of the claim, this is a case where it is clear that it would be unfair to extend time where others in similar circumstances have had such applications refused. Weighing up all of those considerations, and for the foregoing reasons, I am not persuaded that this is an appropriate case to exercise the discretion to extend time. On that basis, I order that the application for an extension of time, as it relates to the dismissal, is refused. I order accordingly.Order1.The application for an extension of time to file that part of the application that relates to dismissal is refused.2.That part of the application that relates to dismissal is dismissed.3.That part of the application that relates to suspension from duties may proceed to further directions.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to fairness between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position, the Applicant argues that a holistic approach needs to be taken in determining fairness. He argues that granting an extension would not create a precedent or unfairness to employers in a similar position, that he gained no forensic advantage from the delay and that it was not deliberate or negligent on his part. The Respondent argues that there are no matters of fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position. As I understand this submission, the Respondent is arguing that this is a neutral consideration rather than one which swings the scales in favour of, or against, exercising the discretion.Consideration There are two distinct acts that the Applicant alleges constitute adverse action: his suspension on 16 November 2023, and his dismissal on 20 December 2023. As is plainly laid out in section 310(3) of the IR Act, the limitation period is 6 years for an application relating to adverse action taken in contravention of section 285 where that adverse action is not a dismissal. The Applicant had 6 years from 16 November 2023 to file an application alleging that the Respondent took adverse action in contravention of section 285 by suspending him. The application is therefore plainly within time insofar as it relates to whether the Respondent took adverse action in contravention of section 285 by suspending the Applicant. However, as noted above, a general protections application relating to dismissal must be filed within 21 days of the dismissal taking effect. I accept that filing in the wrong jurisdiction or pursuing remedies elsewhere, misunderstanding the nature of the remedies available to the Applicant when filing the above-mentioned matters, or not knowing there is a limitation period, do not constitute "exceptional circumstances" that would warrant the exercise of the discretion in this case. I have had regard to the authorities referred to by the Respondent and I follow the same approach set out in those cases I have mentioned above on this issue. The pursuit of alternative proceedings by the Applicant, to the extent that doing so caused the Applicant to delay filing these proceedings, does not constitute an exceptional circumstance. Nor does the Respondent exercising its right to take up a defence. That is did so in those other proceedings is irrelevant to this issue in my view. As to the representative error argument, I have had regard to the solicitor's cost agreement that the Applicant has attached to his materials. I note that the date of that cost agreement is 16 November 2023. The dismissal was issued on 20 December 2023. I note also that the solicitor's cost agreement defines the scope of work as "advise and assist you in relation to your workplace investigation, with a view to preparing correspondence to be sent to Mount Isa City Council." On the evidence, it is clear to me that the solicitor engaged by the Applicant, was engaged for the sole purpose of giving one 15-minute advice session as the Applicant described it. That was confined to advising on correspondence relating to the above-mentioned investigation, not these proceedings or the dismissal that inspired them. Indeed, the brief engagement predates the dismissal. I therefore find that the services provided by the solicitor were not such that the solicitor could be described as the Applicant's "representative" in these proceedings. By the time of the dismissal, the very brief engagement of the solicitor had ended and the solicitor was no longer acting for the Applicant. On the Applicant's own evidence, I find that there was no representative acting for the Applicant at the time of his dismissal or during the period of time that the limitation period ran its course. That finding is fatal to the argument of representative error. It cannot be accepted that the Applicant was entirely blameless for the delay. This is a long way from being one of those cases where the applicant put their matter in the hands of a solicitor or other representative who, whilst holding those instructions, failed to advise on or file the proceedings within the relevant time limit. The Applicant's submission regarding representative error must be rejected.